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Executive Surnmary 
Planning Ahead 
There is currently a real prospect of constitutional reform in the UK. As the general election 
nears, the Labour Party and Liberal Democrats include the same key elements in their 
programmes of reform - although they do not agree on the detail of how best to tackle them. 
These include: 
devolution to Scotland and Wales. 
reform of the House of Lords. 
freedom of information legislation. 
incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights and development of a domestic 
Bill of Rights. 
regional government in England. 
reform of parliamentary procedures. 
(at least a referendum on) electoral reform. 
The Conservative Party, although opposed to the far-reaching reform package proposed by the 
Opposition parties, acknowledges the value of gradual reform and is engaged in the 
constitutional debate. 
Debate about constitutional reform has tended to focus on the substance of reform rather than 
the means of achieving it. But if it is to be successful, it is vital that serious thinking about how 
to implement reform is begun well in advance. This is particularly true in respect of the far- 
reaching programhes of reform proposed by the current Opposition parties which, if 
implemented, will represent change at a pace and of a significance unprecedented in British 
constitutional history. If the next Government intends to pursue constitutional reform, it needs 
to start thinking about how it is going to do so now. 
Whitehall 
The success or otherwise of wide-ranging constitutional reform will depend to a significant 
degree on the effectiveness of Whitehall - Ministers and civil servants - in tackling the policy 
agenda prescribed by a reforming Government. A new party entering government will be faced 
with many important decisions that will have to be taken almost immediately: the design of the 
legislative programme for the first year; the restructuring of Whitehall departments and Cabinet 
committees to meet the objectives and priorities of the incoming government; and the 
appointment of Cabinet and other Ministers. 
Plnizlzi~ig the  Legislative Programme 
In planning the legislative programme constitutional bills will have to compete with other 
programme bills - the main constraint is the amount of parliamentary time available for the 
Government's main programme bills. 
There will be political and practical pressures to proceed at different speeds for different items 
on the constitutional reform agenda. This will depend on: the level of political commitment to a 
particular measure (and whether clear public commitments on timing have been made); the 
amount of preparation necessary; and the inter-relation with other measures. 
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A Minister in Clznrge of  Const i tut io~~al  Reform 
Within the current Whitehall structures there is no one minister with responsibility for constitutional 
matters. But reform programmes of the size and complexity proposed by Labour and the Liberal 
Democrats would need central strategic leadership from a senior Cabinet Minister, possibly a Deputy 
Prime Minister, the Lord President or Lord Privy Seal. 
The title is unimportant, what is key is that the Minister commands the support of the Cabinet 
as a whole, and has no other policy responsibilities that would require legislation, so that his or her 
sole priority in the bidding process wouId be to secure a place for constitutional reform measures. 
The provision of central strategic leadership need not supplant the responsibility of departmental 
Ministers for taking some of the individual measures through Parliament, particularly in the case 
of piecemeal legislation. The essential point here is to ensure a Minister and a body of officials 
have an overview of the whole programme, and recognise the inter-relations between 
constitutional reform measures, rather than simply providing a tactical response unit when 
specific measures run into difficulties. 
Co-ordination and the Machinery of Wkitelzall 
Government must also establish machinery which ensures high level coordination of policy 
input by all interested departments; and that the process of preparing for and legislating on 
constitutional reform are kept at the front of the Government's priorities. The structure of 
Whitehall and Cabinet committees may need to be reshaped to give the reform programme 
effect. Within Cabinet, this may be by means of a Strategic Policy Committee or by the creation 
of a new committee responsible specifically for co-ordination of constitutional matters. 
Westminster 
The time taken by constitutional measures to pass through Parliment tends to be greater than for 
other bills - in part because of their complexity and the controversy they may attract and in part 
because of the use of the committee of the whole House. 
A Con~mit tee of the Whole House 
At least five of the measures listed above are likely to be considered 'first class constitutional issues'. 
By convention such measures are considered on the floor of the House at committee stage. Most 
other public bills which have been read a second time are automatically committed to a standing 
committee. Taking the committee stage on the floor of the House allows all Members to take part in 
the debate and is intended to allow for full debate of particularly significant bills. However, a 
committee of the whole House is potentially a major pressure point for constitutional bills. 
Firstly, it brings out the confrontational and party political characteristics of parliamentary 
debate. The main weapon of the Opposition - and other opponents of a bill - is to delay progress 
through raising points of order, filibustering, and tabling numerous amendments. The size of a 
committee of the whole House offers considerable potential for delay in this manner. 
The other reason why a committee of the whole House is such a pressure point is that time on the 
floor of the House is at a premium. In a typical session a Government has between 50 and 60 
programme bills. The amount of legislative time any Government has on the floor of the House to 
deal with all these bills is around 400 hours in each session. Previous major constitutional bills have 
taken as long as 100-200 hours on the floor of the House. Assuming a desire to have a significant 
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legislative programme of non-constitutional measures, under the current system of parliamentary 
time allocation, there is likely to be time for two constitutional bills per session at the most. 
Use of the Gtlillotine 
Of course a government could decide to introduce a guillotine motion to limit time spent on a 
constitutional bill. However, guillotine motions generate considerable resentment in the House - 
they mean that large sections of a bill may receive little, or no, scrutiny - and have to be used 
with caution. Although there are precedents for the use of the guillotine on constitutional bills, 
opposition to a guillotine motion on an issue of constitutional importance will be particularly 
fierce. The use of a guillotine could damage the democratic credentials of a reforming 
Government, and serve to undermine the legitimacy and durability of the constitutional reforms 
themselves. Indeed, the only occasion since the Second World War when a Government has lost 
a guillotine motion was over a constitutional bill - the Scotland and Wales Bill 1977. 
Changes to Procedure 
Serious consideration therefore needs to be given to changes in parliamentary procedure. The 
key is to ensure that enough time is given for parliamentary consideration and that this time is 
effectively used for the scrutiny of the legislation. There are essentially two different areas in 
which alternative procedures, or reform of existing procedures, could ease the passage of a 
constitutional bill whilst meeting demands for adequate scrutiny: 
to take some stages of a bill off the floor of the House by using another committee forum. 
to alter the control of time, either by limiting the amount of time which can be spent on a bill 
or by removing some of the constraints on time. 
Three proposals which would achieve these aims are: 
partial referral of bills to a standing committee; which would reduce the amount of time that 
a bill takes on the floor of the House, but allow full debate in a standing committee. 
advance timetabling of all bills; which would ensure that all parts of a bill were looked at and 
minimise incentives for filibustering. 
selective use of carry over; which would mean that the time spent debating a bill in one 
session would not be wasted if the bill did not complete its passage in that session. 
Part of a Package of Parliamentary Reform 
Changing parliamentary procedure simply to facilitate or enhance the quality of a constitutional 
reform programme is potentially a high risk strategy. The political nature of parliamentary procedure 
means that changing the rules that govern the game is fraught with coneoversy. Any Government 
initiating procedural change must be content to live with those changes when in Opposition. It is 
important that changes in parliamentary procedure are part of a wider process of parliamentary 
reform which is coherent and desirable in its own right. Reform of parliamentary procedure has 
a relevance which goes beyond constitutional bills and there is no shortage of suggestions for 
ways in which the workings of Parliament could be improved. The desire to secure the passage 
of a large legislative programme should therefore be seized as an opportunity to implement 
wider parliamentary reforms. 
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Consultation, Consensus and Inquiry 
There is a strong expectation that constitutional reform be based on broad public and cross- 
party consultation. If there is the necessary political will, and party unity can be assumed or 
manufactured, there is every reason to regard the Whitehall-Cabinet Committee route as the 
most efficient way of developing policy. But getting legislation on the statue book is not all. 
'Efficiency' also includes making constitutional reforms endure beyond the lifetime of a 
particular government: coherence and legitimacy are equally important. 
Bene3ts of Consultation 
Those interested in embarking on constitutional reform in the UK this century have nearly 
always attempted to engage with other political parties and consult outside of political elites. 
The benefits of consultation can be that it: 
produces more widely acceptable policy and technically accurate legislation. 
allows for the strength and nature of opposition to be assessed. 
provides a means for building support for a measure. 
educates the public and MPs about the issues involved. 
lends weight and authority to the position the government takes. 
Mixed Success 
However, history also shows that few attempts at consultation have resulted in legislation which 
had cross-party support. In some cases failed efforts to achieve consensus may even have 
hindered the passage of the legislation. This can be because consultation: 
is usually entered into as a defensive act, resorted to only when the usual political channels fail. 
produces compromises which are unworkable in legislation. 
identifies and entrenches opposing views. 
forces a government onto the defensive. 
provides a focus for opposition to a measure. 
makes the government look indecisive and directionless. 
Mechanisms 
The absence of any fixed procedure for constitutional amendment means that there is a range of 
vehicles that might be used. There are essentially three categories of consultation: 
building political consensus e.g. inter-party talks, an approach which is particularly suited to 
tackling issues where the balance of political power is at issue. 
calling in the experts e.g. a constitutional commission, a forum appropriate for dealing with 
measures which require technical expertise and where there is no firm policy commitments 
to detail. 
e public consultation e.g. referendums, desirable where a clear demonstration of wide electoral 
support is needed to secure the legitimacy of a measure, or as means of providing a degree of 
entrenchment. 
The key determinant of success in choosing a vehicle for consultation or inquiry is to have 
clearly identified and feasible objectives. 
4 D E L I V E R I N G  CONSTITUTIONAL R E F O R M  
The need for preparation 
Successful implementation of a constitutional reform programme will be difficult, but it can be 
done. Tackling the volume and complexity of the legislation whilst ensuring coherence and 
adequate consultation will require political will, as well as careful and innovative thought. This 
is not an argument against embarking on constitutional reform, it merely underlines the value of 
identifying the practical problems and seeking solutions to them at the earliest possible point. 
Introduction 
"The huge obstacles impeding constitutional 
refom in this country are well understood ... by 
anyone who remembers the political shambles of 
previous attempts to rnodernise the British 
Constitution. The obstacles could be overcome, but 
only by a very rare combination of political 
commitment, imagination, broad-mindedness, 
acumen and good luck. " 
Anthony Lester, 'Can We Achieve a New Constitutional 
Settlement?, Reinventing Collective Action, 1995 
) DELIVERING CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
1 There is currently a real prospect of constitutional reform in the UK. As the general election 
nears, the Labour Party and Liberal Democrats include the same key elements in their 
programmes of reform - although they do not agree on the detail of how best to tackle them. 
Both parties make proposals for devolution to Scotland and Wales; reform of the House of 
Lords; freedom of information legislation; incorporation of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and development of a UK Bill of Rights; regional government in England; reform of 
parliamentary procedures; and (at least a referendum on) electoral reform. The Conservative 
Party, although opposed to the far-reaching reform package proposed by the Opposition parties, 
acknowledges the value of gradual reform and is engaged in the constitutional debate. This level 
of interest in constitutional change has brought it into mainstream political debate. 
2 The Constitution Unit is an independent research project, conducting a technical inquiry into the 
implementation of constitutional reform. The Unit aims to identify the practical steps involved in 
putting constitutional reforms in place and to seek solutions to the difficulties a reforming 
government may face. Our starting point is the policy agendas set out by the main political parties. 
3 The implementation of specific reforms - devolution to Scotland and Wales, regional 
government in England, reform of the  House of Lords, the introduction of human rights 
legislation - will be considered in detail in separate Constitution Unit reports. This report sets the 
scene for those issue-based reports by considering the constitutional, political and historical 
context in which constitutional reform will take place - and the procedure and processes for 
achieving such reform. Debate about constitutional reform has tended to focus on the substance 
of reform rather than the means of achieving it. As Professor Rodney Brazier argues "no political 
party or any  other group has stopped to think about the appropriate methodology of 
constitutional reform".' 
4 The report starts from the position tha t  such thinking is vital well in advance of the  
implementation of constitutional reform if it is to be successful. This is particularly true in 
respect of the far-reaching programmes of reform proposed by the current Opposition parties. In 
advising on the best ways to secure effective, coherent and legitimate constitutional reform, the 
report's notional audience is the members of any Government intent on implementing 
constitutional reform, and their advisers. Such a Government would certainly need to be 
committed and determined. However, if there is a single message of this report it is that if the 
next government intends to pursue constitutional reform, it needs to start seriously thinking 
about how it is going to do so now. 
5 The report looks ahead to the process of implementing constitutional reform - in Whitehall, 
Westminster and beyond. It looks first at  the forces which will drive and shape the reform 
process: the historical and constitutional framework for reform (Chapter 2). The report then 
considers how well Whitehall is equipped to deal with a significant number of constitutional 
reform measures, and what changes might be needed to enable the system to deal more 
effectively with such a programme (Chapter 3) .  Drawing on the experience of constitutional 
change in the UK this century, the report next examines the parliamentary passage of 
constitutional bills (Chapter 4) and considers what changes to parliamentary procedure might 
provide for more constructive and efficient consideration of constitutional measures. Finally, the 
report considers the mechanisms that might be used to build consensus or ensure consultation 
around constitutional reform, looking at UK and international experience (Chapter 5). 
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6 The appendicies have a more historical focus. Appendix A provides a reference guide to the 
preparation and parliamentary passage of key constitutional measures during the twentieth 
century, set out in table form. The history of constitutional reform in Britain will inform any 
future attempts at reform - not least because of the failure of the last Labour Governments to 
secure reform of the House of Lords and devolution to Scotland and Wales. The absence of a 
written constitution also means that historical precedent and constitutional conventions weigh 
heavily in preparing and legislating for constitutional reform. Throughout the report, the history 
of constitutional reform is therefore examined in relation to specific proposals; in drawing on 
this past experience of constitutional reform, potential obstacles are identified and suggestions 
made for ways of overcoming them. These tables provide a quick reference guide in a form not 
available elsewhere. The second part of the historical analysis is an account of previous attempts 
a t  reforming parliamentary procedure (Appendix B). This is included because the report 
identifies the need for changes in procedures as one of the essential preconditions for successful 
constitutional reform. But changes to procedure can be almost as difficult to action as 
substantive constitutional change: here too it is vital to learn the lessons from past successes 
and failures and to plan ahead. 
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Con s titutional 
Change in the UK 
"All constitution 
political p u q  
s are in essence political. They are born of 
?ose, they describe political facts, and they 
depend upon political acceptance. " 
Robert Blackburn, Humon Rights for the 1990s, 1989 
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Introduction 
7 If implemented, the packages of reforms proposed by the Labour Party and Liberal Democrats 
will represent change at a pace and of a significance unprecedented in British constitutional 
history. The existing legislative process has never had to cope with such a transformation; nor 
do we have any entrenched institutional or procedural mechanisms for handling constitutional 
change on this scale. Successful implementation will therefore need careful and innovative 
thought to accommodate the  volume and complexity of the legislation whilst ensuring 
coherence and adequate consultation. This chapter examines the constitutional context in which 
reforms will taka place and considers the historical forces which will shape the process. 
8 Unlike most modem states, the UK lacks an identifiable constitutional document or group of 
documents setting out the basic principles and institutions of its system of government.2 An 
amalgam of statute and common law, conventions and tradition, the UK's 'unwritten' 
constitution is infuriatingly difficult to pin down. Moreover, having avoided both invasion and 
full-scale revolution for several centuries, constitutional change in the UK has tended to be an 
ongoing and evolutionary process, typified as much by creeping changes in practice and 
convention as by statutory provision. 
9 The proposed programme of reform breaks with this tradition, setting out to reform the many 
central tenets of our constitution if not in one fell swoop, certainly in a decade or less. This 
raises the questions of how a Government could, and (more importantly) how it will be expected 
t ~ ,  go about implementing change on this scale. The flexibility of the British constitution means 
that there are few unquestioned rules about how to go about implementing constitutional 
reform, but in practice the process will be shaped by constitutional conventions, historical 
precedents and political pressures. 
Constitutional Principles 
10 Not only does the UK lack a written constitution, but it is also near impossible to identify a 
coherent set of principles on which the UK's constitution is founded. Even where principles can 
be identified, there may be little consensus over their continuing relevance or value. 
1 1  The essence of traditional liberal constitutionalism has generally been regarded as "a system of legal 
limitations on governmental powerW3, predicated on the importance of the protection of individual 
rights. This has applied in the UK as much as in those countries with written constitutions, but 
whereas the UK has relied on the force of common law and convention to secure both limitation 
and protection, others have developed sets of constitutional rules and structures to perform the same 
role - layers of representation, federalism, separation of powers, checks and balances. The absence 
of political and public familiarity with concepts such as these reflect what Nevi1 Johnson described 
as "the atrophy of any language in which we can talk of constitutional issues, of rules or of the 
principles of public law ..... we are left floundering in a world of pure pragmati~m."~ 
12 Nevertheless, each of the three main political parties has articulated its own set of constitutional 
principles, with varying degrees of specificity. 
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Conservative Party 
1 3  The Conservative Party reaffirmed earlier this year their commitment to the maintenance of the 
Union: "We stand four square for the Union. For the monarchy. For the independence and 
strength of Britain. In Disraeli's immortal phrase, the programme of the Conservative Party is to 
maintain the Constitution of our CountryW.5 Despite rejecting the Opposition parties' proposals 
for devolved governance in Scotland, Wales and the English regions, the Conservative Party has 
introduced limited changes to institutional structures - both through legislation e.g. the Single 
European Act and the Maastricht Treaty; the abolition of the GLC and metropolitan counties in 
the 1980s, and the more recent reorganisation of local government in England, Scotland and 
Wales, and by administrative means e.g. the establishment of Next Steps Agencies and the 
Government Offices for the Regions, and the recent commitment to make greater use of the 
Scottish and Welsh Grand Committees. Nor is the Conservative Party opposed in principle to 
constitutional innovation, as the process of talks, and recent proposals for elections, in Northern 
Ireland have demonstrated. 
Labour Party 
14 The Labour Party declares in the new Clause 4 of its own constitution that "we work for ... an 
open democracy, in which government is held to account by the people; decisions are taken as 
far as practicable by the communities they affect; and where fundamental human rights are 
guaranteed". The 1993 Conference Paper A New Agenda for Democracy gives the fullest account 
of the  Labour Par ty 's  specific proposals fo r  constitutional change identifying a new 
constitutional settlement "which establishes a just relationship between society and the 
individual, one which above all, fundamentally redresses power in favour of the citizen from the 
state". Earlier this year in the John Smith Memorial Lecture, Tony Blair reaffirmed the Labour 
Party's commitment to a wide-ranging constitutional reform programme. 
Liberal Democrats 
15 The Liberal Democrats have stated their goals as "empowering individual citizens, limiting executive 
dominance and enhancing governmental effectiveness". They also question long-standing 
constitutional doctrines: "The mechanical reassertion of the Sovereignty of Parliament remains the 
stock-in-trade of most politicians. Yet this concept is ever more outdated and irrelevant ... Similarly, 
the rule of law as set out by Dicey is primarily concerned with the supremacy of the legal order. Few 
question the need for such supremacy within a democracy. Yet after generations of increasing 
executive power, it is the nature of that order ... that ought to be at the forefront of the debate on 
constitutional government."6 The Liberal Democrats have long supported a comprehensive 
programme of constitutional reform, which includes more detailed and, in some cases, more radical 
commitments than those proposed by the Labour Party. These commitments are included in the 
1993 Federal White Paper Here We Stand. Unlike the Labour Party, the Liberal Democrats aim at the 
eventual production of a written constitution codifying the changes. 
16  In addition to advocating conformity to a set of principles or ideals, many constitutional 
reformers lay emphasis on the means by which constitutional change is achieved, stressing the 
importance of internal coherence between various reform measures; cross-party and public 
consultation; and for long-term objectives to take precedence over short-term party political 
advantage. All these factors reflect the belief that stable and sustainable reform can be secured 
only by means which are both legitimate, and are not regarded as procedurally oppressive. The 
history of constitutional change this century reveals that there have been repeated attempts to 
achieve cross-party agreement on constitutional issues before legislation, and there will certainly 
be pressure in the future to build support for constitutional change outside of the party of 
government. As Tony Wright MP argues, "there could scarcely be a starker indictment of the 
British version of adversarial politics than the failure to construct a cross-party consensus 
around the transparent need to reform the political system itself, or even to develop the kind of 
mechanisms whereby such reform could be a d ~ a n c e d . " ~  
17 It is the Liberal Democrats who, of the main political parties, come closest to subscribing to this 
approach, with their commitment to the use of advisory referendums and the creation of a 
Constituent Assembly to draft a written constitution. Both the Labour Party (with its proposed 
referendum on the electoral system for the House of Commons) and the Conservatives (in 
planning for a referendum on the future of Northern Ireland) also acknowledge the utility of 
referendums as a means of establishing consent for major constitutional change. 
The Political Constitution 
18 The short answer to 'how could a Government go about implementing constitutional reform?' is 
that it could do so in the same way as it implements any other government decision - through 
changes in legislation, practice and convention - provided only that it secured a simple majority 
in each House of Parliament in support of any legislative measures introduced. The doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty which has dominated constitutional thinking in Britain holds that 
Parliament can enact any law it chooses confident that it cannot be challenged in the courts. 
This means constitutional laws have the same status as any other legislation and are passed by 
the Houses of Parliament in the same way. The House of Lords could in theory be abolished, or 
adult males disenfranchised, by the same means as legislation to introduce dog licenses. 
19 Parliamentary sovereignty could of course be swept aside if the political will to do so existed; and the 
establishment of the supremacy of European over domestic legislation - and to a lesser extent the 
operation of the European Convention on Human Rights - have to some commentators already made 
the overthrow of parliamentary sovereignty a reality. But in practice and in political mythology, the 
force of the docbine remains and will inevitably surface in any debate about constitutional reform. 
20 There are two important effects that result from this: because neither executive nor legislature 
are required to pass over special procedural hurdles to enact constitutional legislation, all a 
Government requires is a simple parliamentary majority; however, because it cannot bind itself, 
or any future Parliament, to the decisions it makes, Parliament has no established means of 
entrenching constitutional legislation and safeguarding it against future change. Any check on 
constitutional change (and hence any safeguards against change and then reversal of change) is 
primarily political rather than procedural. 
21 This lack of procedural restraints is in contrast to those countries with a written constitution, 
where legislating for constitutional change has to conform with specific formal procedures - 
although some would hold that the political restraints in the UK are no less binding than the 
restraints imposed by written constitutional provision. Such provisions generally stipulate that 
the passage of constitutional legislation requires some form of special majority - either in the 
legislature (as in France and Germany), or in some federal states from the individual states 
belonging to the federation (as in the USA and Canada) - or change may require ratification by 
the electorate, either at a general election or in a referendum (as in Belgium, Australia and Eire). 
What these procedures have in common is that they require constitutional change to be 
endorsed by a wider constituency than the political party temporarily in power and, as far as 
possible, ensure there is consensus supporting the change. 
22 Establishing a fixed, formal procedure for constitutional change involving a requirement for 
super-majorities, multiple approvals or referendums provides an important safeguard against 
partisan revision of the fundamental elements of the con~t i tut ion.~ But one effect of formal 
procedures for constitutional change can be inflexibility. In the USA, for example, the Constitution 
provides for the initiation of proposals for constitutional amendment by a two-thirds vote of both 
houses of Congress and then ratification by majority votes in the legislatures of three-quarters of 
the states (or by popular conventions in three quarters of the member states). An alternative step 
for initiation of proposals for amendment is by way of a constitutional convention, which can be 
convoked by Congress on the demand of the legislatures of two-thirds of the states. The difficulties 
in building such extraordinary legislative majorities in Congress at the initiation stage have meant 
that amendments to the Constitution have been rare. Moreover, the agreement of the states has 
been difficult to obtain in recent years - for example on the Equal Rights Amendment ratifications 
stalled at 35 states, three short of the necessary 75%. 
23 In Britain, constitutional history suggests that the absence of formal mechanisms for determining 
constitutional change has enabled a degree of innovation that is not available to other countries 
more fettered by formal rules on constitutional amendment. The scope for flexibility and 
adaptability inherent in the British system of government is best displayed by the variety of 
mechanisms used to generate consensus building and conciliation in Northern Ireland - from the 
border poll of 1973, through the Constitutional Convention of 1975, the Atkins Constitutional 
Conference of 1980, and the more recent moves towards inter-party talks, bilaterals and the 
proposal earlier this year from the Prime Minister for an elected all-party assembly. 
24 On the other hand, the theoretical flexibility of the British constitution is not always reflected in 
practice. The implicit assumption of the UK constitution is that proposed legislation to change 
the constitution is illegitimate unless the political elite as a whole is agreed on it (although in 
fact almost every successful constitutional reform measure this century has been passed by 
Parliament in the face of some opposition). This assumed need for consensus is seen most clearly 
in the repeated, abortive attempts since the turn of the century to resolve through inter-party 
talks the question of the appropriate composition and powers of the House of Lords. 
25 In addition, there is an innate conservatism in British politics which means that any attempt at change 
will be resisted by at least some members of Parliament and sections of the media and electorate on 
the grounds that there is no need to tamper with a constitution that has "served us well". Defined 
procedure for constitutional reform would at least acknowledge the legitimacy of broaching the 
question of constitutional change. Furthermore, the process of defining such a procedure - and so 
defining what is 'constitutional' - would start to remove the mystique (and lack of awareness) 
surrounding the UK's 'unwritten' constitution which discourages informed constitutional debate. 
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26 This leaves the question of how a Government will be expected to go about constitutional 
reform. Although there are no formal procedures with which constitutional measures have to 
conform in the UK, there are precedents that will inform and political pressures that will be 
brought to bear. Historically, therefore, constitutional measures have been regarded as distinct 
from ordinary legislation. There are two main reasons for this: the political environment and 
constitutional conventions. 
27 The specific political factors are difficult to control or predict. What is certain is that it will not 
be possible to isolate the constitutional reform programme from wider political debates and 
there will be trade-offs within the programme as well as across into other policy areas.9 Some of 
the key factors are considered below: 
28 The size of the Government's majority and the actions of the smaller parties. If the Labour 
Party were to win the next general election the size of its majority will obviously dictate its 
room for manoeuvre. The Liberal Democrats may prove to be useful allies for the Labour Party, 
whether as partners in a coalition government or through more informal agreements. However, 
they will want to extract a price for their support, most probably on the question of endorsing ' 
proportional representation. Given the Liberal Democrats' commitment to the preparation of a 
written constitution by a Constituent Assembly and enthusiasm for advisory referendums and 
citizens' initiatives, they are also likely to push for a fuller package of reform and wider 
consultation than the Labour Party may feel comfortable with. Paddy Ashdown has also insisted 
that "these changes should not be seen as piecemeal, but as a comprehensive programme, 
hanging together as a whole - the centrepiece of which should be a modem Great Reform Billw1o 
- a n  approach which appears to have been rejected by Tony Blair." The difficulties of 
maintaining united back-bench support for a programme of reform may be exacerbated by 
tensions within both parties about co-operation. 
29 The political will behind constitutional reform. In terms of political handling, there may be 
temptations to avoid confronting some constitutional shibboleths, such as the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty, by introducing minimalist reforms e.g. incorporating the European 
Convention on Human Rights but not providing for it to be judicially protected. And with any 
government, thoughts will not stray for long from the prospect of future electoral success. Five 
years to the next general election will not seem that long and there are local government and 
the European Parliament elections to consider too. The Labour Party's collective memory of the 
failure of attempts to introduce devolution in the seventies and to reform the House of Lords in 
the sixties may provoke a cautious approach to constitutional reform, and not all members of 
the Parliamentary Labour Party are fully committed to the reform programme - one of the 
reasons for proposing a referendum on proportional representation, for example, was to avoid 
splits within the party. 
30 The strength of the Opposition (official and back-bench). History reveals how difficult it is to 
achieve support for constitutional measures within a single party, let alone a broader consensus 
across the parties and with the wider public. Past attempts at constitutional reform have more 
than once been undermined by the Government's own back-benchers and on occasion the 
political pressures associated with constitutional measures have caused traditional party 
discipline to collapse and forced Governments to adopt novel procedures such as the 
referendums on membership of the Common Market and devolution for Scotland and Wales in 
the 1970s. This 'political' dimension demands delicate handling - failure to contain intra-party 
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disputes will certainly harm the Government and may put constitutional reform on hold 
indefinitely. 
3 1 Constitutional conventions, are, by their very nature, usually more predictable. Described as "a 
whole code of political maxims, universally acknowledged in theory and universally camed out 
in practjce", which reflect a "positive political morality",12 conventions exert a powerful 
influence. This makes them difficult to disregard even where the Government has the numerical 
strength to do so: for example, convention dictates that constjtutional change requires 
legislation in order that Parliament is able to have its say - even where in theory changes could 
be introduced by use of the royal prerogative e.g. removal of hereditary peers' rights to attend 
the House of Lords. Subsequent chapters attempt to identify these conventions and to assess 
their continuing force. 
Public Opinion 
3 2  In addition to the political environment and constitutional conventions, public opinion will also 
be an important factor shaping the process of constitutional reform. 
3 3  There is certainly growing public interest in what are undoubtedly constitutional issues, and 
dissatisfaction with current political arrangements (as last year's Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust 
H MORI State of the Nation survey demonstrated), but neither is generally expressed in explicitly 
constitutional terms. The obvious exception to this is  Scotland where the debate about 
devolution is rarely out of the press and few members of the public remain ignorant about it. 
3 4  There is also a degree of confusion over exactly what is meant by some apparently popular 
constitutional measures. For example, the Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust 8 MORI survey 
suggested that a Bill of Rights was supported by 79% of the population, but when asked to rank 
in order of preference the rights that should be protected, the preservation of defendants' right to 
silence (protected under most human rights charters, including the ECHR) won favour from only 
32010, whilst the overwhelming "winner" was the right to hospital treatment on the NHS within a 
reasonable time, with 88%. Constitutional reform is dense and complex stuff, with few outside 
the political elite interested in following every twist and turn. A process of public education 
(with little immediate prospect of electoral reward) is therefore likely to be necessary if the 
public is to feel a sense of 'ownership' of the reforms. 
Historical Precedents 
35 The constitutional history of the UK and other countries will inform and may even circumscribe 
future attempts at reform. Banting and Simeon make this point forcefully: "History and tradition play 
a central role in guiding the process. Each country seems to have developed its own language and 
style of constitution-makjng which often have an astonishing continuity over long periods of time."'3 
36 The role of history in the debate on constitutional reform in the UK is twofold. First, the relative 
stability of our constitutional arrangements suggests to some that there is an historical 
! 
- - -. -  - - 
- 
[ D E L I V E R I N G  CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
- - .  
inevitability about evolutionary reform and that more radical shifts are inherently likely to fail. 
Moreover, the very longevity of certain institutions or arrangements is seen by some as a reason 
to preserve them. As the Chairman of the Conservative Party explained earlier this year, 
"Conservative opposition to radical constitutional reform is not an arcane attachment to the 
archaic. It is recognition that the experience of generations; the accumulation of wisdom and 
practice over the centuries is a better and safer way of safeguarding liberty than the trendy 
theories and instant modem solutions of lawyers, academics or even ...p oliticians."'4 Second, the 
history of constitutional reform (and in particular the failed attempts at reform) are seen as 
providing compelling precedents and cautionary warnings for would-be reformers. It is this 
second point that particularly concerns us here. 
37 As Roy Foster has pointed out, in the context of the evolution of Anglo-Irish relations, "those who 
quote history do so because they believe history - or their version of it - is on their side."'5 Politics 
is, of course, inextricably bound up with the assessment of historical evidence and there is every 
reason to expect that historical analogies or precedents will be brought up to defend or reject 
particular constitutional reform proposals. Throughout the report, historical precedents are referred 
to illustrate the backdrop to reform and to assist in identifying the conventions that govern the, 
passage of constitutional reform measures. Appendix A offers a factual summary of the key features 
of 17 key constitutional reform measures this century. The factors identified in each case include: 
e manifesto commitment; 
e the nature of any pre-legislative consultation or inquiry; 
the Government's parliamentary majority and date of the general election; 
the Minister responsible for the Bill; 
the parliamentary procedure adopted; 
the parliamentary time taken; 
e the use of a referendum. 
38 The measures are chosen as representing the high points of constitutional reform and as broadly 
illustrative of the variety of ways in which constitutional reform has been initiated and secured - 
or not. 
They are: 
o Parliament Act 19 1 1 
e Representation of the People Act 19 18 
0 Government of Ireland Act 1920 
e Parliament Act 1949 
e Life Peerages Act 1958 
(P Peerage Act 1963 
e Parliament (No.2) Bill 1968-69 
e European Communities Act 1972 
e Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973 
o Referendum Act 1975 
Scotland and Wales Bill 1977 
o Wales Act 1978 
Scotland Act 1978 
e European Assembly Elections Act 1978 
e Local Government Act 1985 
e European Communities (Amendment) 
Act 1986 
e European Communities (Amendment) 
Act 1993 
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Conclusion 
39 In approaching the task of constitutional reform it is vital to understand the interplay between 
the political, practical and constitutional frameworks. Adherence to a set of constitutional 
principles and commitment to democratic means of decision making can never on their own 
deliver the comprehensive constitutional reform proposed by the Opposition parties. The 
argument made here, and in subsequent chapters, is that the political and practical frameworks 
(and the hurdles to reform inherent in the parliamentary process) must be acknowledged and 
addressed. As Ferdinand Mount has pointed out, "lt is the political struggle rather than the 
pursuit of good government which ultimately decides rulers and ruling classes whether or not to 
drive through or give in to proposals for r e f ~ r m . " ' ~  
40 Finally, whilst the inability of our current political and constitutional arrangements and attitudes 
to accommodate rational debate and constructive co-operation is one of the strongest arguments 
behind constitutional reform, the process of implementing that reform is going to have to take 
place within that failing system. This was recognised by the late John Smith, when Leader of the 
Labour Party, in his 1993 lecture A Citizen's Democracy: "it's very hard to make a constitution , 
change when you're living in the constitution at the moment ... when you're actually carrying on 
the process of government under one set of norms and institutions and trying to change into 
another." Constitutional reform may be difficult, but it can be done. That constitutional reform is 
difficult is not an argument against embarking on it, but it certainly underlines the importance of 
identifying the practical problems and seeking solutions to them at the earliest possible stage. 

Whitehall 
"A reform minded prime minister once 
elected must take the lead in making 
change happen and keep at it until change 
is achieved. Unless that is done, little o j  
serious value will result. The lesson of 
history, here at least, is uncontestable. 
From Gladstone through Lloyd George via 
Wilson and Heath to Thatcher, the 
message is plain: unless the individual in 
No. 10 wants it and presses for it, 
Whitehall will adapt but it will not shif." 
Peter Hennessy, Whitehall, 1989 
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41 The success or otherwise of wide-ranging constitutional reform will depend to a significant 
degree on the effectiveness of Whitehall - Ministers and civil servants - in tackling the policy 
agenda prescribed by a reforming Government. A new party entering government will be faced 
with many important decisions that will have to be taken almost immediately: the design of the 
legislative programme for the first year; any restructuring of Whitehall departments and Cabinet 
committees to meet the objectives and priorities of the incoming Government; and the 
appointment of Cabinet and other Ministers. This chapter highlights the ways in which the 
machinery of Whitehall can be designed to serve the interests of a Government committed to 
constitutional reform; it also explores the process of drafting constitutional legislation and how 
bills can be constructed to ensure that parliamentary proceedings are both efficient and effective. 
The Form o f  Legislation 
Comprehensive or Piecemeal Legislation 
42 In the UK, constitutional reform has traditionally been undertaken in a piecemeal fashion, with 
the single limited exception of the Scotland and Wales Bill 1976-7. Tony Blair has indicated that 
the Labour Party does not intend to deviate from this approach: "The ambition and the extent of 
the programme I have set out will not be achieved in one bill, but over a period of time."'7 
43 However, not all reformers envisage constitutional change being implemented in this way. The 
Liberal Democrats promise a Great Reform Bill incorporating the main features of their 
constitutional reform programme - reform of the House of Commons and House of Lords, 
devolution to Scotland and Wales, establishment of English regional assemblies, reform of 
quango appointments - alongside a smaller Declaration of Rights Bill incorporating the ECHR 
and introducing a Bill of Rights. (It should be noted that the namesake of the Liberal Democrats' 
Bill, the Great Reform Bill of 1832, did not attempt multi-institutional reform but was concerned 
only with the extension of the electoral franchise, resulting in an increase in the total number of 
voters from 500,000 to 800,000 and the redistribution of seats.) 
44 There are conceptual attractions in the approach advocated by the Liberal Democrats, in that it 
allows all measures to be considered together and their inter-relationships to be fully taken into 
account. Such a 'big bang' approach might have the potential to capture the imagination of the 
public and MPs alike, establishing a commitment to the package as a whole and serving to 
maintain momentum for the process of reform. The legislative process for a Great Reform Bill 
would be identical to that applied to more piecemeal constitutional measures, and would have 
the benefit of limiting the time taken up during a Parliament on securing parliamentary 
approval for constitutional legislation. 
45 But it would take some time for a bill to be prepared, if the inter-relationships between the 
different reforms are to be fully explored in the legislation and sufficient detail were to be 
included to satisfy Parliament, for example, the arrangements for the reformed electoral systems 
of the House of Commons and House of Lords proposed by the Liberal Democrats. Politically it 
would be a considerable feat to achieve all this at once. It would require a consensus supporting 
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reform within the party or parties of government, and arguably with parties outside government, 
which at the moment does not exist. Past experience shows that even single issue constitutional 
bills take up a considerable amount of parliamentary time; a Great Reform Bill might reduce the 
overall time needed to introduce all the various measures, but would require the best part of the 
time available on the floor of the House of Commons in one parliamentary session to see it 
through all stages of consideration, squeezing out most other programme bills. Particularly 
difficult would be limiting opposition to such a bill. Different groupings of Government back- 
bencher~ and official Opposition parties opposed to individual elements could work together to 
confound a wide-ranging constimtional bill, even if there were elements which they supported, 
as happened in the case of the Scotland and Wales Bill in 1977-78, and the Maastricht Bill (the 
handling difficulties are illustrated at paragraphs 80-85). 
46 A 'big bang' programme of reform - such as the Great Reform Bill proposed by the Liberal 
Democrats - would require changes to the procedures and structures that underpin the legislative 
process, and both Whitehall and Westminster would expect legislation of this sort to be drafted 
in detail, not broad declaratory terms. It is not impossible, but such an approach would need an 
effective and co-ordinated Cabinet which understood and supported the change;  an 
accommodating Parliament; and a strong political player to push the whole thing through. 
47 A variant on this 'big bang' legislation approach is Charter 88's proposal for a paving motion to 
be passed at the beginning of a reforming Parliament: "Such a motion simply sets out what the 
House of Commons intends to do. The promise could include three things: a set of principles for 
establishing a framework of reform; the legislation to be passed in the subsequent four years; and 
the intention to establish a special Constitutional Grand Committee to oversee the legislation."ls 
Such an approach could similarly serve the purpose of establishing the strength of commitment 
and a momentum for reform, and would be procedurally feasible. It would also provide a clear 
statement on intent. But there are limitations to the effectiveness of this approach. The passage of 
such a 'paving motion' would itself take up parliamentary time and is likely to be controversial if 
it is seen in any way to undermine parliamentary sovereignty by attempting to bind Parliament 
to future action i.e. a commitment to legislate for the constitutional reform agenda. In addition, 
the only way such a motion could bind Parliament would be in a political sense. 
The Level of Detail 
48 A further question on the form of legislation is the level of detail required in constitutional 
legislation. The Government of Ireland Act 1920 and the Scotland Act 1978 present two very 
different approaches to drafting constitutional legislation - the first essentially a framework 
enabling document which identified the powers that would be retained at Westminster; the latter 
a detailed text which enumerated all the powers devolved to the proposed Scottish Parliament 
and exceptions to these powers. There are no immutable rules governing the style of legislative 
drafting; decisions on how detailed legislation is to be will depend on the length of time 
available for preparation, the likely political backdrop against which the legislation will be 
considered and the style of legislation which is most likely to ease its operation in practice. 
49 Consideration could even be given to whether a new style of drafting might be deployed, 
drawing on the European style of legislation which is concerned with establishing the principles 
of policy in legislation, leaving the wider questions of detail to judicial interpretation. But even 
if this appeals as a concept, it is highly unlikely to prove politically acceptable or practicable for 
1 D E L I V E R I N G  CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
constitutional legislation in the immediate future, given that it would represent a major shift in 
the role of Parliament. Whether such a shift proves politically acceptable or practicable depends 
on the commitment a Government attaches to the issue and the parliamentary majority (and 
wider support) available to it. 
Influencing the Draft Bill 
50 Legislation is drafted in such a way as to limit - but not avoid - parliamentary opposition; in 
Lord Thring's aphorism "Bills are made to pass, as razors are made to sell". As the Renton 
Committee Report on the Preparation of Legislation noted, "If there are conventions of drafting 
which are thought to limit discussion and increase the chance of getting Bills passed they will be 
used."lg The longer a bill and the greater the length of individual clauses, the more likelihood 
there is of effective opposition, so bills will usually be kept to the minimum length possible 
where any controversy is anticipated. Parliamentary Counsel will also always aim to draft 
legislation in such a way as to limit the possible range of amendments (paying attention to the 
parliamentary rules governing the admissibility of amendments - which have to be relevant to 
the specific purpose of the bill.) 
51 But these procedures are directed only at the efficiency of the process from the Government's 
perspective, not at enhancing the effectiveness of parliamentary scrutiny. An additional means 
of potentially limiting parliamentary opposition to constitutional bills, whilst simultaneously 
offering greater opportunities for scrutiny, would be to publish bills in draft. Objections and 
queries could be raised at  this stage and amendments made where the Government accepted the 
force of the argument; where it did not, the planning of the parliamentary passage might be 
facilitated by forewarning of where objections were likely to be most vociferous. The Law 
Commission could be invited to give technical consideration to draft bills and Parliament would 
be able to conduct a pre-legislative review of proposed legislation. This would, however, add to 
the length of time before the formal introduction of a bill. 
52 Parliamentary pre-legislative inquiries could take two forms: the consideration of a draft bill 
prior to introduction into Parliament or as the first stage of a parliamentary procedure after 
formal introduction. The Hansard Society Commission on the Legislative Process, for example, 
proposed the establishment of committees of around 12 members for all bills which would 
consider evidence and agree a report which would "draw attention to ambiguities in meaning, 
apparent problems in application or implementation, possible consequences and other practical, 
technical or drafting points".20 In addition to powers to call for individuals, first reading 
committees might usefully have powers to call for papers and records, like select committees. 
53  One example of a detailed pre-legislative investigation is the select committee which examined 
the issue of direct elections for the European Parliament. This might be a way of handling an 
issue in the session before it is planned to introduce legislation - especially in relation to a 
measure that is not subject to clear party political divisions e.g. the content of a UK Bill of 
Rights, where the issue of principle was already resolved. 
54 Pre-legislative parliamentary committees are a means of focusing consultation on building 
parliamentary support. However, the key potential problem with pre-legislative committees is that they 
could become the focus for party politics and split along predictable lines with little scope for 
accommodation or compromise. The particular benefit of allowing examination of a draft bill is that it 
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is sd l  at a stage where it could be revised withm Whitehall, rather than having to make the necessary 
amendments as part of the parliamentaq process. This process has been used with the Environment 
Act 1995 and was felt to provide a usem forum for discussion. There is however a considerable lead 
time required if a draft bill is going to be changed before formal introduction and in some cases it may 
be difficult for a draft bill to be prepared one session in advance of inb-oduction (not to mention that it 
would delay the commencement of a new Government's legislative programme). 
Planning the Legislative Programme 
55  After a general election, the planning of the legislative programme (which normally starts at the 
end of the year prior to the next parliamentary session) has to be telescoped into a much shorter 
period of time than usually available to a Government. An incoming Government will have to 
decide quickly which measures it can prepare in time for its first session, and refer to in the 
Queen's Speech without giving apy hostages to fortune. In planning the legislative programme, 
departments put in bids for bills to be included in the programme and constitutional bills will 
have to compete with other programme bills - the main constraint is that there only around 60 
days available for the Government's main programme bills on the floor of the House of 
Commons (see paragraph 87-92 below). In choosing which bills are to be included, consideration 
will be given to their length and complexity, state of preparedness, the controversy they are 
likely to cause and the balance of the programme as a whole. 
56 There will be a few non-constitutional bills categorised as essential in every session - principally 
Money Bills and bills required to meet international obligations. In the first session of the next 
Parliament, contingency arrangements will need to be made for accommodating any legislation 
which may result from the current Inter-Governmental Conference and the discussions on the 
future of Northern Ireland, both of which would need to be given priority over main programme 
bills. Each of these would be a major constitutional bill. Any programme also has to be 
sufficiently flexible to include unforeseen bills, for example to remedy serious deficiencies 
revealed by judgements in the courts. 
57 In terms of its overall legislative programme, an incoming Government will have wide-ranging 
expectations to meet. It is going to be looking ahead to the assessments of its first year in 
government and will want to be able to show action on key issues such as employment, law and 
order, education and health. Even if these are only indications of the approach to be taken, 
paving the way for more substantial future change. Whatever the political hue  of the  
Government and their level of commitment to constitutional reform, such measures will be one 
set of policy commitments amongst many. Constraints on what can be fitted into the legislative 
programme mean that constitutional reform measures will have to compete with these other 
policy commitments. Lord Irvine of Lairg, Shadow Lord Chancellor, cautions that, "the danger of 
constitutional overload of the parliamentary timetable has to be recognised and resisted .... There 
are those whose affection for constitutional change in general or their own hobby horses in 
particular is so great that they are blind to all the demands for legislation across every area of 
policy that a Labour government will face."Z1 
58 All of these factors mean that under the current system of parliamentary time allocation there is 
likely to be time for at the most two constitutional bills per session. 
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There will be political and practical pressures to proceed at different speeds for different items 
on the constitutional reform agenda. This will depend on: the level of political commitment to a 
particular measure (and whether clear public commitments on timing have been made); the 
amount of prepsration necessary; and the inter-relation with other measures. In addition to 
commitments to specific measures, and on timing, political priorities may be determined by the 
perceived need to address institutional bias against the party or its political interests. Reform may 
be pursued because it is a prerequisite to, or integral part of, a broader political agenda. For 
example, one of the reasons driving reform of the House of Lords in 1949 was that the 
Government wanted to get iron and steel nationalisation through before the end of the Parliament. 
Political priorities may also encourage a Government to confine the reform agenda as far as 
possible to a piecemeal and minimalist approach, tackling what can be done, when it can be done. 
Scottish and Welsh devolution are an example of where a clear public commitment has been 
made by the Labour Party on timing - promising legislation within a year of entering office - 
and, especially in the case of Scotland, there has been significant preparatory work. There is the 
work of the Scottish Constitutional Convention to draw upon and an incoming Government could 
be in a position to publish an early White Paper on this subject. However, the experience of the' 
1970s shows how long it can take to settle the details of the policy and to draft a bill (with a 
dedicated team of 30 civil servants it took two years and nine months in the case of the Scotland 
and Wales Bill). For other measures, such as electoral reform or a UK Bill of Rights, where no 
political commitment has been made to detail or to the timing of implementation, and where 
there is no one clear model advocated by those in favour of change, a more open consultation 
process, with greater independence from Government, might be appropriate. 
The Liberal Democrats have also offered some illustrative legislative timetables in their policy papers 
which indicate that implementation of the reforms set out in their Great Reform Bill would be 
phased, but in a recent speech Paddy Ashdown argued that "these changes should not be seen as 
piecemeal, but as a comprehensive programme, hanging together as a whole - the cenbepiece of 
which should be a modem Great Reform Bi11."22 
There is nothing sacred about the existing process for planning the legislative programme. 
However, it would require an enormous amount of political will, strategic input and innovative 
thinking to plan and implement the legislative programme in anything but the normal way of 
picking off each item on the agenda one by one and balancing competing interests. 
Moreover, bringing in the whole programme of constitutional reforms at once risks bringing 
normal government activity to a grinding halt. This is unlikely to be a price worth paying unless 
an immediate crisis undermines the authority and legitimacy of the constitutional status quo to 
such an extent that sweeping and immediate change becomes unavoidable. Even a "gradualist" 
approach to reform will require careful consideration of the knock on effects of a particular 
reform. For example, reforming the House of Lords to create a more credible second chamber 
(whether through nomination or election) could have a significant effect on the second 
chamber's willingness to observe a self-denying ordinance in terms of its powers to delay 
subsequent legislation. It may also be difficult to predict the behaviour of the existing House of 
Lords once it knows it is going to face reform. On the other hand, creating a Scottish or Welsh 
Parliament with legislative powers should reduce the workload in Westminster - but the 
beneficial effects will take a while to work through, and the quantum reduction may be small. 
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The Cabinet and Machinery o f  Government 
64 Whether the programme of reforni is introduced by way of 'big bang' or through a series of 
more limited measures, the personal standing of individual Cabinet Ministers and levels of 
support within the party can have a significant part to play in securing space for legislative 
measures in the main programme. There is at present no one department to bid for constitutionai 
bills. If the current arrangements are preserved, responsibility for policy on key constitutional 
matters would be spread between a range of Ministers - the Scottish and Welsh Secretaries 
(devolution), the Environment Secretary (English regional government), the Chancellor of the 
Duchy of Lancaster (freedom of information). 
65  The Home Secretary has policy responsibility for the largest number of constitutional issues 
(domestic human rights policy, electoral matters, royal matters and reform of the House of 
Lords) and following restructuring in the Home Office, a new Constitutional Unit has been 
created to take charge of these issues as part of a new Constitutional and Community Policy 
Directorate. However, any Home Secretary is likely to want to introduce legislation in one or 
more of the many policy areas the Home Office covers - criminal justice, prisons, immigration - 
and will have to balance these with the demands of constitutional reform measures. 
66 Given the capacity for internal tensions inherent in the spread of constitutional matters across 
different departments, and the significant degree of coherence between measures that will be 
required for the reforms to be effective, it is clear that the structure of Whitehall (and Cabinet 
committees) may need to be reshaped to give effect to the reform programme. Within Cabinet, 
this may be by means of a Strategic Policy Committee of the sort proposed by Peter Hennessy23 or 
by the creation of a new committee responsible specifically for co-ordination of constitutional 
matters. The reform programme might be made the special responsibility of a senior Minister such 
as a Deputy Prime Minister, the Lord President or Lord Privy Seal. The title is unimportant, what 
is key is that the Minister commands the support of the cabinet as a whole, and has no other 
policy responsibilities that would require legislation, so that his or her sole priority in the bidding 
process would be to secure a place for constitutional reform measures. 
67 The provision of central strategic leadership need not supplant the responsibility of departmental 
Ministers for taking some of the individual measures through Parliament, particularly in the case 
of piecemeal legislation. The essential point here is to ensure an overview of the whole 
programme, recognising the inter-relations between constitutional reform measures, not simply to 
provide a tactical response unit for when specific measures run into difficulties. 
68 Decisions about which Minister should lead on a given bill may have a significant impact on the 
success of a measure. Conversely, the transfer of a Minister to other responsibilities can have a 
negative impact (as with Richard Crossman's replacement by James Callaghan as lead Minister 
on the Parliament No. 2 Bill to reform the House of Lords); and the personal standing and 
authority of an individual will have greater bearing on his or her ability to steer the bill through 
Parliament than any formal title or Cabinet rank. Almost without exception, the lead Minister on 
constitutional reform measures this century has been the Prime Minister or a senior Cabinet 
Minister in the House of Commons; although there is no reason in principle why a Cabinet 
Minister in the House of Lords should not take on the responsibility, it is usually considered 
preferable that the lead policy Minister is in the Commons to handle what are usually more 
difficult parliamentary  proceeding^.^^ 
69 Harold Wilson, when Prime Minister, insisted that "It is in accordance with precedent ... that any 
major legislative proposals involving major constitutional change, reform of our parliamentary 
system, the constitution and powers of another place, should be presented to the House by the 
Prime Minister of the day". But although the Prime Minister's name may appear on the First 
Reading statement, in practice, the Prime Minister more often takes on a supportive role in the 
parliamentary passage of constitutional measures. In the 17 major constitutional bills analysed 
in Appendix A the Prime Minister led in two bills, and played a supportive role in nine. The lead 
policy Minister is normally the Minister to introduce the measure at second reading, supported 
by a junior Minister from the same department or Cabinet Minister from another department 
directly involved. 
70 In Whitehall, the creation of a central agency under the CO-ordinating Minister will be critical. 
At the time of the Labour Government's devolution reforms in the 1970s, a Cabinet Office Unit 
of around 30 staff was used to support the policy making and legislative processes. The Home 
Office Constitutional Unit might appear an attractive base on which to build; but as outlined 
above, the Home Office's other policy responsibilities mean that a Home Secretary may not be 
best placed to bid for constitutional legislation. An alternative to a discrete unit within an 
existing Whitehall department would be the creation of a new department that took on 
constitutional reform - perhaps as part of the Ministry of Justice proposed by the Liberal 
Democrats. The creation of a new department would however take time to set up and it to 
establish its authority and identity within Whitehall. 
71  Another key limitation will be the limited resources of the 36-strong Parliamentary Counsel, 
who draft all primary legislation - even if this number were supplemented it would take time for 
newcomers to develop the necessary expertise. The comments made by the Renton Committee 
Report on The Preparation of Legislation (now over 20 years old) remain valid: "The legislative 
process is the main instrument of political change in our rapidly changing democracy, but it has 
for many years been incapable of efficiently meeting the demands placed upon it. Serious 
defects of the process include the shortage of Parliamentary Draftsmen and the resulting 
pressure imposed upon them. Until that shortage is overcome and the pressure reduced, the 
instrument will become ever more inadequate and ineffective, and political change will continue 
to be made under stress, in some confusion and with unwelcome res~lts."~5 
Conclusion 
72 The effectiveness of Whitehall - both Ministers and civil servants - will be a key determinant in 
the success of a constitutional reform programme. A new party entering government will have 
to take a series of important decisions very quickly and unless prior thought is given to these 
issues there may not be time at that point to devise arrangements to accommodate the volume 
and complexity of the legislation required. 
73 Constitutional measures will have to compete for a place in a wider legislative programme and the 
time available in Parliament will be severely limited. A major reform programme will therefore need 
central strategic leadership from a senior cabinet Minister. Such a Minister must command the 
support of the Cabinet as a whole and his or her priority must be to secure a place for constitutional 
reform measures in the legislative programme. In addition, a central unit or department in Whitehall 
responsible for co-ordination will be critical to give effect to the reform programme. 
Westminster 
"...major constitutional measures which affect the 
whole balance of power in the State, the balance of 
power between different interests in  the country, are 
matters that are resolved only by party 
Governments who know their own minds and are 
determined to carry tlzrough their leading reforms 
without conceding to oppositions of the day the 
requirements they may press. The whole history of 
this great coun ty  supports my view ..." 
Michael Foot MP. House of  Commons, Officol Report, 
3 February 1969, co1.85 
Introduction 
74 This chapter reviews the rules and precedents that govern the parliamentary passage of 
constitutional bills. Looking in turn at the House of Commons and House of Lords, it considers 
alternative ways in which a Government intent on constitutional reform can best ensure the safe 
passage of constitutional reform measures through Parliament whilst having regard to: 
the importance of public and cross party consultation. 
constitutional and parliamentary conventions. 
the desirability of informed parliamentary scrutiny and debate. 
the need for legislation to be workable and durable. 
competing legislative priorities. 
The key to achieving this objective is to ensure that enough time is given for parliamentary 
consideration and that this time is effectively used for scrutiny of the legislation, not filibuster. 
Procedure in the House o f  Commons: Standard Procedures 
75 Bills may be introduced into either House, but the controversial nature of constitutional bills means that 
they are likely to originate in the House of Cornmons.26 One factor underlying this convention is that the 
Parliament Acts do not apply to legislation introduced in the House of Lords and the House of Lords would 
therefore be able to operate a veto on any legislation introduced there; Governments have accordingly 
tended to protect their position by introducing constitutional measures in the House of Commons. 
76 Most public bills which have been read a second time are automatically committed to a standing 
committee unless the House decides otherwise.27 The House may decide to commit a bill to either: a 
committee of the whole House; a select committee; a special standing committee; or a joint committee 
of both Houses.28 Alternatively, the Member in charge of a bill may move that parts of it be committed 
to a committee of the whole House with the rest being considered by a standing cornmittee.29 By 
convention, 'first class constitutional issues' are committed to a committee of the whole House.30 
Committee of the Whole House 
77 Referring a bill to a committee of the whole House is intended to allow for h l l  debate of particularly 
significant bills and a broader form of discussion than a standing committee is perceived to offer. A 
committee of the whole House is also used for non-controversial bills which attract little or no 
debate, and for the speedy passage of bills required urgently. Taking the committee stage on the 
floor of the House allows all Members to take part in the debate. 
78 A committee of the whole House is potentially a hostile arena for constitutional bills. It brings out the 
confrontational and party political characteristics of parliamentary debate and the Opposition will 
exploit any controversy surrounding a bill. Controversy itself does not normally endanger 
Govemment legislation. In most cases a Government will get its bills through, but it may nonetheless 
be damaging. The price the Opposition extracts is the loss of parliamentary time which the 
Government could have used to get other legislation through. The main weapon of the Opposition - 
and other opponents of a bill - is to delay progress through raising points of order, making lengthy 
speeches ('filibustering'), and tabling numerous amendments. The size of a committee of the whole 
House offers considerable potential for delay in this manner. If a bill is unamended in a committee of 
the whole House there is no report stage and the bill goes directly to a third reading.31 As this reduces 
the time spent on a bill and the potential for damaging defeats, it is in the Government's interests not 
to make or accept amendments in a committee of the whole House. 
79 A further problem the Government may face in a committee of the whole House is controlling 
Opposition from its own back-benches. The nature and significance of constitutional changes 
mean that the Government may not be able to rely on the whips' normal powers of persuasion 
to keep its back-benchers in line. Even if some degree of cross-party consensus were achieved 
there is the danger that a cross-party alliance will be built amongst those back-benchers who 
oppose any constitutional change and possibly with those who see proposed changes as not 
going far enough (as happened with House of Lords reform in 1968-69). The problems of 
containing back-bench dissent are essentially political rather than procedural. In the event of 
back-bench Opposition, the role of the smaller parties will be crucial. In terms of parliamentary 
procedure it may be enough that they support the principle of a bill, as opposed to its detail. 
80 A recent indication of this role was seen during the passage of the European Communities 
(Amendment) Bill 1994 (more commonly referred to as the 'Maastricht Bill'). The Liberal Democrats 
supported the Bill in principle and whilst they voted against the Government on specific 
amendments, they supported procedural votes allowing the Govemment on several occasions to 
extend debate after 10 p.m. and to move the closure. The struggle to get the Maastricht Bill 
through Parliament is a good example of the tactics which can be used when a bill is taken in a 
committee of the whole House.32 The Bill itself was very short - three clauses amended to eight - 
but the passage of the Bill stretched over 15 months and inflicted considerable damage on the 
Government. The Government suffered one outright defeat and was forced to accept other 
amendments and to avoid procedural motions which it did not dare put to the vote. 
81 The Conservative rebels first sought to delay the Bill as a bargaining chip and in the hope that 
external events, such as a negative referendum result elsewhere in Europe, would overtake the 
debate. Second, they tried to force a referendum, in the hope that public opinion would be on 
their side. Third, they tried to force amendments which would render the Bill unacceptable to the 
Govemment and, they hoped, cause the Government to abandon the Maastricht Treaty. 
82 It was this third tactic which produced the possibility of the Opposition parties combining with the 
rebels to defeat the Government. This alliance was based on the two sides believing that their 
actions would have different effects. Although the Opposition parties wanted to see the Treaty 
ratified, they wanted to reverse the Government's opt-out from the Social Chapter.33 The 
Conservative rebels hoped that inclusion of the Social Chapter would make the Treaty unratifiable 
either on technical grounds (because it would contradict the Protocol which the UK Government 
had agreed on the Treaty)34, or because the Treaty would no longer be acceptable to the 
Government. The Labour Party wanted to reverse the Social Chapter opt-out on principle and 
believed that inclusion would not prevent the Government ratifying the Treaty. The Government 
managed to get round this in the end by accepting a Labour Party amendment requiring a vote on 
the Social Chapter before ratification, but delaying the vote until after the Bill had been passed. 
83 Although unwilling to destroy the Bill completely, the Labour Party was determined not to miss a 
chance to inflict political damage on the Government. The passage of the Maastricht Bill was 
therefore slow and difficult; only being completed after 185 hours of debate and over 600 selected 
amendments (more were put forward). The Conservative back-bench rebellion gathered strength as 
the Bill moved through the House (32 Conservatives abstained or voted against the government on 
the 'paving motion' compared to 46 at the third reading). The Government relied on Opposition 
votes to defeat key motions, such as the one proposing a referendum, and at times relied on the 
Liberal Democrats to win procedural votes e.g. to sit through the night. 
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84 In the Lords, the Government faced further Opposition from a group of senior ex-cabinet rebels 
led by Baroness Thatcher. The Government took the unusual step of imposing a three line whip 
for a vote on a referendum - the issue on which Opposition in the Lords had focused. 
85  Once the Maastricht Bill had finally completed its passage through Parliament, the government 
still had to win the vote on the Social Chapter. This was in fact two votes; one on a Labour 
Party amendment preventing ratification without the Social Chapter and the second on a motion 
to 'note' the Government's opt-out. The Govemment won the First vote 317-316, but lost the 
second 324-3 16. The Prime Minister then turned the policy on the Social Chapter into a question 
of confidence. The Government won this vote 339-299 (with only one Govemment abstention).35 
86 The theoretical justification for taking a bill in a committee of the whole House is that it allows all 
Members to participate; thus it is a more appropriate forum in which to deal with particularIy 
significant measures. It is debatable how far this reflects reality. In practice, attention is focused on 
broader political questions (effectively providing a continuation of the second reading debate by 
other means) and there is little opportunity to consider details or more practical questions. Debate 
tends to be dominated by a small minority of Members, although the debate on the floor of the ' 
House ensures that a greater number of Members become aware of the issues being debated. The 
proceedings have a high public profile, but the Government is unlikely to make concessions unless 
there is a real possibility of defeat. The Opposition is left with the weapon of delay; but this is only 
really effective if the Government is facing Opposition from its own back-benchers. Without such 
Opposition, the Govemment is likely to impose a guillotine, possibly leaving large sections of the 
bill undebated and hrther compounding the lack of scrutiny. 
Time Constraints and the Use of the Guillotine 
87 In the House of Commons in particular, the time available for legislation imposes a major 
constraint on the government. In any one session a Govemment normally introduces between 
50 and 60 measures of greatly varying complexity and length (constitutional and non- 
constitutional). The amount of time any Government has to deal with these programme bills on 
the floor of the House of Commons is limited to around sixty days in every session, given that 
time also has to be set aside for Opposition Days, Estimates Days, Service Debates, and so on. As 
the figures in Table 1 show, this means that in each session the Government has around 400 
hours to get its main programme bills through Second Reading, committee stages taken on the 
floor of the House, report and Lords amendments. 
Table 1 Average amount of time spent on Government Bills on the 
floor o f  the House of Commons 
total hours of sitting 1 582 1 468 1 374 69 6 1 934 
hours on Government Bills 465 373 338 189 61 3 
010 time on Government Bills 29.4 25.4 24.6 27.1 31.7 
Source: Sittings Reform and the Jopling Report, House of Commons Research Paper 94/96, 8 September 1994. 
1991-2 was a short session and 1992-3 a long session because of the election in April 1992. 
88 The estimate of parliamentary time is a crucial factor in determining the place of a measure in 
the legislative programme, but it is difficult to predict with any accuracy. The use of filibustering 
and delaying tactics mean that the length of time taken is not necessarily a useful indicator of 
the complexity of a measure, but rather of the extent of controversy surrounding an issue. The 
focus of controversy may not always be readily apparent to the Cabinet or to Whitehall in 
advance, and may also be instigated by the media rather than by parliamentarians. The time 
taken by constitutional measures tends to be greater than for other bills (in part because of the 
levels of controversy and in part because of the use of the committee of the whole House) and 
can affect the introduction and passage of other legislation. 
89 Analysis of the time taken to get major constitutional bills through the House of Commons 
(Table 2) illustrates how a major constitutional bill can dominate a parliamentary session and 
severely limit the amount of other legislation the Government can deal with. As is also clear 
from this table, in cases where the Government believes progress on a major bill is being 
unnecessarily delayed it may decide to introduce a "guillotine motion" (formally, an allocation 
of time motion) to curtail debate. 
Table 2 Time spent in consideration of previous constitutional bills on 
the floor o f  the House of  Commons 
Constitutional Measure Hours spent on the floor o f  the House 
- - - 
Parliament Act 191 1 169 
(guillotined) 
Representation of the People Act 191 8 220 
(not guillotined) 
Parliament Act 1949 20 in 1947; 11 in 1949 
(passed under Parliament Act 191 1) 
Parliament (No 2) Bill 1969 8 5 
(abandoned after 79 hours in committee) 
European Communities Act 1972 223 
(guillotined) 
Scotland and Wales Bill 1976 124 
(abandoned after 93 hours in committee) 
Scotland Act 1978 158 
(guillotined) 
Wales Act 1978 107 
(guillotined) 
Local Government Act 1985 42 (1 76  hours in standing committee) 
(guillotined in standing committee) 
European Communities (Amendment) Act 1993 185 
(not guillotined) 
Source: Hansard. See Appendix A for further details 
90 Guillotine motions generate considerable resentment in the House and have to be used with 
caution. This is because one consequence of a guillotine motion is that large sections of a bill 
may receive little, or no, scrutiny. It is important that the Government is not perceived to have 
stifled proper democratic debate and a Government promising "wider democracy: better 
government-36 would be particularly vulnerable to criticism of this sort. The price could be 
damage to the democratic credentials of a reforming Government, and serve to undermine the 
legitimacy and durability of the constitutional reforms themselves. 
91 Although there are precedents for the use of the guillotine on constitutional bills, Opposition to a 
guillotine motion on an issue of constitutional importance will be particularly fierce. Indeed, the only 
occasion since the Second World War when a Government has lost a guillotine motion was over a 
constitutional bill. After 94 hours of debate in a committee of the whole House the Government tried 
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to guillotine the original Scotland and Wales Bill 1977. Once the motion was defeated the Leader of 
the House concluded that there was no prospect of the Bill reaching the statute book in reasonable 
time and abandoned the Bill. In the subsequent separate bills for devolution to Wales and Scotland in 
1978, the Government successfully moved guillotine motions after just one day's debate, an 
unprecedented step to take at such an early stage of a major constitutional This was possible 
partly because of the Lib-Lab pact, but also because by then the rebel back-benchers had realised that 
defeat over devolution could bring the Government down. 
92 Since December 1994 and the formal agreement to adopt voluntary timetabling as a regular 
practice under the Jopling reforms, there have been no guillotine motions. However, the 
effectiveness of these voluntary arrangements is widely held to be the result of the uncontroversial 
legislation introduced during this period. In previous years, there has been a significant level of 
advance agreement through the 'usual channels', avoiding the situation in Australia where most 
bills face a guillotine. But the prospect of significant constitutional legislation after the next 
general election and the adversarial positions already adopted by the Conservatives on the one 
hand and the Opposition parties on the other, means that both voluntary timetabling and 
agreement through the usual channels are likely to be impossible over constitutional measures. Thk 
guillotine is therefore likely to be used with greater frequency and the quality of scrutiny 
decreased, unless alternative mechanisms for controlling time can be agreed upon. 
Procedure in the House o f  Commons: Alternative Procedures 
93 There are essentially two different areas in which alternative procedures, or reform of existing 
procedures, could ease the passage of a constitutional bill whilst meeting demands for adequate 
scrutiny. The first is to take some stages of a bill off the floor of the House by using another 
committee forum. The consideration of constitutional measures in a committee of the whole 
House is a constitutional convention and is not part of Standing Orders. In theory, therefore, 
alternative scrutiny procedures might be adopted. The second is to alter the control of time, 
either by limiting the amount of time which can be spent on a bill or by removing some of the 
constraints on time. Although these alternative procedures and reforms will be considered 
primarily in relation to constitutional bills, some are already used for other public bills and our 
recommendations have a relevance which goes beyond constitutional bills. 
94 It is possible to argue that it is precisely for such significant bills that alternative parliamentary 
procedures should be used. But in practice, the ability of a Government to introduce new 
procedures (whether through changing conventions or standing orders) will be circumscribed by 
the need to cany the opinion of the House with them, not least because of the desire to maintain 
goodwill on the merits of the bill. 
95  The next section outlines some of the alternative procedures which could be used and considers 
their advantages and disadvantages. The options covered are: 
Committee Procedures 
Referral to a standing committee 
Partial referral to a standing committee 
Scottish and Welsh Committees 
Special Standing Committees 
Other options 
Control of Time 
Increased use of closure 
Time limits on most, or all, speeches 
Attendance requirement 
Remove the sessional cut-off 
Advanced timetabling for all bills 
Con~mittee Procedures 
Stn~zdirlg Colnnzittees 
96 111 theory, the Government could break with convention and have a constitutional bill sent to a 
standing committee. Nearly all bills are sent automatically to a standing committee, unless the ' 
House decides otherwise. Therefore, the Government could just choose not to put forward a 
motion that a bill be referred to a committee of the whole House. However, such a motion can 
be made by any Member and the Government might face Opposition. Given the convention that 
'first class constitutional issues' are considered on the floor of the House, the Government might 
not be able to rely on its back-benchers for support. This was the case in 1968 when the 
Government considered sending the Parliament (No 2) Bill upstairs, but concluded that it would 
not be able to win a division.38 More recently, the Local Government Acts (Scot1and)and (Wales) 
1995, were sent to standing committees although as they dealt with the creation of unitary 
authorities they could well be argued to have been constitutional measures. 
97 It is questionable whether a bill is likely to receive better scrutiny in a standing committee. 
Standing committees use the same procedures as committees of the whole House and although 
not as publicly visible, are just as partisan. More of a bill tends to be considered in a standing 
committee, but this does not necessary mean greater attention is paid to detail. The scope of 
amendments which could undermine the coherence of a bill is also likely to be wider in a 
standing committee. (Formally the scope for amendments is the same in standing committees as 
in  a committee of the whole House, but in practice greater flexibility is exercised by the 
Chairman in admitting amendments in standing committees.) 
98 The composition of standing committees reflects the representation the parties have in the House 
as a whole. Members of a standing committee are selected by the Committee of Selection, but 
are, in effect, nominated by the Whips.39 To some extent this allows the Whips. to ensure that 
supporters of their front-benches are in place and makes coalitions from different ends of the 
political spectrum much more difficult. However, the Committee of Selection will note Members 
who have indicated an interest, perhaps by speaking on second reading, including those who 
may not support their party's line. The Committee of Selection has tended to avoid involvement 
in internal party disagreements, but at the same time tries to ensure standing committees 
accurately reflect the composition of the Commons. 
99 On the plus side, with up to eight committees running at the same time, the use of standing 
committees saves parliamentary time and allows the Government to deal with more legislation. 
Standing committees also tend to attract less public and media attention than committees of the 
whole House - so defeats and concessions are perceived as less damaging to the Government, 
and there is a greater willingness to meet critics half way. From a Government point of view it is 
not certain that there would be a net gain from sending a controversial constitutional bill to a 
standing committee. Although the Government continues to have a majority in a standing 
committee, because of the smaller numbers involved, the rebellion of a single Member has 
greater significance. In addition, as in committees of the whole House, opponents will attempt to 
prolong debate as much as possible and the Government is therefore just as likely to face a 
dilemma over guillotining the measure. 
Portilrl Referral to Standing Cornrnittee 
100 An alternative which might be less controversial and more effective, would be to follow the 
practice adopted for finance bills where most parts of the bill are referred to a standing 
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committee, leaving key issues to be debated in committee of the whole House. This procedure 
has also been adopted for other legislation e.g. the Sunday Trading Act 1994. 
101 Procedurally, this would require the Government to move a motion to this effect immediately 
after the second reading. In the case of finance bills, the choice of which matters should go to 
the standing committee and which should be debated on the floor of the House is effectively left 
to the Opposition. In addition to the clauses selected by the Opposition to be debated on the 
floor of the House, the Government will also select clauses it wishes to debate. This means that 
the Opposition may have to reduce the number of clauses which it has selected and-or negotiate 
the order in which the clauses are taken, in order to achieve maximum coverage of the points it 
wishes to make.40 When the bill is reported from the standing committee, the whole bill is 
considered on the floor of the House, normally at two sittings. Third reading may be taken at the 
same time or left to a separate day of debate. 
102 The question of whether it would be possible to treat constitutional bills in this way was raised 
with the then Clerk of the House in a 1946 Procedure Committee Rep01-t.~' In his view it was 
'theoretically possible; the machinery part could go upstairs and questions of principle could 
remain on the floor of the House'. If the Government does intend to split a bill in this way, this 
would have to be reflected in the drafting of the bill to allow for core issues and detail to be 
divided up easily (although drafting in anticipation is unlikely to prove an easy task). 
103 The only previous example of a constitutional measure handled in this way is the Local 
Government Act 1985, which abolished the GLC and the metropolitan counties. In this case, the 
first clause of the Bill was taken on the floor of the House, with the rest of the Bill being 
considered in a standing committee. This reduced the time spent on the bill on the floor of the 
House considerably: 41 hours were spent on stages taken on the floor of the House and 176 
hours were taken in standing committee. 
104 There are two further features which it is important to note. Firstly, the standing committee was 
exceptionally large: made up of 50 members (essentially a 'London Grand Committee'). Second, 
the bulk of the Bill was taken off the floor of the House and debated after the first clause had 
been agreed in a committee of the whole House. This is significant because if a bill is split 
between a committee of the whole House and a standing committee, the timing of the two 
debates will be important in relation to the scope of amendments allowed in the two debates. If, 
as would normally be the case, the committee of the whole House stage was taken first, 
amendments moved in the standing committee which were incompatible with what had been 
already agreed in a committee of the whole House, would not be ruled in order. 
Scottish Grand Committee 
105 The Scottish Grand Committee is made up of all MPs from Scottish constituencies. If, in the 
opinion of the Speaker, a bill relates exclusively to Scotland, the Speaker gives a certificate to 
that effect and a Minister may then move a motion to refer the bill to the Scottish Grand 
Committee for consideration of the principle of the bill, in effect its second reading. A bill 
considered in principle by the Scottish Grand Committee will go to the Scottish Standing 
Committee for its committee stage and may be referred back to the Grand Committee for the 
report stage. Referral back to the Grand Committee on report can be blocked by twenty Members 
objecting to the motion. This means that bills cannot be referred on report to the Scottish Grand 
Committee without the support of the Opposition. Recent changes to Standing Orders mean that 
Iaken in the Scottish Grand Committee at the Report stage are returned to the Scottish 
Gr;,,,d committee for 'further consideration', in effect a third reading. 
h t  be argued that the Scottish Grand Committee would be an appropriate forum for a 
,ish devolution bill. However, the Speaker is very unlikely to consider a devolution bill as 
K,;,,i,,g exclusively to Scotland and give it the necessary certificate to be considered by the 
S,a,irh Grand Committee. In addition, given the existing majority for the Labour Party in the 
rand Committee and very limited representation of the Conservative Party, the referral 
devolution bill to the Committee would almost certainly be fiercely attacked (particularly by 
SNP and the Conservative Party) as preventing proper debate. 
ttee can have bills referred to it for consideration of their principle and at 
ay to its Scottish equivalent (the most significant difference being'that 
e second reading stage can be blocked by the objections of 20  Members). 
ade up of all Welsh Members plus up to five 0thers.4~ The Committee has 
< 
le as the Scottish Committee, as there are very few purely Welsh bills, 
it has the same limitations in respect of constitutional bills. Only two bills have been referred to 
Welsh Grand Committee since it was first permitted to debate bills in 1974. 
ttish Standing Committee 
committee stage of bills relating to Scotland may be referred to the Scottish Standing 
mmittee. The Committee must include 16 Scottish Members, but this membership is supplemented 
Members from outside Scotland so that the representation of the parties is similar to that in the 
se as a whole. This is really a Scottish variation of a standard standing committee and has the 
e advantages and disadvantages as discussed in relation to standing committees above. 
appropriate to split a bill relating to Scottish devolution between a 
use and the Scottish Standing Committee with questions of principle 
sed by the House as a whole, and the details of how a devolved Scottish Parliament 
ses itself debated by the Scottish Standing Committee. There is no technical reason why this 
not be done. However, it is unlikely to be acceptable politically. The dominance of Scottish 
will be sensitive given that one of the sticking points on devolution in the past has been the 
on of Scotland in Westminster - to commit a bill on devolution to a 
ottish MPs may not be regarded as sufficiently balanced in terms of 
f the UK, and is unlikely to prove politically acceptable. 
landing Corninittees 
anding committees were formally established in Standing Orders in 1986, but had been 
o~casionally in previous sessions since their first introduction in 1980. After second 
bills may be referred to a special standing committee which is essentially a mixture 
a select committee and a standing committee. It can take oral and written evidence, 
ot more than three morning sittings in public and one in private during the 28 days 
11. Once its deliberations are complete the committee reverts to 
ike any other standing committee. To date, there has been very limited use of special 
'g committees and none has been used for a controversial measure. 
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1 1  1 From the, albeit limited, experience of special standing committees they appear to demonstrate 
the valuable role of consultation and informed scrutiny in improving the quality of legislation, 
and engaging politicians' interest. A survey of MPs who served on the first three special 
standing committees in the 1980s found that, of 37 respondents, 28 felt that the experiment had 
been "very worthwhile" and only one said it made no d i f f e r e n ~ e . ~ ~  The other point worth noting 
is the extent to which the process flies in the face of traditional partisan politics, which is not 
designed to be constructive nor to encourage independence of thought. 
1 1 2  Sir Patrick Mayhew, who claimed more experience with the special standing committee 
procedure than any other Minister, has offered the view that "it has certainly proved its worth", 
although he added the caveat that "the new procedure would be difficult to operate fruitfully in 
a Bill engendering Party controversy. There would be a strong temptation to treat the Committee 
as an arena into which party protagonists were propelled, to fight the party fight before their 
respective supporters. I do not think that, in these days, party discipline would be too strong, 
however, to deprive the procedure of all its beneficial effect, even in such a Bill." 
1 1 3  In relation to constitutional measures, the real advantage of special standing committees is th& 
through the evidence sessions, they allow for some direct input from concerned individuals and 
organisations to the legislative process. However, it is doubtful that a special standing committee 
would be an appropriate or successful means of easing the passage of a constitutional bill through 
the House, without making changes to the rules governing their operation. In particular, the strict 
time limits on taking evidence would certainly require an extension and the evidence sessions 
would need to be carefully structured to provide a range of representative views and assist the 
committee in tackling the key substantive issues. (Previous special standing committees have 
concentrated more on exposing weaknesses and inconsistencies in the drafting of a measure). 
Special standing committees may be desirable in terms of improving the way the House legislates, 
but as Government reluctance to make use of them indicates, from the point of view of managing 
Government business they do not generally facilitate the speedier, or easier, passage of a bill. 
Select Committee or Joint Comlnittee of both Houses 
1 1 4  One means of allowing more detailed examination of provisions than is possible in a committee 
of the whole House is to commit a bill to either a select committee or a joint committee of both 
Houses. This either House can do at any time in between the Second and Third Readings. This 
could be done for part or all of the bill, and would probably go to a specially created committee 
on constitutional matters rather than one of the existing Departmental Select Committees. For 
controversial bills, the use of select or joint committees may be limited by realpolitk. For 
example, referral to a select committee was suggested by the Government in 1977 when the 
Scotland and Wales Bill floundered. It was presented as a last attempt to achieve consensus, but I 
was perceived to  be more about keeping the Scotland and Wales Bill alive and hence 
maintaining the Nationalists' support. The Government insisted on a proviso that the Committee 
! 
! 
should consider the Bill within the general framework and principle which had been approved in j 
granting the Bill a second reading. The Opposition wanted wider consultation and the 
Nationalists refused even to discuss the idea. 
1 15 The advantage of such committees is that they provide opportunities for more thorough scrutiny 
and examination of the proposed measures and because of the traditional attempts to maintain a 
non-partisan atmosphere as far as possible, they are probably less likely than special standing 
committees to split along party lines. However, referring a bill to such a committee is in effect 
putting it on hold. This is unlikely to be attractive to a Government with a tight timetable for 
reform. (But it would be possible for a Government to send only part of a bill to a select 
committee or joint committee, especially if the bill were drafted in such a way as to facilitate the 
splitting of clauses in this way). There is also a tendency, perhaps quite rightly, for these 
committees to go back to examining the principles underlying a bill which a Government with a 
clear manifesto commitment to the principle of the legislation may wish to avoid. 
Control of Time 
116 One of the main objections to the use of the guillotine is that it may restrict debate on important 
parts of a bill. Other time control mechanisms - automatic timetabling of bills, changes to  the 
length of parliamentary sessions and a provision to cany measures over from one session to 
another - are potentially more effective in serving both the Government's desire to  get 
legislation through and demands for adequate and effective debate. 
111cr~nsed Use of Closure 
117 On the floor of the House, the closure requires a majority in favour and, if there is a division, 
not fewer than 100 members in the majority. In a standing committee the minimum number 
required to support a closure is the quorum of the committee (17 members or one third of the 
committee, whichever is less). The acceptance of a closure motion lies within the discretion of 
the Chair who may refuse if "it shall appear .... that such a motion is an abuse of the rules of the 
House or an infringement of the rights of the minority." Although closure was for many years a 
controversial weapon in the Government's armoury for controlling business, and its imposition 
was often opposed, it is far less rigorous a restriction of debate than the guillotine. Its use is now 
regarded as generally fair, but any extension may well be resisted, not least because its 
application could look draconian, and may involve the Speaker in controversy. It would not be 
effective, in any case, without more rigorous enforcement of time limits on speeches. 
T i n ~ e  Limits on Most, or All, Speeches 
118 Since December 1994, the Speaker has had the power to announce at the commencement of 
proceedings on any motion or order of the day that she intends to call Members to speak for not 
more than ten minutes in the debate, or between certain hours during that debate.44 Front- 
benchers have also been asked to strive to limit opening speeches to 30 minutes and their 
closing speeches to 20 minutes. There is no technical reason why time limits should not be 
imposed in respect of debates on constitutional matters in the committee of the whole House, 
although it might be difficult to impose limits on the whole debate and similarly difficult to 
predict the timing of the least controversial issues and therefore specify certain hours. It might 
also be advantageous to introduce rules limiting the number of times which an individual may 
speak in any given debate - thus preventing filibustering. In the US House of Representatives 
and in New Zealand far greater use is made of limits on speeches as a means of controlling time. 
Attendance Requirement 
119 It has been suggested that parliamentary time could be used more effectively if MPs were 
required either to attend a debate from the beginning of the clause or section on which they 
wished to speak, or even register in advance their intention to speak. But this would almost 
certainly be met with a hostile reaction from MPs and prove to be unworkable "on the ground". 
Moreover, the discipline gained through the move would not necessarily be matched by any 
increase in the quality of output or any reduction in the total time taken up. 
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the Sessional Cut-Off 
Renq J J  public bills which have not been passed by the end of a session fall, the length of sessions 
120 a 0 an important factor. There are two ways in which this could be changed: by lengthening 
is a15 
or by allowing public bills to be camed over from one session to another. 
sessl 
then ing  sessions.  There is no  set length to a parliamentary session. However, by 
12' ~ ~ ~ ' e n t i o n ,  sessions last roughly a year starting in October-November, with recesses over 
cond 
stmas, Easter, Whitsun and the Summer. The main exceptions to this are a new 
Chri nment's first session and the last session before an election, which depend on when the G ~ ~ ~ L ~  has been called. For example, if, as in 1992, the election is called in April, the last 
elect' 
.op of the old Parliament is unusually short and the first session of the new Parliament lasts 
sesS1 play until October of the following year. In theory, one way of ensuring the passage of a 
from legislative programme would be to ignore the conventions governing the length of the 
large fientary session. Other Commonwealth countries, such as Canada, conduct business in 
parlia 
.,as which cany on for several years. 
sessl 
consequence of lengthening sessions is that the proportion of parliamentary time allocated 
'22 One osition days will be reduced, as this is set at an agreed number of days per session; 
oP!ly the number of opportunities for Private Members' Bills would decrease, as under 
simila 
t rules there is only one ballot per session. Such changes would undoubtedly provoke a 
currep 
. reaction, but could be dealt with as consequential amendments to Standing Orders 
hOst'':ing the effect of previous practice. There is also the more important danger that without 
reinsfa jscipline of the sessional cut off, bills will get so bogged down that opponents will win a 
the dofatuition. On the other hand there is less to be gained from filibustering if there is no 
war 
auto8atic cut off. 
,over of bills between sessions. Canying-over public bills from one session to another 
123 Car<dornmended by Making the Law. the Hansard Society Commission's repon on the 
was live process, with qualified support in evidence from, amongst others, the First Division 
\egisla 
,jation of senior civil servants, the Study of Parliament Group and the Law Society.45 The 
ASsOeLmtation of this change would reduce the pressure on the Government's timetable, but 
imp] d not directly speed up the passage of individual bills. 
w oul 
argument in support of a motion to enable the carry-over of public bills is that the 
124 The kejnts of time and congestion are inimical to the production of good legislation. Allowing 
cons@ 
carry-over of bills from one session to another already happens in a number of other 
';@ble parliamentary systems and in respect of private bills in the UK Parliament. It would 
certainly be essential to allow for pre-legislative inquiries on published bills or more 
use of special standing committees. But it could also assist in securing the passage of 
regular bljall~ complex constitutional legislation. 
pote 
(iscipal justifications for the present cut off are: 
125 The '[it imposes a useful discipline on the government. 
o tha [the Opposition can in extrernis use delay to ensure bad legislation does not get to the 
0 tha 
~ t e  book. 
are some parliamentary procedures designed assuming an annual session, e.g. the 
0 the$ 
procedure. 
126 All of these points can, however, be addressed. Although a degree of discipline is certainly 
the results of the present arrangements are to compress the opportunities for scrutiny and 
to produce flawed legislation. If more detailed timetabling were introduced, that would provide a 
substitute discipline. The discipline argument might also be met by ensuring that carry over 
would only be permitted where certain criteria were fulfilled. The second point has less force, as 
history demonstrates that this simply does not happen; the guillotine is invariably imposed well 
before the possibility of delaying a bill into oblivion is reached. Accommodating measures 
which assume an  annual session would be a technical matter, which would have to be 
addressed, but it should not in itself represent an insuperable obstacle. 
127 If carry-over is to be introduced, there are a number of ways in which it might be achieved: 
An ad hoc Government motion at the end of a parliamentary session. The likelihood of 
securing agreement from the Opposition would depend on the level of controversy the bill had 
attracted. The Government would plan to ensure that more "political" bills were introduced 
I early in the session. 
I e Automatic lapsing of bills twelve months after introduction. 
1 e Legislation which dies on the Order Paper may be revived in the following session either by 
i unanimous consent or simply on a motion of the Government, as in Canada. 
I s Certain categories of bill may be exempted from the prohibition on carrying over (this would 
require a clear definition of such bills and a mechanism for applying the provision, e.g. 
certification by the Speaker). 
Allocntio~z of Tinze it? Advauce 
128 Most bills go through the House with an overt or tacit agreement as to their broad time 
schedules. Formal advance timetabling has been advocated by repeated Procedure Committee 
reports, Opposition parties and external bodies.46 There is also widespread acceptance that the 
voluntary timetabling arrangements in operation since agreement on Jopling in December 1994 
have proved a success. So why not move beyond this and, in the Leader of the House's phrase, 
"attempt to agree in a prescribed way, a systematic scheduling of the stages of a Bill to ensure 
organised debate and effective scrutiny" thus avoiding the prospect (however distant) of 
voluntary agreements breaking down? The answer lies partly in the perceived relationship 
between timetabling and wider reform of the legislative process. 
129 Timetabling is closely linked to sitting hours reform and the parliamentary calendar: the 
1977-78 Procedure committee rejected the possibility of imposing a fixed hour of rising, 
agreeing with Enoch Powell's assessment that "a fixed hour of rising is the equivalent of living 
under a permanent guillotine." It is clear that any substantial changes to the parliamentary day, 
week or year would need to avoid the stigma of operating as a guillotine, and ideally should be 
settled ahead of any scheme for advance timetabling of business. In terms of winning support, if 
nothing else, it is undoubtedly preferable to take a holistic approach and produce a set of 
measures that aim to please "most of the people most of the time". 
130 Perhaps the most often voiced objection is a concern that more formal timetabling would tip the 
balance of power away from the Opposition, and in favour of the Government. This objection 
takes two forms: first, concern that formal timetabling would remove opportunities for scrutiny 
and debate from the Opposition and especially from back-benchers on both sides of the House 
(which is in part a product of the negative associations of the word timetabling with regular 
guillotines and enhanced executive power). Second, concern that the Opposition's only means of 
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forcing the Government to accept changes to bills is through filibustering, which would be 
impossible within the constraints of formal timetabling. 
131 The first concern is perhaps easier to assuage than the second. Timetabling can facilitate 
improvements in the way legislation is considered - better use of committee time for proper 
scrutiny of bills can be secured if there is agreement about what the main issues are and how 
time should be allocated to different parts of the bill; deliberate time-wasting would no longer 
have tactical advantages for the Opposition (and Government back-benchers who did so with 
Government encouragement could more easily be condemned); report stage would not take so 
long if bills were adequately considered during committee. In addition, time that may be freed 
up by advance timetabling might be used to provide an extra day for private member's business. 
132 As to the second concern, it is undeniable that one purpose of timetabling is to ensure that the 
Government can plan its legislative programme with a degree of certainty by removing the 
possibility of filibuster and delay being used as tactics of Opposition. So those who treasure the 
"unpredictability of timing" as the key weapon in the Opposition's armoury will not be appeased. 
But timetabling can enable the provision of alternative, more constructive mechanisms for 
resistance (pre-legislative scrutiny, special standing committees) providing more opportunities for ' 
amendment, at earlier stages; and can prevent the situation where whole sections and even parts 
of bills go unconsidered because a guillotine is imposed as the Government's "hidden" deadline 
nears. Nevertheless, the judgement as to the balance of advantage will remain an individual one. 
The viability of advance timetabling can only be determined through trying it. In terms of wider 
public interest and debate, the public is likely to assume that all parts of a bill are considered as a 
matter of course - and will see little sense in a power of delay as an alternative to this. 
133 The introduction of automatic timetabling could be done formally through changing the 
Standing Orders of the House, which would require the consent of the House and could be 
difficult given past Opposition to timetabling. An alternative would be for the Govemment to 
outline publicly an intended timetable for a bill making it clear that a guillotine will be used if 
the bill overruns. Such a timetable could be kept to by the regular use of closure and by limiting 
the length of speeches. This would be harder to enforce than formally agreed timetabling, and 
limiting speeches would require the cooperation of the  Speaker, but it could reduce the 
incentives for causing delay and make it easier to move for a guillotine if the declared timetable 
were ignored. As long as the timetable was generous enough the Govemment could argue that it 
had given the Opposition the opportunity to debate all parts of the bill and that it was up to the 
Opposition to make the best use of that time. 
134 What  would advance timetabling cover? Advance timetabling could involve making decisions 
at  the start of the bill's passage through parliament (or at  any point thereafter) as to any 
combination of: 
e the date for report stage (probably most important). 
C- the date for commencement and conclusion of all stages. 
t- a clause by clause timetable for committee proceedings. 
135 Of course, this sort of approach is fairly regimented. The flexibility inherent in maintaining 
voluntary arrangements for timetabling, negotiated through the usual channels, has advantages: 
it is not always possible to predict how much time a bill or a particular stage will need and 
precise arrangements fixed at the outset may not be appropriate a few months down the line. 
But if the value of flexibility is recognised, it should be possible to provide for this in whatever 
alternative arrangements are developed - for example, through reassessing a tinletable on a 
motion to review. 
136 Who would have control.of the process? It would be possible to formalise the current voluntary 
arrangements to secure the role of the usual channels - in fact, the only real difference there 
need be between the current arrangements and any more formal scheme would be in the degree 
of publicity given to the arrangements and the establishment of more prescribed mechanisms for 
the decision making process. But it is unlikely that such a scheme would secure the support of 
back-benchers, or that the usual channels would wish to straightjacket themselves in this way. 
137 The alternative would be to devise some new machinery which was more transparent, more 
accountable and where the division of responsibilities might secure an effective and widely 
acceptable outcome. Different stages might be controlled by different individuals or bodies: for 
instance, the date for report might be set by the Government or through the usual channels at the 
outset; and the more detailed timetable determined by a Business Committee (either one generic 
committee, or a sub-committee of each standing committee), on which the Government need not 
even have a majority. The initial decision could be subject to some sort of affirmation procedure 
at a higher level i.e. a sub-committee would report to the standing committee and their agreement 
would be required. Of course, any confirmation procedure inevitably runs counter to the aim of 
saving time; but it would ensure that the process is not hijacked by an unrepresentative minority, 
and could provide an opportunity for the Whips to flex their muscles (thus reducing some fears 
about loss of control which are likely to be raised by the use of timetabling). 
138 Timetabling of selected bills. The application of time management procedures to certain 
categories of bills may prove to be more acceptable than automatic timetabling of all bills. For 
example, the Procedure Committee report of 1985-86 recommended that bills need only be 
subject to timetabling procedures where they were expected to take more than 25 hours in 
committee - and that timetabling for Report and Third Reading would take place only where the 
Whips could not agree. This sort of fallback scheme has some attractions, in that it allows the 
"normal procedures" to be tried in the first instance, and provides for an alternative to a 
Government imposed guillotine if they fail. 
139 If existing parliamentary procedures might be used or adapted to assist in the development and 
passage of effective constitutional legislation, and reform of procedures to assist in the passage 
of constitutional measures is best introduced as part of a wider package of reform to the 
legislative process, how achievable is this? Debate about reform of Westminster procedures is 
constrained by institutional conservatism, and by a host of factors inhibiting reform. Moreover, 
reform of parliamentary procedures is unlikely to be a vote winner with the public, because the 
procedures are understood by relatively few, and the impact of change on the quality of output 
would be difficult to measure. 
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Party Policies 
140 Over the last sixteen years of Conservative Government, successive Leaders of the House have 
acknowledged the scope for improving practice and procedure, although there has been no 
radical change since the 1979 Select Committee reforms, and no over-riding vision of the goals 
of parliamentary scrutiny has ever been put forward. Caution and incrementalism mark out the 
approach. In November 1995, procedural changes were announced extending the use of Scottish 
and Welsh Grand Committees as a counter-attack to the Opposition parties' proposals for 
devolution. No further specific changes (except possibly on scrutiny of European legislation) are 
expected as a Government initiative this side of the general election. 
141 The Labour Party has no up-to-date agreed statement of policy in respect of reform of the 
Commons procedures - the last comprehensive statement was in 1989 in the report of the Policy 
Review: Meet the Challenge, Make the Change. The 1993 A New Agenda for Democracy promised 
a further review of possible reforms, but this has not yet materialized. The Labour Party has 
nevertheless already made a number of commitments on procedural reform: in the justice field, 
for exampie, promises of a new Select Committee on Judicial and Legal Affairs. Tony Blair also 
recently indicated that the Labour Party would be looking more widely at reform of the House of 
Commons: "We still need to update our legislative procedures to improve the effectiveness of 
Parliament. There is also a case for effective consultation to produce better quality legislationn.47 
142 The Liberal Democrats included a number of commitments in their 1993 policy paper Here We 
Stand which were designed to tackle five "main weaknesses" they identified in the House of 
Commons: it is too large; too partisan; its membership too mediocre; the workload too heavy; 
and there is an unhealthy degree of Government dominance. They also proposed the creation of 
an elected second chamber which would have new functions necessitating procedural reforms. In 
addition, the Liberal Democrats have this year embarked on a consultation exercise which is 
expected to identify a range of specific procedural changes that could be made in advance of 
any wider constitutional settlement. 
Factors Inhibiting Reform 
143 There are a number of factors inhibiting the implementation of ideas for reform: 
a in-built conflict between the interests of the Whips, front-benchers and back-benchers, as 
well as between political parties wanting to score points off each other. 
e views differ on the proper role and powers of Parliament - which in turn, makes it difficult to 
reach agreement about what should be done to improve its effectiveness. 
e those who have managed to get into Government - and sometimes those who aspire to it - are 
unlikely to change a system that is largely designed to assist in the Government's exercise of power. 
e the nature of the Commons - "essentially a closed corporation, adept at socializing new classes 
of membership and defining its role in terms of internally developed rules and conventions"48 
restricts the ability of (even a new) Government to win the support of MPs for change. 
e resistance to change arises partly because of the difficulty of determining in advance the 
likely impact of procedural changes: as with special standing committees, which were 
designed to assist in increasing the time available on the floor, but are perceived to cause 
"delay" in the system. 
e the recommendations of even the most rigorous and respectable of reports, such as those of the 
Hansard Society Commission on the Legislative Process, are not routinely implemented. Even 
the Procedure Committee felt moved, in 1987, to express frustration at the lack of progress 
even in discussing some of their proposals: "Our final recommendation of this Parliament is 
that if a committee of Members is appointed by the House and spends much time deliberating 
in considerable depth on aspects of the current procedure of the House, which affect all 
Members, then time must be found by the Government for the specific proposals contained in 
its reports to be considered and, if thought fit, adopted by the House."49 
144 lt is also the case that those with an immediate interest in the proceedings of parliament are 
most likely to be in a position to frustrate attempts at change. This perhaps best demonstrated 
by the fate of special standing committees, in his 1990 speech to the Statute Law Society, 
Sir Patrick Mayhew suggested that the reason the Special Standing Committee Procedure had 
not been used since 1983-84 was "that it has not found favour with the departments or business 
managers". He elaborated: 
"the Special Standing committee procedure ... was much feared by Government business 
managers at its introduction, because it has the dire effect of informing their backbcnch 
members on the Standing Committee of any Bill to which it applied just what the Bill is 
about, what it is intended to remedy, and how the remedy is to be achieved. This of course, 
gets them interested, and may lead them to make speeches. All this adds up to loss of control, 
which to any Whip  is whal the loss of the Crown Jewels would be to the Governor of the 
Tower of London. " 
I Factors Stimulating Reform 
145 There are two motors that can drive procedural reform. The first is public and parliamentary 
recognition of a major defect in the present arrangements, as happened over the allegations of 
"sleaze" that prompted the establishment of the Nolan Committee on Standards in Public Life 
and the adoption of its recommendations and the continued existence of an independent 
external body that would monitor the implementation of proposals. The second motor for 
procedural reform is recognition within Parliament that specific procedural reforms would bring 
mutual benefit to Government and Opposition, or front-benchers and back-benchers (as with the 
Departmental Select Committees in 1979, the recent Jopling reforms, and the procedures for 
scmtiny of Deregulation Orders introduced in 1993). Success has usually been secured where the 
objectives are limited, and the interests of different groupings within the House of Commons are 
balanced. Agreement between the frontbenches is a prerequisite. 
146 Reviewing the history of procedural reform, a number of other factors also stand out as 
Important in securing reform: 
' Prior consideration of the issues by the Procedure Committee or other Select Committee, 
giving an opportunity to flush out objections and resolve potential difficulties. 
timing - in particular, reforms have been particularly well received soon after a general election. 
' forward planning in relation to the impact on the resources available to support reforms; and 
' hack-bench pressure for change. 
147 In this context, it is perhaps the attractions of procedural reform to facilitate the passage of a 
large package of constitutional reforms that will be the spur necessary to prompt a Government 
institute wider procedural reform. 
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Procedure in the House o f  Lords 
148 The beginning of this chapter indicated that it was not usual for constitutional bills to be 
introduced in the House of Lords. However, it is possible to do so, and in theory it would be 
possible to deal with constitutional measures in this way. Indeed, this was done with the Life 
Peerages Act 1958 on the basis that it was relatively uncontroversial, being the product of 
agreement reached in inter-party talks, and was such a limited change that it did not affect the 
House of Commons. The extent to which the House of Lords can be used to introduce 
constitutional bills will be essentially a political judgement about the likely reaction of the 
House of Commons and House of Lords to a given measure; the principal advantage of 
introducing bills in the House of Lords is that this frees up time in the House of Commons at the 
beginning of a session, allowing more bills to be introduced than would otherwise be the case. 
Committee Procedure 
149 Once a bill has passed through the House of Commons it moves to the House of Lords and , 
passes through the same stages as ordinary legislation in the House of Lords (essentially the 
same as the stages in the  Commons). The committee stage in the  House of Lords for 
constitutional bills is taken on the floor of the House, in a committee of the whole House, as are 
most other public bills. The main legislative role of the House of Lords is revision. Most of the 
amendments made in the House of Lords are moved by Ministers: Governments regularly use 
this stage to tidy up or add to bills introduced at speed dictated by political considerations. Thus 
the Local Government Act 1972 was 349 pages long on introduction and 449 when passed, 
largely thanks to 722 Lords Amendments, almost all from the Government. 
150 There have been moves recently to use standing committees and special standing committees for 
some limited categories of bills. However, it is both unlikely that the House of Lords would 
welcome an extension of these innovations to constitutional measures (in large part because the 
House is made up of individuals rather than party interests, so that committees can never be 
representative of the wider House), and unnecessary, given that the time constraints are less 
significant than in the House of Commons. 
Control of Time 
151 The most important difference between the two Houses in terms of constitutional measures is 
that no closure or guillotine is used in the House of Lords. Opposition cannot therefore be 
restricted by resort to timetabling. 
152 To what extent the second chamber would oppose constitutional measures coming from a Labour 
or Liberal Democrat Government is unclear. Certainly, the possibility of hostility from the House 
of Lords to a Labour Government has historical resonance. During the 1970s the House of Lords 
showed greater confidence in exercising its delaying and amending powers, but this was in the 
context of a minority Labour Government. To a lesser extent, the House of Lords' assertiveness 
has continued under a Conservative Government, the difference being that the Conservatives can 
seek to call on a comfortable majority in the House of Lords if pushed to do so. 
~h~ attitude of the House of Lords to constitutional legislation will depend on a number of 
factors. First, the detail of any manifesto commitment. Since 1945 the House of Lords has 
observed The 'Salisbury convention', as explained by Lord Carrington: 
"Cranborne lConservative Leader of the House of Lords, later Lord Salisbuy) reckoned that it 
zuas not the duty of the House of Lords to make our system of Government inoperable. Nor, he 
considered, was it justified that the Opposition peers should use their voting strength to wreck 
any measure which the Government had made plain at a General Election they proposed to 
introduce. He thus evolved guidelines, now unoficially known as the Salisbuy Rules, which 
meant that the Lords should, $ they saw j?t, amend, but should not destroy or alter beyond 
recognition, any Bill on which the country had, by implication, given its verdict. The Lords in 
other words, should n o t h s t r a t e  the declared will of the people. I doubt i f this amounted to a 
formal constitutional doctrine but as a way of behaving it seemed to be vely sensible ... by and 
large the Salisbu y strategy workedn50 
154 The convention assumes that measures included in a Government's manifesto are de facto 
approved by the public at large. This convention does not, however, prevent the Lords from 
amending a bill, and there is a delicate balance between an Opposition Party expressing its 
dissatisfaction and presenting a menace to the security of the Government. In the 1970s, for 
example, Labour Governments suffered substantial amendments to some bills which implemented 
manifesto commitments, including the Scotland and Wales Bills, and in total suffered some 355 
defeats during the 1974-79 Parliament.51 Although bills introduced by Conservative 
Governments are not so susceptible to amendment on the floor of the House, they are not entirely 
exempt (the Conservative Government experienced some 156 defeats in the House of Lords 
between 1979 and 199052) and some bills have involved considerable behind the scenes 
negotiation with Ministers to secure changes. 
155 The reaction of the House of Lords may also depend on where a bill is introduced. The House of 
Lords may be less willing to oppose a measure that had been passed by a clear majority in the 
Commons, than one that was first introduced in the Lords. 
156 In addition, the House of Lords tends to regard itself a guardian of constitutional propriety and 
members are more likely to oppose the view of the House of Commons if they feel democratic 
principles have been ignored. For example, the House of Lords rejected interim arrangements 
ending elections to the GLC in the run up to its abolition, on the basis that there was no 
guarantee that the abolition legislation would be passed. Questions over the legitimacy of the 
Government's mandate may also provide a focus for opposition in the House of Lords. This was a 
problem the minority Labour Government experienced in the 1970s. More recently, those in the 
Lords opposed to the Maastricht Bill claimed that because all parties had supported its ratification 
in the 1992 elections, the electorate had been given no choice. On controversial issues, evidence 
of adequate consultation or a commitment to a referendum would reduce the potential for 
opposition from the House of Lords. It is, however, difficult for an unelected chamber to sustain 
the argument that it represents the true voice of the electorate for long. 
157 Finally, possible reform of the House of Lords itself may also have a knock on effect on the Lords' 
consideration of other constitutional measures. It is difficult to predict how a threat or promise to 
reform the House of Lords would affect their behaviour. In 1910, after the Lords refused to pass 
Lloyd George's budget, there was a threat to use the Royal Prerogative to create enough sympathetic 
peers to pass the Bill. In the end this was not necessary to get the Finance Bill through, but the 
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threat had to be reiterated in order to pass the Parliament Act 191 1. Under a Labour or Liberal 
Democrat Government, an unreformed House of Lords might take the attitude that it had nothing to 
lose by opposing a Government's constitutional refonn plans, given that reform of their own 
institution was inevitable anyway; whilst a reformed House (whether nominated or elected) would 
have greater credibility in opposing the wishes of the Government and House of Commons. 
House of Lords Amendments 
158 If the Government is defeated in the House of Lords it must then spend further time in the House of 
Commons dealing with Lords' amendments. Decisions are referred back and forth between the two 
Houses until agreement, or disagreement is reached. Ultimately, the Govemment can bring the 
Parliament Acts 19 1 1 and 1949 into play, whch allow a bill which has been passed in two successive 
sessions by the House of Commons, but rejected by the House of Lords, to be presented for Royal 
Assent.53 (This procedure has only ever been used to secure the passage of the War Crimes Bill; but 
the 1949 Act and also the Govemment of Ireland Act 1914 and Welsh Church Act 1914 were passed 
under the 19 1 1 procedures.) Fighting the House of Lords step by step would be very debilitating for a 
Government. In terms of parliamentary procedure the Government, particularly a Laboor 
Government, has only limited powers to influence and control proceedings in the House of Lords. 
Queen's Consent 
159 If a Bill affects royal interests or the Royal Prerogative, the Queen's (or Prince of Wales') Consent 
will be required at some point. The Clerks of Public Bills in the two Houses (after consulting the 
Government's Parliamentary Counsel) advise the Speaker on the question of whether or not a 
bill requires Queen's Consent. This is usually done at the third reading, but if Royal interests or 
prerogatives are fundamental, Queen's Consent may be required prior to second reading - this is 
provided routinely by the Government. 
Conclusion 
160 In the House of Commons in particular, the time available for legislation imposes a major constraint 
on the Government. The time taken by constitutional measures tends to be greater than for other 
bills - in part because of the complexity and the controversy they tend to attract and in part because 
of the use of the committee of the whole House. Assuming a desire to have a significant legislative 
programme of non-constitutional measures, under the current system of parliamentary time 
allocation, there is likely to be time for at the most two constitutional bills per session. 
161 There are essentially two different areas in which alternative procedures, or reform of existing 
procedures, could ease the passage of a major constitutional reform programme whilst meeting 
demands for adequate scrutiny: 
e to take some stages of a bill off the floor of the House by using another committee forum. 
a to alter the control of time, either by limiting the amount of time which can be spent on a bill 
or by removing some of the constraints on time. 
162 The discussion above has identified three proposals which may meet these criteria and ease the 
passage of constitutional bills. 
0 partial referral of bills to a standing committee; which would reduce the amount of time 
that a bill takes on the floor of the House, but allow full debate in a standing committee. 
o automatic advance timetabling of all bills; which would ensure that all parts of a bill were 
looked at and minimise incentives for filibustering. 
selective use of cany-over; which would mean that the time spent debating a bill in one 
session would not be wasted if the bill did not complete its passage in that session. 
163 Changing parliamentary procedure simply to facilitate or enhance the quality of a constitutional 
reform programme is potentially a high risk strategy. The political nature of parliamentary 
procedure means that changing the  rules that govern the game is fraught with controversy. It is 
important that changes in parliamentary procedure are part of a wider process of parliamentary 
reform which is coherent and desirable in its own right. Reform of parliamentary procedure has 
a relevance which goes beyond constitutional bills and there is no shortage of suggestions for 
ways in which the workings of Parliament could be improved.54 Any procedural change is likely 
to be better accepted if introduced as part of a wider reform of the legislative process, aimed at 
balancing the interests of interests of different groupings within the House of Commons. Such 
reform is likely to be welcomed by a wide range of experts and outside interests, from the 
Hansard Society to the CBI. The desire to secure the passage of a large legislative programme 
should therefore be seized as an opportunity to implement wider parliamentary reforms. 
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inquiry, Consulta 
and Consensus 
Charles Pannell MP: " May I ask my right hon. Friend whether the lesson of thisjasco is 
not that inh ture ,  rather than striving for all party agreement, we should seek to impose 
a proper settlement based on the promises whick we made at the last General Election." 
The Prime Minister: " I  would regret drawing from this episode of constitutional history 
the same conclusions as my  right hon. Friend. In a major constitutional measure ... it is 
desirable, ifpossible, to proceed by agreement not only between the parties but between 
the Houses. " 
House of Commons, Officol Report, 17 April 1969, col. 1341 
Exchange following the announcement of  the withdrawal o f  the Parliament No. 2 Bill. 
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164 So far, this report has considered the implementation process of an agreed policy. But there is 
often a prior stage of inquiry or consultation. In fact, determining the best way to attempt 
constitutional reform has repeatedly taxed governments. One of the key issues has been the need 
for reform to build on political consensus rather than to be derived from partisan policies. 
165 There is a strong expectation that constitutional reform be based on broad public and cross- 
party consultation. In recent speeches this has been reaffirmed by all three main political parties. 
This is not because it is necessarily the most efficient or productive way of making and 
implementing policy. If there is political will, and party unity can be assumed or manufactured, 
the most efficient way of developing policy is the standard process of Whitehall deliberation 
followed by a Cabinet Committee recommendation to the whole Cabinet. 
166 But getting legislation on the  statute book is not all 'Efficiency' also includes making 
constitutional reforms endure beyond the lifetime of a particular Government: coherence and 
legitimacy are equally important. Those interested in embarking on constitutional reform in the 
UK this century have nearly always attempted to engage with other political parties and consult 
outside of political elites, even if these attempts are subsequently abandoned, although (as the 
exchange above illustrates) there is no agreement as to the rules that should be followed. 
Moreover, the absence of any fixed procedure for constitutional amendment means that where a 
Government does not have definitive plans for reform or chooses to consult on its proposals 
before implementation, there is a range of vehicles that it might use. 
167 This chapter examines the various consultation mechanisms that might be used and their 
strengths and weaknesses. The analysis draws on the past experience of handling constitutional 
measures which provides a backdrop that will be difficult to ignore, and also identifies relevant 
and useful experience from overseas. 
Mode o f  Policy Development 
168 In developing constitutional policy there are advantages for the Government in using existing 
standard procedures, rather than adopting procedural innovations or devising new systems of 
consultation. As Banting and Simeon comment: "Incumbents are likely to try to keep 
constitutional discussions within existing channels - to make them as similar as possible to 
'normal' processes in order to control the agenda and alternativesn.55 
169 There are political and practical limitations to the extent to which consultation is viable in 
practice; and careful decisions are needed about who needs to be engaged in the debate and 
what signals the Government wants to send. Three categories of consultation are considered: 
e building political consensus: usually regarded as important in relation to issues where refonn 
is likely to impact on the party system or balance of political interests. 
e calling in the experts: regarded as advantageous where an issue appears intractable in a 
party political sense, but a solution needs to be found and be able to claim legitimacy. 
e public consultation: in the most basic sense takes place at a general election, but additional 
consultation may be undertaken where a reform needs public support if it is to succeed. 
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Building Political Consensus 
Cross-Party Talks 
170 During the twentieth century there have been repeated attempts to secure consensus on 
constitutional measures through cross-party talks. These have been held under various titles and 
include both private talks at a Privy Councillor level and more public and formal inter-party talks. 
17 I There are issues on which inter-party talks have been repeatedly attempted. There have for example 
been several attempts to secure reform of the House of Lords through inter-party talks. Any reform of 
the House of Lords is likely to affect the balance of power in Parliament and especially party political 
balance and for these reasons it has been considered appropriate to engage in inter-party talks. 
172 In 1909, the Lords' refixal to pass Lloyd George's Finance Bill prompted moves to curtail their 
legislative powers, eventually resulting in the Parliament Act 191 1. Although initial efforts to get 
the Bill through the House of Lords relied on a threat to use the Royal Prerogative to create up to 
300 sympathetic peers, the death of the King in May 1910 produced pressure for a more 
consensual approach and Asquith proposed a two-party constitutional conference.56 The 
Conference broke down because the Opposition insisted that constitutional changes, such as Home 
Rule, should be submitted to a referendum, a provision to which the Government would not have 
been able to secure its own supporters' agreement.57 Inter-party talks do not preclude other forms 
of consultation: in this instance proposals for reform were also submitted for the popular approval, 
as the question of reform of the House of Lords dominated the second general election in 19 10. 
173 A later attempt at inter-party talks on the Lords was marginally more successhl. These talks took 
place when the second reading of what became the Parliament Act 1949 was adjourned for talks on 
powers and composition. The talks broke down after seven meetings but agreement was reached on 
a set of principles relating to composition. In 1951 the Conservatives hied to restart the talks, but 
the Labour Party refused to participate; the Life Peerages Act 1958 built on the agreement on 
composition reached in the talks ten years earlier. Crossman's failed attempt to reform the House of 
Lords in the 1960s is also a useful case st~dy.58 Moves were made very early on to achieve cross- 
party support and to involve the Lords in the process. What emerged was an inter-party conference 
made up of key members of the three main parties drawn from both the Commons and the Lords.59 
In practice, much of the work of the inter-party conference was done by a sub-committee made up 
of the party Leaders in the Lords, together with Crossman and a small secretariat. 
174 By the time the conference had agreed on a draft White Paper, Conservative members' 
enthusiasm for agreed reform was fading. Matters came to a head when Conservative Peers 
defeated the Southern Rhodesia (United Nations Sanctions) Order. Infuriated, Wilson made an 
announcement to the Commons promising comprehensive and radical legislation and broke off 
the inter-party conference. However, even after the inter-party talks had broken down, the 
Government continued to base its legislation on the limited agreements which had been reached. 
As a consequence the Parliament No. 2 Bill was designed to be passed as a cross-party measure, 
and was too large and unwieldy to cope with the sustained Opposition it faced. After a 
particularly embarrassing failure to secure closure, the Government decided to abandon the Bill. 
175 With hindsight, it is doubtf~~I  that cross-party agreement could ever have been achieved. Very early on, 
the Conservatives made it clear that they wanted implementation of any reform delayed until after the 
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next election. This was always going to be unacceptable to the Labour Party which was concerned 
about the Lords disrupting their legislation in the last two years of the Parliament. This was one of the 
issues cited by the Conservatives when they pulled out of the inter-party talks (although there were 
wider issues behind the breakdown). A further weakness was that the tactics throughout had been to 
keep the detailed work of the inter-party conference and later Cabinet Committee quiet. Few attempts 
were made to engage back-benchers in the process which meant that the objections of MF's to 
proposed schemes were not hl ly  taken into account, leaving back-benchers feeling excluded and 
without any understanding of why certain compromises had been made. The officials working on the 
Bill were similarly isolated. Once the 'usual channels' had broken down the Government persisted with 
a large and complex Bill which was drafted on the basis of cross-party agreement. 
176 The option of inter-party talks will inevitably be raised in the context of future constitutional 
reform. It is obvious that, given the different constitutional views and political interests of the 
parties, it is never going to be easy to reach cross-party agreement on constitutional issues. Yet the 
success of such an approach requires the politics of consensus to prevail. If it does not, the 
consequential reforms are likely to be either piecemeal - introduced on the basis of whatever 
agreement was reached, not the comprehensive reforms originally intended - or rejected by the' 
Opposition parties. There is significant scope for tactical manoeuvenng by Opposition parties during 
the talks, or even for frustrating the very establishment of talks by non-participation. There is also a 
danger that the party leaders may not be representative of the party at large, and may not be willing 
or able to whip their back-benchers into line during subsequent parliamentary proceedings. 
177 The process of inter-party talks therefore needs to engage back-benchers in the consultation 
process as far as is possible. Even if formal involvement is not practicable, there is value in 
keeping back-benchers up to date with the progress of discussions and the reasons for any 
apparent compromises made. Equally, debate and agreement within the Cabinet on the 
Government's own stance is a crucial pre-requisite to successful negotiations in any cross-party 
forum. Where talks break down, any decision to proceed with the measure should recognise that 
it can no longer expect support across the House and the bill should be framed accordingly. It is 
also important that those taking part in the negotiations are in a position within their own 
parties to ensure that the decisions reached are accepted. Otherwise, even where agreements are 
reached, they may not be sustained through the parliamentary passage of resulting legislation. 
178 The keys to success are likely to be ensuring sufficiently high level political engagement whilst 
avoiding the danger of establishing an inward looking clique, over immersed in the detail of the 
issues and unconcerned with the wider political ramifications (as happened in 1969). The 
principal advantages are that the concerns and preferences of the parties can be teased out in 
negotiations which enable suitable solutions to be developed at an early stage - especially if the 
talks are focused on principles rather than the detail. Moreover, if successful in reaching a 
conclusion, they should smooth the passage of legislation. This approach does not preclude the 
commissioning of research to assist in deliberations nor the publication of consultative papers 
(or the use of other consultative mechanisms e.g. polling) to discover public opinion. 
179 A further form of inter-party consultation is discussions held on Privy Councillor terms i.e. 
confidential. These tend to be on areas outside shictly party politics, and are essentially about sharing 
information rather than consensus building, although they may also be used to explain to the Leader 
of the Opposition the background to a decision taken by the Government where immediate public 
disclosure of all the facts would damage the national interest. Examples of discussions held on Privy 
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Councillor terms include Asquith's meetings with Bonar Law on the Ulster crisis in 19 13 - which were 
not a success; Baldwin's talks with MacDonald in 1927 on the composition of the Simon Commission 
which considered the future Government of India, his consultation of Attlee and Sinclair (the Leader 
of the Liberals) on the abdiiation crisis in 1936, and talks since the early 1970s between various 
P~ime Ministers and Opposition Leaders on Northern 1reIand.W 
Speaker's Conferences 
180 Speaker's Conferences consider and recommend changes in electoral law and are primarily 
concerned with the technical aspects of such measures, for example: Speaker's Conferences on 
Electoral Law were held in 1965-68; 1972-74; and 1977-78. Called on the invitation of the Prime 
Minister (with the prior agreement of the Speaker) a Speaker's Conference has been described as "a 
frail advisory mechanism, at the mercy of the Government of the dayV.6' A total of around 30 MPs 
usually participate, appointed by the Speaker on the basis of nominations from the parties. Speaker's 
Conferences sit in private and do not publish proceedings. They have the power of recommendation 
only. They are served by a joint secretariat from the Clerk's Department and the Civil Service. 
181 A Speaker's Conference was last used in 1977-78 to recommend the level of representation 
Northern lreland MPs should have in the House of Commons. Since then the role of a Speaker's 
Conference appears to have been taken over by select committees. For example, the Home 
Affairs Committee reported on the redistribution of Commons seats in 1987, which would 
traditionally have been the role of a Speaker's Conference.fi2 The advantage of select committee 
proceedings is that their openness arguably provides a more desirable forum for the discussion 
of constitutional reform measures. 
182 The hture  use of a Speaker's Conference depends whether it is judged appropriate for a particular 
issue to be considered in this way. For example, the use of a Speaker's Conference to decide on 
levels of Scottish representation in Westminster was raised by the Opposition during attempts at 
devolution in the 1970s. The Labour Government resisted this suggestion on the grounds that the 
involvement of the Speaker in such a potentially controversial debate would considerably weaken 
the position of the Speaker. As explored by David Butler in ModiSying Electoral Arrangmmts, there 
is evidence of reluctance on the part of previous Speakers to become involved in controversial 
electoral issues. The extent to which this would be the case in respect of any of the current 
proposals for reform would depend on how controversial the issue was - and' especially the degree 
of specifically party political controversy. Where an informal agreement had already been reached 
between parties, a Speaker's Conference could be used to formalize the outcome. However, it is 
difficult to see which of the measures on the current reform agenda might be appropriate to refer to 
such a forum. As David Butler notes "although Speaker's Conferences seem to have become 
established as parts of the Constitution, their record is not very impressive either in achieving 
consensus on controversial matters or in seeing their recommendations translated into law."63 
Constituent Assembly 
183 There is no clear precedent in British history for a constituent assembly of the sort proposed by 
the Liberal Democrats. The various consultative models in Northern Ireland have come closest - 
indeed, the proposal for an elected multi-party body, recently announced by John Major, might 
in some senses be regarded as a constituent assembly. However, other countries have deployed 
constituent assemblies to a greater extent. 
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184 As McWhinney suggests, "the constituent assembly - albeit a constituent assembly elected by 
direct, popular vote and therefore having its own direct political mandate and claims to political, 
as well as constitutional legitimation - ... represents the culmination of the constitutional 
thinking of the Age of Enlightenment".64 The concept of a constituent assembly has its origins in 
the revolutionary Constituent Assemblies in France in 1789-91 and in 1848 (the Constitutional 
Convention held in Philadelphia in 1787 to produce the American Constitution was also a 
constituent assembly in all but name). In Russia, the demand for a constituent assembly (derived 
from the French experience) emerged in 1879, and became a core element of the programme of 
all Russian populist organisations. 
185 More recently, there was a surge in the use of constituent assemblies following the Second World 
War e.g. the All-India Constituent Assembly of 1946 and the parliamentary council of Germany 
which produced the 1949 Bonn Constitution. In Israel, a Provisional Council of State was created 
with the main task of preparing elections to a Constituent Assembly following the establishment of 
the Jewish state in 1948. No date was set for the completion of the Constituent Assembly's work 
and it was assumed that when the formulation of the constitution was complete, elections would 
be held. However, the members of the Constituent Assembly were divided over the need for a ' 
written constitution, and even advocates found that there was little convergence between their 
views on the specifics. As a result the Constituent Assembly simply passed the Transition Law; 
which determined Government arrangements and a resolution to the effect that the constitution 
would be determined in stages through a series of "basic laws", which would in due course be 
codified. As soon as it had thus deferred the task of writing a constitution, the Constituent 
Assembly changed its name to the First Knesset (House of RepresentativesL65 
186 The managed transition to democracy in South Africa has also involved a constituent assembly, 
charged with creating a written constitution. But this was instituted as part of a longer process of 
negotiation - first, the existing Tricameral Parliament enacted an interim Constitution and 
provisional Bill of Rights drafted by a multi-party conference (MPNP); a transitional executive 
council {or multi-party Cabinet committee) oversaw the Government during the election campaign 
for a Constituent Assembly, charged with drawing up and adopting a new Constitution. The results 
of the elections to the Assembly determined the proportional representation of Cabinet members in 
an interim Government; and elections under the new Constitution are intended to take place no 
more than five years from the elections to the Constituent Assembly. There had been several prior 
rounds of multi-party talks and specifically two democratic Conventions which had laid the 
ground for the Constitution and had agreed the process of reaching a final constitutional 
settlement. The whole process was one of negotiation and pact making, with several breakdowns 
in communication along the way. There was a particular disagreement about whether the 
constituent assembly should come before or after the drafting (through negotiation) of a new 
constitution. This process in not finished - the provisional Constitution is being revised and will 
be submitted to the Parliament convened as a Constituent Assembly. 
187 Historically, therefore, constituent assemblies have been used where a new state has been created - 
either geographically or metaphorically i.e. where previously disenfranchised sections of society 
(class in France and Russia; race in South Africa) are to have a voice in the body politic and 
existing institutions of the state are discredited. The experiences of both South Africa and Northern 
Ireland also suggest that the role, functions and timeframe of a constituent assembly are issues that 
require negotiation rather than imposition. Experience shows that the use of a constituent 
assembly can be time consuming and does not guarantee the acceptance or durability of any 
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agreement reached. Ultimately, the device of a constituent assembly does not avoid the need to 
tackle party political differences and to maintain the momentum of reform through negotiation as 
well as consensus building. It may also prove inadequate to deal with a non-crisis situation, as "the 
motive power of constituent assemblies will come from acting quickly, in periods of great public 
euphoria where natural law ideas are dominant - normally following on some great political or 
social revolution or similar upheaval, when there is little difficulty for the constitution-makers in 
perceiving the nature of the public mood and in translating it into technical legal form."66 
188 The Liberal Democrats propose the use of a constituent assembly which would "revise, codify and 
supplementV67 constitutional reform measures introduced by means of ordinary law in a first 
Parliament, bringing them together into a written constitution. The constituent assembly would 
be made up of all MPs elected to a new Parliament under a proportional representation system. 
The assemhly would be free to decide its own procedure and would have to adopt the written 
constitution by a majority of at least two thirds and the constitution would then be submitted to 
a referendum. In this sense, it is at odds with the more traditional notion that a constituent 
assembly will assume a blank sheet of paper as a starting point, and the extent to which a 
constituent assembly would be satisfied with altering an existing constitution must be questioned. 
189 It is also difficult to see how those elected as MPs could function both as normal Members of 
Parliament and members of the constituent assembly, unless there is an immediate crisis of 
political authority that requires it as in South Africa. For Parliament to function as a constituent 
assembly and perform its normal functions it is almost certain to require either a considerable 
increase in the number of days or hours it sits, or a minimalist non-constitutional legislative 
programme. The latter option effectively means putting Government on hold (or on auto-pilot) 
for as long as it takes to reach a constitutional settlement. 
190 Moreover, the assumption that a constituent assembly would be particularly well equipped to agree 
a constitutional settlement relies on there being a degree of consensus amongst its members about 
the substance of constitutional change, or at least a willingness to reach consensus. Yet it would 
take an enormous leap in political culture for such an assembly to be elected with the task of 
drafting a written constitution foremost in the electorate's mind; voting is likely to remain based 
on party political affiliation and even with proportional representation there is no guarantee (nor is 
it likely) that avid constitutional reformers will dominate such an assembly. This constituent 
assembly would seemingly be entitled to over-ride all the reforms introduced and implemented in 
the previous parliament; but perhaps worse is the prospect of no agreement being reached. The 
procedures adopted by the constituent assembly would have to include some mechanism for 
securing decisions, even if not through consensus. 
Calling i n  the Experts 
Royal Commission 
191 There are no standard criteria for when it is appropriate or helpful to set up a Royal Commission, 
and the breadth and political sensitivity of the subject matter referred to a Royal Commission can 
vary enormously. Although the origins of Royal Commissions lie in the Middle Ages, their golden 
age was the nineteenth century - between 1800 and 1859, more than 220 Royal Commissions were 
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established, covering subjects as diverse as the poor law, penal administration, sanitation, slavery, 
and housing. During a period of social, economic and political dislocation - and in the absence of 
a professional civil service - investigative committees entrusted with fact finding and policy 
making were an effective means of short-circuiting the political struggles that surrounded major 
reforms during the first half of the century. 
192 But even then, they suffered from the selective use or collation of evidence, the packing of 
committees and the manipulation of opinion. They were also used on occasion as political 
expedients to delay or avoid political problems. Nevertheless, the extent to which Royal 
Commissions had been reduced in public (and certainly political) esteem over the next hundred 
years in perhaps best encapsulated by Harold Wilson's quip that Royal Commissions and 
departmental committees "take minutes and waste years"68 and by Margaret Thatcher's 
reluctance to make any use of them at all, taking the view that Royal Con~missions were an 
unnecessary diversion from the business of government. 
193 There has been one previous attempt to refer constitutional reform to a Royal Commission. In 1968, 
the Wilson Govemment set up the Royal Commission on the Constitution, chaired first by Lord* 
Crowther and then by Lord Kilbrandon, in response to growing demands for decentralisation. The 
Commission was first decided on in 1968, started work in 1969 and reported in October 1973. 
Vernon Bogdanor has argued, and the view is widely supported, that the Commission was 
established as the "expedient of a harassed administration ... the demand for immediate concessions 
to meet the nationalist threat could be contained, and by the time the Kilbrandon Commission 
reported the SNP and Plaid Cymru might no longer be so credible politically, in which case its 
findings could be quietly pigeon holed."69 The political expediency that lay behind its establishment 
was further exposed by the fact that, despite the broad terms of reference for the Commission, the 
Parliament (No. 2) Bill to refonn the House of Lords was about to be introduced into Parliament at 
the very same time that the Commission was decided upon; and by the subsequent decision to 
proceed with Scottish local Govemment reform without waiting for the Commission's report. 
194 The expectation that the members of a Royal Commission should be both broadly representative, 
and expert in the field, presents immediate obstacles to consensus forming. In the case of the 
Kilbrandon Commission these inevitable difficulties were compounded by the loss through death 
of two members (including its first Chairman) and the resignation of three others. Two of the 
remaining members issued a Memorandum of Dissent - which argued that the Commission's 
terms of reference permitted a comprehensive review of constitutional arrangements, whereas 
the main report focused almost exclusively on devolution. On publication, the Commission's 
report was debated briefly in the House of Commons, but neither of the two main parties' 
election manifestos made any commitment to devolution. 
195 In the event, the nationalist threat did not recede, and both the SNP and Plaid Cymru polled well 
in the February 1974 election which returned Labour to power six months after the Royal 
Commission had reported. This ensured that the Commission's recommendations were further 
considered, through the publication of a Green Paper for consultation (although only 4 weeks 
were given for responses) and then a hurriedly produced White Paper which attempted to 
identify principles on which devolution would proceed with the details in several more White 
Papers. At the very least, it can be seen that the work of the Commission assisted little in 
reducing the decision making burden of the government. The history of the Scotland and Wales 
Bill and the subsequent separate Scotland and Wales Acts is well known. 
I N Q U I R Y .  CONSULTATION A N D  CONSENSUS [ . 
196 There is nothing intrinsically wrong with Royal Commissions - indeed, most policy making 
processes are preceded by inquiry or investigation of some sort. The principal advantage of a 
Royal Commission is that it is a public body which is expected to invite evidence from a wide 
range of bodies and individuals. In doing so a Royal Commission can raise and address new 
ideas and may also create a climate sympathetic to change. 
197 However, it is not overstating the case to say that there are more reasons why a Royal 
Commission might be inappropriate or ineffectual, particularly in considering constitutional 
reform measures. Firstly, Royal Commissions are famously regarded as an  'excuse for 
procrastination' and even sett ing one up would raise questions about a Government's 
commitment to reform. Lord Kennet, as long ago as 1937, observed that "when a Government 
finds itself extremely hard put to distract the attention of the public from one of the fundamental 
ills for which the public expects a remedy from the government, and for which the Government is 
sorry it can find no remedy, it promotes a dog-fight between the people with different views, and 
for starting a dog-fight there is no method so valuable as that of a Royal Commission."70 
198 Second, Royal Commissions may produce findings which are not sufficiently policy oriented or 
which fail to reflect the realities of the political environment into which their recommendations 
are delivered. Previous experience also suggests that there is a strong possibility of the report 
not being unanimous. Moreover, although the fact that Royal Commissions are initiated by and 
report to Government - not Parliament - can lead to a perception that they lack independence, 
there is always a risk that the Government may not welcome the findings produced. The decision 
then is whether to accept the recommendations despite the Government's own reservations; or to 
disagree and face the political consequences. 
199 Third, and perhaps most important, is the importance of .engaging parliamentarians in 
negotiating a settlement of a constitutional issue, rather than collecting the views of external 
experts. Depending on the issue under consideration, the need may well be for political direction 
rather than the objective analysis which is ostensibly the input of the Royal Commission (quite 
apart from the fact that it is extremely difficult to identify a range of sufficiently expert, but 
non-partisan, Commission members). To the extent that objective analysis is required to feed 
policy decisions, it can just as well be camed out by departmental or commissioned researchers. 
200 The decision to appoint a Royal Commission may therefore serve two unhelpful ends: keeping a 
contentious issue alive and without resolution for a period of years, whilst adversely affecting 
the reputation and authority of the Government because of public perceptions about the 
purposes to which Governments put Royal Commissions and their inherent utility. 
Constitutional Convention or Commission 
201 The terms constitutional convention and constitutional commission are used to describe a variety of 
bodies. For the sake of clarity it is worth outlining what is meant by them in this report. 
Constitutional convention is used to refer to a body made up of a combination of politicians, experts 
and the wider civic community - as, for example, in the case of the Scottish Constitutional 
Convention. (The term convention has also been used to apply to what are essentially constituent 
assemblies, as with the United States Constitutional Convention in 1787). Constitutional commission 
is used to describe an independent, expert, standing body, such as the Law Commission. 
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202 Although it has no official status, the Scottish Constitutional Convention (SCC) launched in 1989 
provides an example of how a constitutional convention could work. It is made up of 
representatives of the Scottish Labour Party, the Scottish Liberal De~nocrats and representatives 
of other parts of Scottish civic society: the trade unions, churches, women's movement, ethnic 
minority groups and sections of the business and industrial The aim of the SCC 
was to develop a workable and realistic scheme for a Scottish Parliament. The SCC proceeded 
initially through working groups and prepared a draft scheme in 1990. Issues which were left 
outstanding, such as proposals on gender balance, electoral system and constitutional 
implications at a UK level, were referred to a Constitutional Commission which was established 
in 1993. The Commission was a much smaller body which took expert evidence on these 
technical issues and reported its findings back to the Convention for decision. 
203 The Scottish Constitutional Convention has been successful in attracting support and achieving 
consensus in its decision making. In bringing together such a wide cross-section of people and 
engaging politicians in the process, the SCC has managed to be both educational and consultative and 
to combine technical advice with building political consensus. It represents a degree of cross-party 
co-operation which is quite alien to national politics (although not so uncommon at local Government 
level). Even so, two limitations should be noted: the Scottish Conservatives and the SNP both rehsed 
to participate in the Convention thus limiting the authority of its recommendations; and the consensus 
rule for decision making meant that where no such consensus could be reached, the Convention has 
remained silent. Hence its proposals do not deal exhaustively with all the issues that are raised by the 
prospect of devolution, nor have their proposals yet faced the test of implementation. 
204 Australia offers an example of some of the strengths and weaknesses of both the convention and 
commission models. A Constitutional Convention was set up in 1973 and deliberated until 1985. 
The Convention was made up of delegates from Federal and State Parliaments in order to 
generate non-partisan support necessary for constitutional amendments. It failed in this aim, 
hampered by the continuing hostilities caused by the dismissal of the Whitlam Government in 
1975.72 Frustrated with the Convention's lack of progress, in 1985 the Hawke Government 
established a Constitutional Commission in its place. The Commission was independent, made up 
of six members: two lawyers, two academics and two politicians and encompassed broader 
expertise through working groups which examined specific areas. Its remit was to conduct a 
hndamental review of the Australian Constitution and to report on its revision. 
205 The strengths of the Commission in comparison with the Convention were that it was not dominated 
by politicians and it based its findings on systematic and wide consultation. In addition, through 
public meetings held round the country the Commission played an important role in involving and 
educating the public in constitutional issues. On most areas the findings of the Commission were 
unanimous. Four of the Commission's proposals were put to referendums but were rejected by the 
electorate in September 1988. Any further impact has been hampered by loss of political interest in 
constitutional reform. Thls may be changing now with the revival of republicanism as a major issue. 
206 In relation to constitutional reform in the UK, Anthony Lester argues that "...a well constructed 
and well directed constitutional convention would be an effective means of promoting public 
education about the need for a new settlement, of preparing a well rounded scheme, of 
circumventing Whitehall resistance, and of limiting parliamentary Opp0sition".~3 The main 
difficulty in holding a constitutional convention on the constitutional reform agenda would be 
persuading parties other than those already committed in principle to reform to take part. 
I N Q U I R Y .  CONSULTATION A N D  CONSENSUS L 
of the 
constitutional reform agenda at once would be a massive task, which would make it difficult to 
sustain the same momentum as the more focused work of the SCC, and may run into similar 
problems as a Royal Commission. In addition, there will be political and practical pressures to 
proceed with measures at different speeds. 
207 A constitutional commission could be established as part of the reform process, providing a new 
agency which cut across Whitehall boundaries and would be "committed to the enterprise and has 
the expertise and authority to drive it alongM.'4 The advantages of such a constitutional 
commission would be its potential for ensuring that the reform programme as a whole is coherent 
and that the interaction of the various elements within it were fully thought through. It would be a 
means of removing thinking about, if not legislating on, constitutional questions from the political 
arena; would offer opportunities for public education and could develop as an independent point 
of reference for constitutional questions e.g. how to phrase referendum questions. It would not 
however remove the need for co-ordination of policy within Whitehall, discussed above. 
208 However, the Nolan Committee's report on the registration of MPs' interests demonstrated the 
difficulty of finding consensual solutions even to quasi-constitutional issues. There was some 
hostility to the recommendations of the Nolan Committee as they related to the House of 
Commons. The Select Committee set up to consider the implementation of the proposals accepted 
them all in principle, with some modifications and reserved for further consideration the question 
of consultancies. The House accepted the Committee's report, but Opposition resurfaced when the 
issue of consultancies came to be debated. The final decision was approved by a majority of 51, 
with the Prime Minister and several Conservatives opposing the change.75 Although implemented, 
the experience of Nolan shows that even if coherence is achieved at the planning and drafting 
stage of reform there is no guarantee that it will survive the parliamentary passage. In the case of 
a constitutional reform programme, opponents could effectively target the clauses that were 
dependent on one another and sabotage the whole package of reform. 
209 Another, longer term role, for a standing constitutional commission in the UK would be to monitor 
and revise constitutional changes and tackle issues referred to it by Government. This would 
emulate the role of the Law Commission, although its members would not be senior members of 
the legal profession and judiciary, but similar in professional background to the Nolan Committee. 
Indeed, some have regarded the work of the Nolan Committee on Standards in Public Life as 
foreshadowing the introduction of some independent constitutional monitoring machinery. 
210  Professor Rodney Brazier recommends two roles for a constitutional commission: 
e to consider and report on any constitutional provision which, in its opinion, were in need of 
clarification or reformulation. 
e to consider any aspect of the UK constitution referred to it by a Minister, and to report on 
whether and how it might be reformed.76 
21 1 It would provide an external and independent motor of reform and provide expert advice77 - to 
do for the constitution what the Law Commission does for the rest of English Law. In addition, a 
standing constitutional commission might take on the consolidation of piecemeal measures if 
each of the items on the reform programme were legislated for in a phased programme. 
However, there is no reason to expect that the recommendation of such a commission would be 
acceptable to Government or Parliament unless there were external pressures for ref0rm.~8 
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Public Consultation 
Manifesto Commitment 
21 2 The importance of a manifesto commitment is that it provides a means by which a Government 
can claim public support for a particular action. This has become especially important since the 
establishment of the Salisbury doctrine that the House of Lords will not vote against the principle 
of any measure included in a Government's election manifesto. Manifestos are more than a means 
by which a Government can claim public support for a particular action. Manifesto commitmenrs 
also make the party itself think through and declare its policy in advance of the election and 
educate opinion as well as preparing civil servants for the future. The most specific example of a 
manifesto pledge on constitutional reform is to be found in the two general elections of 1910, 
which were essentially fought on the question of whether the House of Lords' powers should be 
restricted and the party manifestos concerned themselves only minimally, if at all, with other 
matters. But it is more usual for manifesto commitments to be expressed very broadly. 
213 In other cases, the argument that the election of a Govemment gives an automatic mandate for all ' 
the policies outlined in a manifesto is obviously less credible, given that electors will usually vote 
for the 'best of all possible worlds', which is not the same as offering a rubber stamp of approval 
on all that party's policy commitments. Some would argue, as Baroness Birk, that a manifesto 
commitment on a constitutional matter does not give the Government carte blanche to enact 
legislation: "To say that an issue is constitutional does not mean that a change should never be 
made, but it should be made only with great care, great deliberation and great trepidation; and, 
too, only when a very strong case has been made out. This supersedes any  manifesto 
commitment."79 Even where Parliament accepts that a manifesto commitment sanctions the pursuit 
of a particular objective, it does not necessarily accept that the particular means of achieving the 
objective will also be regarded as sanctioned, as the Opposition in both Houses to the Conservative 
Government's two stage abolition of the GLC and Metropolitan Counties demonstrated. 
214 But whatever the limitations of a manifesto commitment as a guarantee of legislative sucess in 
goverment, they do not override the need to explain clearly in a manifesto the reforms a party intends to 
pursue in government. As Viscount Alexander of Hillsborough argued during the passage of the Life 
Peerages Act 1958, "on such a vital matter as amendment of the Constitution ... details of the proposed 
reforms should be submitted in any general appeal to the electorate for their mandate. It is not good 
enough simply to say in an election address ... We propose to deal with the reform of the House of Lords'." 
Green and White Papers 
2 15 The publication of Green and White Papers provide an opportunity for debate and consultation. 
At the very least, they will bring issues to the attention of MPs, particularly if parliamentary 
time is given to debating them. Publication of such documents should also serve to get the 
Government's proposals into the public arena and foster wider discussion and debate, although 
the dissemination of Green and White Papers is usually limited and prompts only limited formal 
feedback, unless accompanied by a more broad based public relations-consultation exercise. The 
numbers of responses to Government consultation papers is commonly lower than, for example, 
the numbers of people who ring into tabloid newspaper "decision-lines". Moreover, those who 
do choose to reply may not be representative of the population at  large - indeed, they are likely 
to over-represent extremist points of view and the opinions of those with vested interests. 
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The process of consultation through Green and White Papers can also take considerable time which 
mnisters may ill afford to lose - in the 1970s it took two years and nine months, a general election, 
one Green Paper and two White Papers (and a supplementary statement) before the introduction of 
the first devolution bill. However, this need not be the case - the time taken in the seventies resulted 
as much from Labour's political difficulties in pursuing devolution as from the technical task. So 
long as a reasonable period is allowed for consultation, unmanageable delay can be avoided. 
Governments in other countries have adopted different means of developing proposals for 
constitutional reform. One of the most recent examples is the Canadian Government's handling of its 
draft Charter of Rights. There were nationally televised hearings of a joint parliamentary committee 
on the Government draft of the Charter. The committee heard evidence from 1000 individuals and 
300 groups, leading to 65 substantial amendments to the original draft.80 This was of course also rime 
consuming and it should be noted that it took place in the context of much higher public awareness 
of constitutional and rights based issues than there is in the UK at present. However, it was an 
important factor in securing support for the final version of the Charter, giving the public a sense of 
ownership and in raising the level of understanding of its provisions and operation. 
Referendums 
Some would argue that, constitutional reform and referendums go together. In some countries, 
referendums are required before changes to the constitution can go ahead, and many other 
countries have chosen to use referendums to settle constitutional issues. In the UK, the doctrines 
of Ministerial responsibility and parliamentary Government mean that the use of a referendum 
sits uneasily in our constitutional tradition. However, four referendums have been held in 
Britain so far; one on EC membership and three others on the constitutional status of Northern 
Ireland, Scotland and Wales. It seems likely that we will see further referendums in the near 
future. All three main parties either support, or have not ruled out a referendum on further 
European integration; and whichever party is in power, some form of referendum is likely to 
accompany any settlement in Northern Ireland. In addition, the Labour Party has promised 
referendums on electoral reform and the introduction of elected assemblies in the English 
regions, and the Liberal Democrats have promised to extend powers to hold referendums to local 
and regional Government and to introduce advisory citizens' initiative referendums. 
A. V. Dicey first introduced the referendum into main stream British political debate in 1890. He 
argued that the referendum would "protect the Constitution from sudden changes, and thus 
ensure that every amendment in the fundamental laws of the land shall receive the deliberate 
sanction of the people ...".8' Like most advocates of the referendum, Dicey had his own political 
concerns in mind when supporting its introduction. He believed that it would act as a block on 
Home Rule for Ireland - a 'national veto'. The referendum was seen as a conservative device 
which, in the absence of more rigid constitutional requirements, could prevent a Government 
from making constitutional changes without demonstrating broad support. 
This use of the referendum as an extra check on the Government resurfaced during the crisis 
over Lloyd George's 1909 Budget. During debates about the Parliament Act 191 1, various 
Proposals were made involving the use of the referendum including: 
as a means of resolving conflicts between the two Houses, i.e. an alternative to the Parliament 
Act's removal of the Lords' veto. 
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@ as an addition to the Parliament Act, obligatory for 'constitutional' legislation. 
9 as a regular part of government, to be u ~ e d  on issues where the two Houses reached deadlock 
and when 200 MPs petitioned for one. 
221 Such proposals failed to attract support. "The referendum was a necessity only when the absolute 
veto of the Lords was dying, but not before"" and proposals for its use were perceived as being 
driven by political expediency: the Unionists were split over free trade and the promise of a 
referendum on the issue was a means of healing party splits and allowing free-traders to remain 
within the Party. 
222 After the passage of the Parliament Act proposals for the use of the referendum resurfaced 
periodically, including a suggestion by Churchill that one be used to extend the term of the 
wartime coalition government. However, the referendum only re-emerged as a major political issue 
in the late 1960s in the context of Northern Ireland and membership of the European Community. 
223 The Ireland Act 1949 stipulated that Northern Ireland would not cease to be part of the UK without 
the consent of the Stormont Parliament. With the prorogation of Stormont in 1972 'a system of 
regular plebiscites' was promised as an alternative means of ascertaining the will of the people of 
Northern Ireland. The 1973 poll was the only one ever held. It consisted of two questions: 
Do you want Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom? 
Do you want Northern Ireland to be joined with the Irish Republic outside of the United Kingdom? 
224 The Government argued that a referendum would remove the border issue from political debate 
by resolving it through a referendum. Critics of the referendum pointed out that the result was 
determined by the borders set by the partition in 1921 and was bound to reflect the Protestant 
majority in Northern Ireland. The Republicans dismissed the poll as a propaganda exercise and it 
was boycotted by the majority of the Catholic population. The turnout was 58.7010, of whom 
98.9% voted to  remain within the UK. The legitimacy of the referendum result was never 
accepted by the Catholic community in Northern Ireland and the simple 'yes-no' formula of a 
referendum was criticised as an inadequate way of dealing with the complex issues involved. 
225 The idea of a referendum on EC membership was first put forward by the Liberals in 1969 as the 
only means by which deep divisions over Europe in the country as a whole could be resolved. In 
the 1970 general election both main parties were committed to entry into the EC and opposed to 
a referendum on the issue. However as the Conservative Government negotiated detailed 
conditions for entry, divisions grew within both the main parties and calls for a referendum 
gained renewed strength. 
226 A Conservative back-bencher's amendment to the European Communities Bill providing for a 
referendum was not supported by the Labour Party, but this stance was undermined by 
Pompidou's announcement that a referendum on admitting the new member states would be 
held in France. As Vernon Bogdanor notes, "not only was Britain the only country of the four 
then seeking admission to the EEC (Britain, Denmark, Ireland and Norway) which would not be 
holding a referendum, but it now appeared that the French electorate would be offered the right 
denied to the British of determining whether there was 'full-hearted consent' for British entry."83 
227 The Labour Party changed its policy and campaigned in both the 1974 general elections on a 
platform of renegotiating Britain's entry terms and promised that the electorate would be 
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allowed to decide 'through the ballot box' whether or not to accept these terms. This left open 
the possibility of holding another general election, but it would have been the third election in 
eighteen months and divisions within the Labour Party made a referendum the more attractive 
option. The Cabinet was split sixteen in favour to seven against continued membership and the 
rest of the Party was similarly divided.84 Collective responsibility on this issue was suspended for 
the duration of the referendum campaign and members of the Party participated in both of the 
two umbrella organisations co-ordinating the campaigns for and against continued membership. 
228 The referendum attracted a high turnout of 64010 of the electorate, of which 67.2% voted 'yes' and 
32.8% voted 'no'. Even with this decisive result, current debates about Britain's continuing role in 
Europe illustrate that although the referendum defused political tensions about Europe in the short 
term, it in no way decided the issue once and for all. For the Labour Party, the gamble of holding a 
referendum paid off. The Party's pledge to hold a referendum was popular with the electorate and 
may have conbibuted to the Labour Party's electoral success in the 1974 elections85 and in the longer 
term it also served to maintain Party unity in a way that might have been impossible otherwise. 
229 Although the White Paper on the EC Referendum stressed "the unique nature of the issueW,86 
eighteen months later the Government was forced to concede two further referendums on 
devolution to Scotland and Wales. The reasons were again largely to do with internal party 
discipline. The original Scotland and Wales Bill did not include provision for a referendum, and 
was never desired by the Government. But with some Labour Party back-benchers strongly 
opposed to the measure, the Government hopcd that the concession of a referendum would 
secure the legislation's passage through Parliament. The introduction of an amendment making 
provision for a referendum was controversial in itself. It was conceded at second reading once 
the passage of the Bill appeared in danger and was seen as establishing a precedent allowing a 
Government to hold a referendum as a way of overcoming parliamentary Opposition to a 
measure.87 In the end the Government failed to secure a guillotine and the Bill was abandoned. 
230 When separate Bills were introduced for Scotland and Wales they included provision for 
referendums, but this time the Government came under pressure to include a 40% threshold. 
This required that 40% of the eligible electorate vote 'yes' before devolution went ahead. An 
amendment to this effect was canied on both Bills.88 The Scottish and Welsh referendums were 
held on I March 1979. In Scotland, although a majority of those who voted were in favour of 
devolution (5 1.60/0), the 'yes' votes failed to reach the 40% threshold (32.8%). In Wales there was 
a resounding vote against devolution (79.7% voted 'no'). 
231 The concession of referendums on devolution is a lesson in how not to do it. The circumstances in 
which the Government conceded the referendum provision during the second reading of the 
original Scotland and Wales Bill meant it was on the defensive from tlle start. The Scotland and 
Wales Acts have been much criticised and it has been argued that had the Government known 
from the beginning that its proposals would be subject to a referendum their approach may have 
been more coherent.89 The complex sharing out of responsibilities, differences between the 
measures proposed for Scotland and Wales and the perception that the proposals represented 
politically expedient solutions rather than a principled approach made them very difficult to 
defend, let alone promote. None of this was helped by the background to the devolution 
referendums: the winter of discontent and the struggles of a minority Government to stay in 
power. 
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232 As Europe once again became a major issue in British politics, the referendum debate re-emerged. 
During the 1990 Tory leadership campaign, Margaret Thatcher refused to rule out a referendum on 
economic and monetary union. More recently the issue of whether or not to hold a referendum on 
the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty was a dominant theme during its parliamentary passage, 
particularly in the House of Lords. The Government's objections to a referendum were that it would 
represent an abdication of responsibility by the House and the Govemment and that one was 
neither necessary nor appropriate. 
233 The Labour Party explained its Opposition to a referendum in similar terms, claiming that it 
would undermine parliamentary democracy. Although much of the campaigning for a 
referendum came from the Euro-sceptics, the Liberal Democrats also supported a referendum but 
from a pro-European perspective. The Liberal Democrats argued that a referendum would 
involve the public in the debate and that as sovereignty belonged to the people, not Parliament, 
it was the people that should make the decision to transfer more sovereignty to Europe. 
234 After the four referendums of the 1970s the argument that referendums have no place in the 
British constitutional tradition is hard to sustain. All of the major referendums held to date were$ 
about 'constitutional measures' and it is going to be impossible for any Govemment embarking 
on major constitutional change to avoid the issue of whether or not they should be used. 
235 There are several arguments in favour of their continued use. First, constitutional change is an issue 
in which Government may have a vested personal and professional interest and its judgement and 
that of its MPs should therefore be subject to a more detached check. In addition, strict party 
discipline normally undermines the ability of MPs to act on their own considered judgement, whereas 
the referendum allows MPs greater scope to break with the party line (without endangering the 
Government they may in general support). In the absence of a written constitution, the referendum 
also provides a limited means of entrenchment. This can operate in three ways: 
o the weight of precedent and convention can make it difficult for a Government to implement 
a measure without holding a referendum. 
e a Government can pass legislation requiring a referendum before a change could be made. 
e the use of referendum in securing a change can establish a precedent making it difficult for 
the measure to be reversed without a second referendum. 
236 Although in theory Parliament could choose to ignore precedent or pass legislation reversing any 
formal requirement to hold a referendum, it would be a controversial route to follow. In this way 
the referendum can help to secure our constitutional arrangements and act as a guard against 
hasty and unwanted change. The ability of the referendum to settle issues once and for all should 
however be treated with caution. At best a referendum can offer a 'snapshot' of public opinion in 
respect of a specific issue and whilst it can give a decision legitimacy it cannot provide an 
authoritative answer for all time, and the sovereignty of Parliament means that the power to 
legislate against a referendum result, however recent or overwhelming, remains with Westminster. 
237 Finally, referendums involve the electorate much more directly in public decision making, and 
as a result can have an educative effect and increase voter participation in debate about public 
issues. This may not be enough to overcome voter apathy, but could go some way to countering 
the growing resentment of politicians making decisions without sufficient consultation with the 
public. Popular support for referendums is high: in 1968 a poll found that 69% of respondents 
believed that Britain should adopt a referendum system and the 1995 MORI/Joseph Rowntree 
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Reform Trust 8 MORI Stnte of the Nation survey showed that this belief has been strengthened 
with 77% of respondents coming out in favour of the greater use of referendums.90 
On the other hand, referendums are not a panacea. Political expedience rather than democratic 
principle has been the dominant theme in past UK referendums and unless rules or conventions 
are developed for the use of referendums, it is likely to remain so. There are no guarantees that a 
Government will receive the referendum result it wants, nor that Parliament will accept 
legislation that gives effect to policy agreed through referendum. In addition, referendum results 
are difficult to divorce from the overall standing of the Government. Some also argue that 
referendums are a bad way to make decisions, simplifying issues by forcing a 'yes or no' answer 
which is unable to reflect shades of opinion and placing heavy reliance on the choice and 
wording of the question. Moreover, their outcome can be affected by the unequal provision of 
information and resources. There is also a more hndamental argument of principle that, by 
returning decision making to the electorate, referendums detract from MPs' representative role 
and undermine Ministerial responsibility and parliamentary sovereignty (although Parliament 
continues to decide which issues go to a referendum and, as mentioned above, is not formally 
bound by a referendum result unless it chooses to be and its successor might choose not to be). 
Some of these problems can be minimised through the way in which questions are set, adequate 
and fair provision for dissemination of information and the careful use of referendum results, but 
referendums should still be recognised as blunt instruments by which to resolve complex issues. 
The use of a referendum on one constitutional measure will generate political pressure for the 
consistent use of referendums in relation to further constitutional change. For example, if the 
agreement which results from the Inter-Governmental Conference is considered to be 
constitutionally significant and therefore to warrant a referendum, it is going to be very difficult to 
argue that other major constitutional measures such as devolution should not also be subject to a 
referendum. Similarly with the commitments to a referendum on electoral reform and on a 
settlement in Northern Ireland - indeed a referendum on Ireland's future relationship with the UK 
and Eire - will offer an obvious parallel for Scotland and Wales. However, opponents of the use of 
referendums will be able equally to point to major constitutional changes which have not required a 
referendum, e.g. the Parliament Acts, the Maastricht Treaty and successive parliamentary 
Even if it is not planned to hold a referendum on a measure, the possibility of being forced to 
concede one should be anticipated. The experience in the 1970s where referendums on 
devolution to Scotland and Wales were held, show how damaging the failure to anticipate such 
a concession can be. It is preferabIe to anticipate irresistible pressure for a referendum and 
propose it (or at least have advanced contingency plans for one), than to be forced onto the 
defensive and concede a referendum unprepared. 
Within a major programme of constitutional change, the timing of any referendums is going to 
be an important consideration. Practical decisions will need to be made about whether 
referendums should be pre- or post-legislative, and the legislative programme and strategic 
planning will have to take into account: 
<: the areas in which it is held (e.g. should a referendum on Scottish devolution be held only in 
Scotland or throughout the UK?). 
the use of thresholds. 
I the timing and potential controversy of any enabling legislation. 
-- 
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the timing in relation to othcr elections e.g. European Parliament elections. 
time needed to mount an information campaign. 
time needed for implementation, or drafting, of legislation to give expression to any decision 
arrived at. 
the fact that referendum results are difficult to divorce from the overall standing of the 
government. 
0 who should be responsible for each of these stages i.e. should they be handled within 
Government or by some external body? 
Conclusion 
243 This century has seen repeated attempts in the shape of inter-party conferences and independent 
inquiries to debate constitutional issues at a step removed from normal party hostilities. However, 
few of these attempts have resulted in legislation which had cross-party support and in some cases 
failed efforts to achieve consensus may even have hindered the passage of the legislation. This may 
reflect the inherent difficulty of turning a compromise over wording and content into legislative 
form: "Nothing is more hampering to the Parliamentary Counsel, when drafting stage is reached, 
than to be obliged to build what is usually a complex s h c t u r e  round 'sacred phrases' or forms of 
words which have become sacrosanct by reason of their having been agreed upon in Cabinet or in 
one of its committees. A still more serious objection to agreed form of words of this kind is that they 
often turn out to represent agreement upon words only, concealing the fact that no real compromise 
or decision has been reached between conflicting views up on some important question."92 
244 A Government embarking on consultation must therefore be realistic about what can be 
achieved. Each of the consultation mechanisms discussed in this chapter has merits and 
disadvantages. The benefits of consultation can be that it: 
produces more widely acceptable policy and technically accurate legislation. 
allows for compromise before final decisions are made. 
allows for the strength and nature of opposition to be assessed. 
a provides a means for building support for a measure. 
educates the public and MPs about the issues involved. 
lends weight and authority to the position the Government takes. 
245 One of the key determinants in the success of consultation will be political will. It is also crucial 
that objectives are clearly defined and realistic - governments have tended to expect too much 
from consultation, which can only ever serve a limited number of functions. In designing 
mechanisms for consultation and inquiry, effective planning can minimise the chances of: 
producing compromises which are unworkable in legislation. 
identifying and entrenching opposing views. 
a forcing a Government onto the defensive. 
a providing a focus for opposition to a measure. 
making the Government look indecisive and directionless. 
246 A further reason for the lack of success of consultation mechanisms may be that they are usually 
entered into as a defensive act, resorted to only when the usual political channels fail. As Professor 
Rodney Brazier points out: "[Governments] do not look ahead and use departmental committees, 
Royal Commissions, inter-party talks and the like in a planned way, in order to see how Ministerial 
initiatives on the constitution might be improved. Rather, those mechanisms are resorted to only 
when events leave them no other choice."g3 

1 DELIVERING CONSTITIJTIONAL REFORM 
1 Throughout the report, historical PI-ecedents have been used to illustrate the backdrop to reform 
and to assist in identifying the conventions that govern the passage of constitutional reform 
measures. This Appendix is a factual summary of the key features of 17 key constitutional reform 
measures this century presented in a series of tables. The factors identified in each case include: 
@ manifesto commitment; 
@ the nature of any pre-legislative coiisultation or inquiry. 
e the Government's parliamentary majority and date of the general election. 
@ the Minister responsible for the Bill. 
GB the parliamentary procedure adopted. 
@ the parliamentary time taken. 
e the use of a referendum. 
Manifesto Commitment 
2 A manifesto commitment provides a means by which a Government can claim public support for a 
particular action. The tables quote any commitment made by the party of Government in the previous 
election campaign relating to the reform considered. In some cases there was no commitment, and it1 ' 
others no clear commitment to legislation. See also paragraphs 1 53 - 154 and 2 12 - 2 14. 
Pre-legislative Consultation 01- Inquily 
3 A wide variety of consultative and inquiry mechanisms have been used to develop policy, 
broaden support for existing policy or negotiate settlements. This has led to an expectation that 
constitutional change should be preceded by consultation. The various consultative mechanisms 
which have been used in relation to constitutional reform this century are identified in the 
tables. See also paragraphs 164 - 246. 
The Government's Parliamentary Majority and Date of the General Election 
4 The size of the ruling party's majority in the House of Commons is, of course, a key determinant 
of the ease with which constitutional reform measures can be  secured.94 Alliances between 
parties have not necessarily proved to be more effective at facilitating the passage of reform - in 
part because of the need for delicate management of internal conflicts. And there will always be 
some back-bench rebels on any issue and on constitutional reform more than most (the clearest 
examples in these tables are the Parliament No. 2 Bill to reform the House of Lords in 1968-9 
and the Maastricht Bill 1993. See also paragraphs 28 and 156. 
Minister Responsible for the Bill 
5 The lead policy Minister is generally the Minister to introduce the measure at second reading, 
supported by a junior Minister from the same department or a Cabinet Minister from another 
department directly involved. The lead Ministers identified in the tables provide a guide as to 
where the policy responsibility for constitutional measures has been assigned in the past. For five 
of the bills examined the lead Minister in the House of Commons was the Leader of the House 
and for three the Home Secretary. However, internal party politics and the personal standing and 
authority of an individual will have as much, if not greater, bearing on his or her ability to steer a 
bill through Parliament than any formal title or Cabinet rank. See also paragraphs 64 - 7 1. 
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Parliamentary Procedure Adopted 
6 Parliamentary procedure for constitutional measures differs from the procedure for ordinary bills 
only in that the committee stage of the bill in the House of Commons is taken in a committee of 
the whole House, i.e. on the floor of the House, rather than in a standing committee. All but one 
of the measures included in this table were handled in this way. The use of timetabling motions 
(guillotines) is also a feature of the more recent attempts at constitutional reform. See also 
paragraphs 74 - 163. 
Parliamentary Time Taker1 
7 The time taken for constitutional measures has tended to be a lot greater than for other bills. 
This is in part because of the levels of controversy they cause and in part because of the use of a 
committee of the whole House. The tables show the amount of time constitutional bills have 
taken to get through their various stages in both the House of Commons and House of Lords. 
These times have been rounded to the nearest hour and should be treated as a close guide rather 
than exact figures. See also paragraphs 87 - 92 and 116 - 138. 
Use of a Refel-endurn 
8 The use of referendums in the UK is a fairly recent phenomenon, the first being held in the 
1970s. Since then, there have been repeated calls for referendums - especially on European 
issues. It is unlikely that any future constitutional measure will survive its parliamentary passage 
without being subjected to demands that a referendum be held. The tables identify the 
constitutional measures which have been the subject of a referendum and where sustained 
argument has been raised in favour of holding one. See also paragraphs 2 18 - 242. 
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The Uni t  would l ike to thank Lena Troth and Helen Fox for their assistance in the preparation o f  these tables. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION I N  THE 20TH CENIURY I 
-- 
Purpose i An Act to  make provision with respect to the powers of the House of Lords in relation to 
j those o f  the House of Commons, and to limit the duration of Parliament. 
i 6 clauses, no schedules (8 clauses, no schedules) 
Manifesto Commitment January 1910 General Election - Liberal Manifesto 1- i "The limitation of the [House of Lords'] veto is the first and most urgent step to be taken ..." 
Pre-legislative 
consultation or inquiry 
December 1910 General Election - Liberal Manifesto 
"As lately as January in the present year, I expounded to you in detail, and you approved 
by a decisive majority at the poll, the present aims of Liberal policy ...... l ask you to repeat, 
with still greater emphasis, the approval which only eleven months ago you gave to the 
proposals o f  His Majesty's Government." 
Constitutional Convention April 1910 (failed) 
Election Date i 14 January - 9 February 1910 and 2-19 December 1910 
Parliamentary Majority : C. 272 Lab. 42 
: Lib. 272 Irish Nat. 84 
House o f  Csnanacaras 
Lead Minister i Prime Minister 
Supporting Ministers (most other Cabinet Ministers spoke at some point) 
_1_1_1_- 
Hours spent i Vote ( i f  taken) : Comments 
First Readina i 14 i 351-227 ; same bill had been presented April 1910 
I Second ~ e a l n ~  I 28 j 368-243 - - 
i Committee Stage i 95 
--- 
i CWH 
! Report Stage - : 15 
I guillotined ; 281-200 
Third Reading 1 7  i 362-241 
Consideration o f  1 10 i first day of debate adjourned by Speaker due to 
1 Lords Amendments i grave disorder 
I-- 
-PA-- 
Introduced by 
-- 
Second Reading 
-- 
Committee Stage 
Report Stage 
Third Reading 
Consideration o f  
Commons Amendments I 
Total Parliamentary i House of Commons: 169 
Time lhoursl I House of Lords: 72 
Referendum 
Total: 241 
i (qeneral discussion of the role of the House of Lords and its relationship with the House 
i 6f Commons dominated the orevious session) I 
i proposed I 
- 
- -. 
1 DELIVERING CONST l?UT lONA l  REFORM 
I Purpose i An Act to amend the Law with respect to Parliamentary and Local Government 
i Franchises and the Registration of Parliamentary and Local Government Electors, and the 
: conduct of elections, and to provide for the Redistribution of Seats at Parliamentary 
Elections, and for other purposes connected therewith. 
I (gave vote to all Inen over 21 and all women over 30) 
. -- 
33 clauses, 9 schedules (47 clauses, 9 schedules) 
--  - - - 
Manifesto Commitment January and December 1910 General Elect~ons 
-- 
None 
- -  - - - - - 
, Pre-legislative Speakers Conference - leglslat~on based on agreement reached there 
consultation or Inquiry - - I 
- - - - - -- - - - - -- - I 
Election Date 2-19 December 1910 I 
-p-- - - - -- -- - -- .- - - 
Parliamentary Majority C 272 Lab. 42 1 
Llb 272 lr~sh Nat 84 
- - - - - 
- - - -  - - - I 
- 
I 
I 
Lead Min~ster  Secretary of State for Colon~es 
-- - - - -  - 
Supporting Ministers Secretary of State Home Department 
Hours spent Vote ( i f  taken) 
First Reading no debate 
Second -- Reading 14 - 
Committee Stage 114 
6 
Report Stage 
~ h i r d  Read& 
Consideration o f  18 
Lords Amendments 2 
Comments 
CWH 
recommitted for a further hours to add 2 further 
amendments - 3R followed immediatelv 
- - - 
vote to recomm~t o committee 
- - 
some amendments agreed to I 
amendment on alternative vote returned to Lords twlce ( 
I 
Introduced by Joint Parliamentary Secretary of National Service Department 
Hours spent Vote ( i f  taken) Comments 
First Reading < 1 
Second Reading 11 
Committee Stage 46 
Report Stage 13 
Third Reading 1 
Consideration of 5 
Commons Amendments 2 
some amendments insisted on - returned to Commons. 
amendments insisted on - returned to Commons. 
Total Parliamentary House of Commons: 220 
Time (hours) House of Lords: 79 
Total: 299 
Referendum no (one proposed on the enfranchisement of women) 
- 
CONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION IN T H E  20TH CENTURY 
An Act to provide for the better Government of Ireland (recognised part~tion) 
70 clauses, 6 schedules (76 clauses, 9 schedules) 
Manifesto Commitment December 1918 General Electron - Coalition Manifesto 
"Ireland IS unhappily rent by contend~ng forces, and the main body of lrlsh opinlon has 
seldom been more Inflamed that In IS at the present moment So long as the lrlsh 
question remains unsettled, there can be no polltlcal peace e~ther In the United Kingdom 
or the Emplre, and we regard ~t a one of the frrst obligations of British statesmanship to 
explore all practical paths towards the settlement of this grave and difficult questlon on 
the basis o f  self-government. But there are two paths which are closed - the one leading 
to a complete severance of Ireland from the British Empire, and the other to the forcible 
submission of the six countles of Ulster to a Home Rule Parliament against their will In 
imposlng these two l~m~tat ions, we are only acting in accordance wlfh the declared 1 
views of all Engllsh polltical leaders 
-- ---  - - -- - - - - - - -- - - 
consultation or Inquiry 
- - -- - - -- ---- - -- - - - - - - 
14 Decenlber 1918 - i 
C 23 
- I 
Parliamentary Majority Coallt~on S~nn Fein 73 
Unionists 335 Irish Unionist 25 Others 10 I 
Coalition Llb 133 Lib. 28 
Coalltlon Lab 10 Lab 63 I 
Irish Nat 7 
- 
- 
-1 
Prlme Mln~ster 
I 
' Supporting Ministers Chief Secretary for Ireland 
I 
1 Flrst Reading 
I ; Second Reading 
I Committee Stage 
j Report Stage 
j Third Reading 
I 
Consideration o f  
Lords Amendments 
! 
Introduced by 
First Reading 
Second Reading 
Committee Stage 
Report Stage 
1 Third Reading 
Consideration of 
Commons Amendments 
Total Parliamentary 
Time (hours) 
Leader of the House 
Hours spent Vote ( i f  taken) 
no debate 
16 348-94 
57 
Lord Chancellor 
Hours spent Vote [if taken) 
no debate 
19 164-75 
24 
4 
1 
1 
House o f  Commons: 92 
House o f  Lords: 49 
Total: 141 
Comments i 
I 
proposed 20 day limit on remaining stages of the Bill , 
CWH 
I 
Comments 
Referendum 
- - . -- - 
1 DELIVERING CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
pt I (reduced Lords' power of delay to 1 year 1911. - passed under the 191 1 Parliament Act) 
Purpose 
t 2 clauses, no schedules 
- 
Manifesto Commitment July 1945 General Election - Labour Manifesto 
i "We give clear notice that we will not tolerate obstruction of the people's will by the 
i House of Lords." 
- 
Pre-legislative : Conference of Party Leaders 1948 -failed to reach agreement. 
consultation or inquiry : King's Speech debate 
-- 
Election Date ! 5 July 1945 
-- 
Parliamentary Majority C. 213 Lab. 393 Others 20 
j Lib. 12 Communist 2 
House o f  Commons 
Lead Minister : Secretary of State for Home Affairs 
Supporting Ministers Attorney-General 
1947 
Hours spent j Vote ( i f  taken) ' Comments 
I l f I l f I l f . I l f I l f I l f I l f I l f I l f I l f I l f I l f  
First Reading i no debate I 
--
- ~ 
Second Reading j 13 j 345-194 
--- - 
Committee Stage 1 3  
-- 
i CWH 
- 
Report Stage : reported without amendment 
P 
Third Reading r 4 i 340-1 86 
--  --- 
Consideration o f  i no 
Lords Amendments i amendments 
-- 
1949 
Hours spent j Vote ( i f  taken) i Comments 
%,-.-p<mr- --_.___( =---.--- -.---.----&.=&.- = s<>m,a-nmw- 
First Reading i no debate : 
.- 
Second Reading : 7 1 333-196 
Committee Stage i no debate : 286-1 17 j CWH 
: considered without amendment or debate to meet 
Parliament Act 191 1 requirements 
Report Stage i reported without amendment 
- - 
Third Reading i 4 : 340-187 
Consideration o f  I no 
Lords Amendments amendments 
continued 
CONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION IN T H E  20TH CENTURY 1 
Parliment Act 1949 continued 
House sf Lords 
Introduced by : Lord President 
1947 
-- 
A - 
Hours spent i Vote (if taken) i Comments 
First Reading i no debate 
Second Reading i 17 i 81-177 i refused 2nd reading 
-- 
Committee Stage 
Report Stage 
Third Readinq 
Consideration o f  
Commons Amendments 
---->-- --- - 
1949 
- 
Hours spent Vote ( i f  taken) Comments 
-- ----- .s-- ---> 
First Readina no debate 
Second Reading 2 37-1 10 refused 2nd readlng for second tltne passed under 
Parliament Act 191 1 
-- 
Committee Stage 
A- --- 
Report Stage 
-- - - 
Third Readinq 
Consideration o f  
Commons Amendments i 
I Total Parliamentary i House of Commons: 1947,20; 1949, 11 
Time (hours) i House of Lords: 1947, 17; 1949, 2 
Total: 1947, 37; 1949, 13 
Referendum i no 
- 
j DELIVERING CONSTITUTIONAL RCFORM 
-- -- -- 
-- - . .. . 
i An Act to make provision for the creation of life peerages carrying the right to sit and 
; vote in the House of Lords. 
2 clauses, no schedules 
-- -- - 
Man~festo Commitment May 1955 General Election - Conservative Man~festo 
: "It has long been the Conservative wish t o  reach a settlement regarding the reform of 
r the House o f  Lords, so that i t  may c o n t i n ~ ~ e  to play i t s  proper role as a Second Chamber 
I under the Constitution. The Labour Party's refusal to take part in the conversations we 
i have proposed on this subject must not be assumed to have postponed reform 
indefinitely. We shall continue to seek the co-operation o f  others in reaching a solution. 
We believe that any changes made now should be concerned solely with the 
composition of the House." - 
Pre-legislative Legislation in accordance with principles established a t  failed Conference o f  
consultation or inquiry : Party Leaders 1948. 
I -- ----A -~ . . 
I Election Date 26 May 1955 
, _ ~ 
- -- 
, Parliamentary Majority C. 344 Lib. 6 
! Lab. 277 Others 3 
I _ - . _  . -  - - -  - .  _ 
. ---- ~ -~ 
.. -- -- . - . - .- - - - - -. . -- 
, 
I j 1__._7=ai:.:Tli__~i._-_ ,<=.A=, ~ .-.-.:- .--- :.: ...l ~5 --_:-=l_i9- 
j Lead Minister i Secretary State for the Home Department 
-- 
- 
1 Supporting Ministers : Lord Privy Seal 1 __=_^_.._~_ l.-l_* ____L-z_____^_,.: ..-...-.--_l_,,_ -l- xl-l."=__==L-rl=%=== - .>%.._.-,l -zx- L.===l-==.% - i=<._l - ..* .^=:. 
Hours spent : Vote ( i f  taken) : Comments 
1 L.:_.i __-.--> "._ii_.,__i . .- _Y_l/j_r_lx_lr =. _ _  ____i.m_ --~Jis:L_- =i=_.=ij=i ~-.- '=.=-_ :_=: __<=_ 
First Reading no debate 
.- I Second Reading - : 12 305-251 : Crown consent given at 2R 
-- 
-- 
/ Committee Stage : 4 I CWH 
~. -- I ~ G i r s t  age reported without amendments -- ~ -- . Third Reading 3 292-241 
-- 
--pdP .-  -. . -- -  -- - p- 
1 Consideration o f  none 1 Lords Amendments 
- -~ 
- --I- _ ~ -- - -  - 
Total Parliamentary : House of Commons: 19 
Time (hours) House o f  Lords: 19 
Total: 38 
- 
Referendum I no 
------.-----.-pp.--..---- ~ 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION IN  THE ZOTH CENTURY ( 
Purpose i An Act to authorise the disclaimer for life of certain hereditary peerages; to include among 
i the peers qualified to sit in the House of Lords all peers in the peerage of Scotland and 
r peeresses in their own right in the peerages of England, Scotland and the UK; to remove 
certain disqualifications of peers in the peerage of Ireland in  relation to the House of 
i Commons and elections thereto ; and for purposes connected with the matters afore said. 
-- 
i 7 clauses; 2 schedules 
Manifesto Commitment none 
Pre-legislative i Main provisions arose out of the Stansgate case -Tony Benn MP's campaign to sit in the 
consultation or inquiry i House of Commons rather than succeed t o  his father's peerage - and the subsequent 
1 Report of the Joint Select Committee published in December 1962. The Conservatives 
i originally wanted the Joint Select Committee to consider composition and remuneration 
as well as the specific questions o f  peers' eligibility to sit in the Houses of Parliament 
i and vote in Parliamentary elections. Labour objected, saying that if the terms of 
i reference went beyond the immediate issue, they should also include functions and 
i powers. The Joint Committee was eventually established with narrow terms of reference 
.- 
i and included 11 MPs and 12 peers. 
Election Date 
- 
i 8 October 1959 
Parliamentary Majority ; C. 365 Lib. 6 
i Lab. 258 Others 1 
House sf  Consmons 
= TT 
Lead Minister i Chancellor of the Duchy (also Leader of the House) 
_ _ _ _ _ ; &  -. - 
Supporting Ministers i Attorney General 
Hours suent ' Vote (if taken) i Comments 1 
- -~ - - -- -- - 
'irst Reading i no debate 
Gcond Reading 1 5  j agreed to without division 
:ommittee Stage i 3 
- 
i CWH 
feport Stage i reported without amendment 
'hird Reading ; 3R followed on immediately 
Ionsideration of : i l  i amendment agreed to 
ords Amendments 
House o f  Lords 
itroduced by f Lord Chancellor 
i wrapped up by Lord President (Leader of Conservatives in Lords) 
Hours suent i Vote (if taken) i Comments 
rst Reading no debate 
1 5 :cond Reading 
ommittee Stage i 5 CWH 
sport Stage i <I 
l i rd Reading 1 < I  
msideration of i none 
Immons Amendments . 
ltal Parliamentary i House of Commons: 9 
n e  (hours) i House of Lords: 11 
Total: 20 
ferendum ; no 
- 
- - - 
f D E L I V E R I N G  CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
- 
Purpose j A Bill t o  Amend the law relating to the composition and powers of the House of Lords; 
: to make related provisions as to the Parliamentary franchise and qualification; and for 
i purposes connected therewith. 
i 20 clauses, 1 schedule 
.- 
-~ ~ -- 
Manifesto Commitment i March 1966 General Election - Labour Manifesto 
i "Legislation will be introduced to safeguard measures approved by the House of 
: Commons from frustration or delay by the House of Lords." 
Pre-legislative Inter-Party Conference - broke down after Lords rejected Southern Rhodesia Order 1968. 
consultation or inquiry j White Paper 
- --- 
Election Date 
.- 
: 31 March 1966 
-- - - 
Parliamentary Majority i C. 253 Lib. 12 
i Lab. 363 Others 2 
Hause o f  Commons 
- - 
Lead Minister Home Secretarv 
Supporting Ministers i Prime Minister, Leader of the House, Attorney General 
Hours s ~ e n t  : Vote (if taken) . Comments 
-- ~ - 
First Reading 
- 
i no debate i 
. .- 
Second Reading 1 6  j 285-135 
- 
Report Stage 
Third Readinq 
Queen gave support to government at second reading 
CWH 
Sheldon gave longest speech for 15 years 
Foot/Powell alliance 
withdrawn by PM - 
prioritisation of Industrial Relations and Merchant 
Shippinq Bill 
Consideration of 
Lords Amendments 
- - 
House o f  Lords 
- 
Introduced by Never reached Lords, but expected to have been supported 
----- 
Hours spent ! Vote ( i f  taken) ; Comments 
--- 
First Readinq 
Second Readinq 
Committee Stage 
-- 
- - - - -- 
--- 
Report Stage 
- - 
-- 
Third Readma 
Consideration of 
Commons Amendments : 
- - -- 
- -- - - -- --- 
Total Parliamentary House of Commons 85 
Time (hours) House of Lords 0 
Total 85 
-- -- - -- - - -- -- 
Referendum no 
- - - -- - - -- 
-- -  - -- - 
Purpose 
-  -  -- 
Manifesto Commitment 
- 
-- 
An Act to make provision in connection with the enlargement of the European 
Communities to include the United Kingdom, together with (for certain purposes) the 
Channel Islands, the Isle of Man and Gibralta. 
-- 
12 clauses, 4 schedules 
-- -- -. . 
June 1970 General Election - Conservative Manifesto 
"If we can negotiate the right terms, we believe that i t  would be in the long term 
interest o f  the British people for Britain to join the European Economic Community, and 
that i t  would make a major contribution to both the prosperity and the security of our 
country. ... Only when we negotiate will i t  be possible to determine whether the balance 
is a fair one, and in the interests of Britain. Our sole commitment is to negotiate; no 
more, no less. As the negotiations proceed, we will report regularly through Parliament 
to the country. A Conservative Government would not be prepared to recommend to 
Parliament, nor would Members of Parliament approve, a settlement which was unequal 
or unfair." 
- / P r G q i r l a t i v e  Select Committee 
consufiation or inquiry i Consultative committee 
-- 
- .- I -- Election Date 
- - -- 
18 June 1970 
~ 
Parliamentary Majority ' C. 330 SNP 1 
Lab. 287 Others 6 
Lib. 6 
L - - -. -  - - - -- -p.-p-p--p ~ ,- _ - - - _-- ___- 
i-.i.oi,rse of' corrrs.ijotts 
I -. ,. . ..&-=%.,,=. rL' z ~ . ~ 2 ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ = = r z . a - , = ~ ~ ~ > - . ~  .&?? 5.,z2%p-ae.>---L- -z* -m=-=..-------a-a --mm 
1 Lead Minister Chancellor of the Duchy o f  Lancaster 
/ 1 ._lJ__i__F ~ u ~ ~ o r t i n ~ ~ m e  Secretary, Foreign Secretary 
___= _____ri____--~v&p dSP .-am- 
First Reading i no debate : 
Second Reading 1 17 ; 309-301 
Committee Stage : 193 i CWH 
-- 
i splits in Labour made up for Cons. back-bench 
i 7 : 304-293 I rebellion guillotine introduced after 10 days of debate 
I R e ~ o r t  ~ t a a e  1 Bill reported without amendments 
301-284 16 C. noes 
4 C. and 13 Lab. abstentions 
Cons~deration of 
[ ~ ~ e n d m e n t s  none 
2-Eausc of k i3ydh 
. L 2 - __ _ _ - - -- - -a --=----=------ ------a-------4d-----n--d-L-7 
Introduced by Lord Chancellor 
----- -=.-a = - - - -  r _ , --_ _ _  -_ -- __Y__d - _lL-d- -------- Hours spent Vote (if taken) Comments 
- - - - -=-a -. -- -- -.= -.- ?-*a- -- 2 -&--!&=- - --- -------- -- 
First Readlng no debate 
Second Reading 13 189-19 3 l ~ n e  whlp I Committee Stage 29 -- -- -- Report Stage 13 - - - Thlrd Reading 8 161-21 - --/ Consideration o f  none 1 Commons Amendments 
_ - - - _ _ _ _ _  - 
_ -  y;~ [;;i;;entary House of Commons 223 House of Lords 63 
- 
- 
Total 286 
- -- 
- - 1 Referendum n o 
I - - - - - - 
- L- - - -- -- ----- -- 
..-. -- -  
1 DCLlVERlNG C O N S l l l U T l O N A L  REFORM 
Purpose To make new provision for the Government of Northern Ireland 
i 43 clauses, 6 schedules 
Manifesto Commitment ' June 1970 General Election - Conservative Manisfesto 
i None -direct rule re-imposed from Westniinster in 1972 
Pre-legislative I Cross Party Talks 
consultation or inauirv i White Paper 
Election Date i 18June 1970 
Parliamentary Majority C. 330 SNP 1 
i Lab. 287 Others 6 
i Lib.6 
House o f  Commons 
Lead Min~ster Secretary of State for Northern Ireland 
-- 
Supporting Ministers Pr~me M~nister, Secretary of State Home Department 
-=- 
Hours spent Vote ( i f  taken) Comments 
- -- - - - 
First Readinq no debate 
Second Reading 6 230-7 
Consideration o f  < 1 agreed to 
Lords Amendments 
- - - - -- - - - ---  - - -- - - -- - 
~ - ~ ~ , x - , - ~ L 7 . . z a x .  .-- 
--.--.--.--- - - . . --*- L-- - = T z ~ - ~ ~ - ~ - ~ - ~ ~ - ~ - ~ - - ~ - - - = z c . ~ = . .  ..->-=-==- 
 
Introduced by : Lord Privy Seal i I 
-- - -. - - 
I Second Readinq I 
-- - - -- - - 
Report Stage 
- - ----- - - 
Third Reading 
- - 
< 1 
- 
~onsiderai ion o f  
Commons Amendments 
Total Parliamentary House of Commons: 34 
Time (hours) House of Lords: 5 
Total: 39 
Referendum no 
-- -. - - - - - 
Comm~ttee and all subsequent stages taken In 
one day so Bill could be on statute book for f~rs t  
meet~ng o f  the new Assembly 
-- - - - - - 
taken ~rnmedrately 
taken - kmed la teb  - 
Purpose 
Manifesto Commitment 
To provide for the holding of a referendum on the United Kingdom's ,membership of the 
European Economic Community 
6 clauses, 1 schedule 
October 1974 General Election - Labour Manifesto 
"Our genuine concern is for democratic rights in sharp contrast to the Tory attitude. In 
the greatest single peacetime decision of this century- Britain's membership of the 
Common Market, British people were not given a chance to say whether or not they 
agreed with the terms accepted by the Tory Government. Both the Conservatives and the 
Liberals have refused to endorse the rights of our eople to make their own decision. 
Only the Labour Party is committed to the right oPmen and women of this country to 
make this unique decision. The Labour Government pledges that within twelve months 
of this election we will give the British people the final say, which will be binding on the 
Government - through the ballot box - on whether we accept the terms and stay in or 
reiect the terms and come out." 
-- - 
Pre-leg~slatrve Wh~te  Paper. Adjournment debate ~n the House of Commons 11 March 1975 
consultation or lnqulry Government won the vote 31 2 - 262 
- - 
Election Date 10 October 1974 
-- -- -- - - - - - - 
Parl~amentary Majority C 277 SNP 11 
Lab 319 PC 3 
Lib 13 Others 12 I---- -- - -- -- - - --- -- - - -1 
- - - --  -  - -- 
; 4 r i ~ l ~ i  Cif' ~ ~ F I T  WIO[?S 
- * - >- - -- --.-- -- A -- = =*--- -- -,------- - --a*- -= -- --= --- -- =- --- 
Lead M~nister Leader of the House 
-- - - 
Supporting Mln~sters Prime Mln~ster r-- --A --,-- --rm=--- Secretary o f  State for the a-5 Home Department --- - - = - - -*- 
Hours spent Vote ( ~ f  taken) Comments 
=-- --&-&- --- a - u- - --- -=--- - 
First Reading no debate 
Second Readlng 6 
-- 
3 12-248 
Committee Stage 2 1 
- - -- - -- - 
CWH 
- 
Report Stage 4 
-- -- -- - - - - -- -. - - 
Bill reported lmmedlately wlth amendments i -- Thlrd Readlng 1 180-41 
-- - - -- -- - -- - - -- -- 
I 
Consideratron o f  < 1 all agreed to 1 
, Lords Amendments 
L - - -  - - - --A -  -- --- - 
- -- - - 
- I 
I 1 I / Introduced by Lord Chancellor I 
I 
I Hours spent Vote (if taken) Comments 
I First Reading no debate 
1 Second Reading 
Committee Stage 3 
Report Stage no debate 
Third Reading no debate 
Consideration o f  
Commons Amendments 
, Total Parliamentary House of Commons: 32  
Time (hours) House o f  Lords: 6 
Total: 3 8  
Referendum June 1975 
i DELIVERING CONSTITOTIONAL R E F O R M  
- - -- - - -- - - 
- -- - -- - - - -- - - - 
I Purpose To provide for changes rn the Government o f  Scotland and Wales 
115 clauses, 16 schedules 
- - -- -- - -- -- -- - - 
~ a n i f e s t o  Commitment October 1974 General Elect~on -Cabour Man~festo 
1 
I I 
"The next Labour Government wrll create elected assembl~es In Scotland and Wales It I 
wlll also consult with the local authorit~es and other interested parties about the 
democratisat~on o f  those regional bodies whlch are at present non-accountable A 
1 
I 
I separate statement settrng out more detalled proposals has already been published by 1 
the Labour Party and the Government's proposals are set out ~n the Wh~ te  Paper 1 1 Separate man~festos are being published for Scotland and Wales I 
-- - - -- - - - - 
- - - 
I Pre-legislative Based on the f ~ n d ~ n g s  o f Royal Commlssron on the Constitution 1969 - 1973 I 
consultation or inquiry Green Paper June 1974 7 poss~ble schemes 
Two separate Whlte Papers 1974 
- -- - -- -- 
- - - - - - 
Elect~on Date 10 October 1974 
.- -- 
SNP 7 
i 
Parliamentary M a j o r ~ t y  C 277 I 
Lab 319 (lost 5 by-elect~ons '75-'77) PC 3 I 
Llb 13 Others 12 1 
- - - --- - - - - 
-- - -- - - - -- - - - 
- - -- -- -   - -- 
I 
- - -  - - 
: e l  I \  i 
I 
> -  . - a h -  & -  
Lead M i n ~ s t e r  Leader o f  the House 
- - - - 
- - --- - - - - 
Support~ng M~nis ters  Pr~me Minister 
Secretary o f  State for  Scotland and Wales 
I 
I 
I Chancellor o f  the Exchequer 
-- ------,-------~ -- a - _ = _  - I -1 --_- / 
Hours spent Vote ( ~ f  taken) Comments 
cL? " --.--- "- A*-&-=- - -- - z- - r-- -=- 8 --=- -sz---u A 
no debate 
- -- - -- 
- -- 
i I 
25 292-247 majority of 45 - secured votes by promising 
referendums 
proposal for a const~tutional convention - 
I defeated by 48 
I G m m l t t e e  Stage 93 CWH I 
I guillotined Govt. defeated on gu~ l l o t~ne  motlon introduced 
I m o t ~ o n  rejected after 10 days debate In committee 6 on guillotine 283-31 2 (22 Lab noes, 21 abstent~ons) 
BtII abandoned 1 -- - -- -- 
Report Stage 
- - - - - -- - 1 Thlrd Reading 
- - -- -- - 
Consideration o f  I Lords Amendments L__- -- -- - -- -- 
--=-- 
- 
-- -- - - -- -- --- 
- --- 
- --- - -  
- - - -  - -- 
Referendum 
LEGISLATION IN I I I E  20TH CENTURY 
pose ' To provide for changes in the Government of Scotland and in the Constitution and 
functions of certain public bodies 
; 83 clauses, 17 schedules 
nifesto Commitment October 1974 General Election - Labour Manifesto 
i "The next Labour Government will create elected assemblies in Scotland and Wales. 
; It will also consult with the local authorities and other ~nterested partles about the 
i democratisation of those regional bodies which are at present non-accountable. A 
i separate statement setting out more detailed proposals has already been published by 
the Labour Party and the Government's proposals are set out in the White Paper. 
j Separate manifestos are being published for Scotland and Wales." 
-- 
,-legislative i Based on the findings of Royal Commission on the Constitution 1969 - 1973 
isultation or inquiry ' Green Paper June 1974: 7 possible schemes 
i Two separate White Papers 1974 
. - 
-- 
ction Date 
-- i 10 October 1974 - -- 
~liamentary Majority : C. 277 SNP 7 
: Lab. 319 (lost 5 by-elections '75-'77) PC 3 
: Lib. 13 Others 12 
- - - - . . - ~ 
- pp 
Ws~rse of C Q ~ R R I B ~ S  
---- --- -:I 
3d Minister Leader of the House 
~ p o r t i n g  Ministers ' Prime Minister 
: Secretary of State for Scotland 
Hours spent i Vote (if taken) i Comments 
- 
st Reading i no debate i 
- --
cond Reading : 7 i 307-263 i 11 Labour MPs voted against 2R, 
.- 
i 4 Conservatives voted in  favor 
~mmittee Stage i CWH 
i ouillotine i auillotine introduced 2 davs after 2 R 
- J . 
i accepted 313-287 i I 
: 15 *port Stage I i 297-257 ~ i r d  Reading 1 7  
msideration of i 24 i uillotine accepted 292-274 on Lords amendments 
brds Amendments i i y239 of them) after 1 hours debate 
i 3 8 amendments returned to  the Commons I ! 
- 
House of  Lords 
7- 
troduced by Lord Chancellor 
---.3--.- 7- - =----- 
Hours spent Vote (if taken) Comments 
. --p=P--%- - ---&----.--- 
rst Reading no debate 
-- . I  
x o n d  Readlng 14 
ommittee Stage 91 B ~ l l  heavily amended 
eport Stage 2 2 
sp--- - 
hird Reading 8 
-- -- 
onsideratlon o f  7 Government accepted some 170 amendments 
ommons Amendments ~ncludlng 29 key concessions 
otal Parliamentary House of Commons. 158 
ime (hours) House of Lords: 142 
Total 300 
- - - -- - - -  
(eferendum March 1979 
- - - 
DELIVERING CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
Purpose To provide for changes in the Government of Wales and in the Constitution and 
i functions of certain public bodies 
j 84 clauses, 12 schedules 
Manifesto Commitment October 1974 General Election - Labour Manifesto 
i "The next Labour Government will create elected assemblies in Scotland and Wales. It 
i will also consult with the local authorities and other interested parties about the 
i democratisation of those regional bodies which are at present non-accountable. A 
separate statement setting out more detailed proposals has already been published by 
: the Labour Party and the Government's proposals are set out in the White Paper. 
i Separate manifestos are being published for Scotland and Wales." 
- 
Pre-legislative i Based on the findings of Royal Commission 
consultation or inquiry j Green Paper June 1974. 7 possible schemes 
; Two separate White Papers 1974 
Election Date i 10 October 1974 
Parliamentary Majority - C. 277 SNP 7 
i Lab. 319 (lost 5 by-elections '75-'77 PC 3 
i Lib. 13 Others 12 
.- 
House o f  Csrnmoras 
Lead Minister 
- 
j Leader of the House 
Supporting Ministers i Prime Minister 
; Secretary of State for Wales 
Hours spent i Vote ( i f  taken) Comments 
First Reading i no debate ; 
-- 
j 295-264 Second Reading i 7 hours 
; followed next j 
i day by guillotine j guillotine motion accepted 314-287 (3 hours) 
; motion 3 hours i 
i 64 Committee Stage CWH 
Report Stage i 7 i reported immediately with amendments 
--- 
Third Reading i 6 : 292-264 
Consideration o f  ; 17 i Government accepted 83 of the Lords 198 returned 
Lords Amendments 3 ; from Lords accepted amended version of two others 
- 
House o f  Lords 
Introduced by i Lord Chancellor 
Hours spent i Vote ( i f  taken) Comments 
First ~ e a d i n ~  i nodebate ; 
Second Reading .: 6 
---ppp 
Committee Staqe j 43 i Bill heavily amended 
Report Stage i 11 
- 
Third Reading 1 2  
- 
Consideration of i 5 i not agreed to 
Commons Amendments j 
Total Parliamentary i House of Commons: 107 
Time (hours) i House of Lords: 67 
-- 
Total: 174 
-- 
Referendum i March 1979 
- -- 
- -- - 
CONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION IN THE 20TH CENTURY 1 
- 
-- -- 
Purpose ; An Act to make provision for and in connection with the election of representatives to 
i the Assembly of the European Community and to prevent any treaty providing for any 
increase in the powers o f  the Assembly from being ratified by the UK, unless approved 
I by Act of Parliament. 
: 16 clauses, 5 schedules (8 clauses, 2 schedules) I - -  . -- -- -- - - - - i Manifesto Commitment October 1974 ~ e n e z ~ l e c t i o n  - Labour Manifesto 
I 
I i None - not an issue in 1974 
I -- - 1 Pre-legislative ; Council o f  European Ministers 
I consultation or inquiry Select Committee 
1 Green Paper 
- 
: White Paper 
- _ _-__--__ _ 
Election Date 10 October 1974 
1 Parliamentary ~ a j o r i v -  C. 277 SNP 7 
I Lab. 3 19 (lost 5 by-elections '75-'77) PC 3 
Lib. 13 Others 12 
I------- -- - -- - -_ - ~ 
_ -. - -  --..---_._____ 
;<2;;;,: -;-: ( - - . r ~ ~ i l T . - l - , .  - 
,. . . i J . l ' . , tL~~\ ! : ,  j -.= 
.i-l-z.i.L = .=_ _.-.. . ? _ .  _ _ _  __ . . . - . _ . i_=.~.jL _ :_ . i_.__L__ L_____r__ia____l__i_ _ 
Lead Minister Home Secretary 
.-___--- 
Supporting Ministers Prime Minister 
' c_.?>_._ 
Foreign Secretary 
-2-= ..=r..=. .-- -_____L ;b_i:_._-i_.-L -----,- - ___->-l.- - - -.---..- 
; ---<.-a 
Hours spent i Vote (if taken) Coinments 
=_-- >%=I. -=* =-.--r- - -~.-..__-- 
First Reading 
. -=-- 
I _ .----_____ no debate 
- -- - _-- . - -. 
Second Reading : 7 i 381-98 
- 
; same Bill presented four months before 
i 38 i CWH 1 Committee Stage 
i 
1 i 3 on j guillotine ; guillotine introduced after 23 hours 
r guillotine i accepted 
i 314-137 I - 
-- 1 Report Stage 1 4  ; followed immediately - no amendments 
Third Reading 4 i 159-45 
Consideration o f  none 
Lords Amendments : 
K ~ u s e  of Bcurds 
* . ~ - - - r l v ~ - ~ ~ ~ ~  .: .__- - --  -_-- I - _-------- _ -------- 
Introduced by i Minister of State, Home Office 
-~-------=--~.-~-d-- .-_Y___=_- ._Y----d-d.-d - ._ --.-.-.------ 
---.- 
-- --&s-.*,7- 
Hours spent i Vote (if taken) Comments 
L------=--x.-- = * - - - - - Z - ~ - - - = . -  -. .------?- ! ~ i K i d i n ~  I no debate I 
i Second Reading : 3 
-- 
! Committee Stage 1 4  
I Report Stage i Bill reported immediately no amendments 
Third -- Reading i 10 mins 
Consideration o f  
Commons Amendments j 
-- 
-- 
Total Parliamentary i House of Comnlons: 56 
Time (hours) 1 House o f  Lords: 7 
Total: 63 1 
-- 
Referendum : no 
-. - - - -  - - . - - -- -. __i - 1  
- -- - -- -. -- 
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Purpose : To abolish the GLC and metropolitan county councils; to transfer their functions to the ! local authorities in their areas and, in some cases, to  other bodies and to provide for 
; other matters consequential on ,or  connected with the abolition of these councils. 
i 98 clauses, 17 schedules / z n i f e s t o  Commitment - June 1983 General Election - Conservative Manifesto 
: "The Metropolitan Councils and the Greater London Council have been shown to be a 
t wasteful and unnecessary tier of government. We shall abolish them and return most of 
i their functions to the boroughs and districts. Services which need to be administered 
i over a wider area -such as police and fire, and education in inner London - will be run 
i bv ioint boards of borouah or district re~resentatives." 
., 
--- 
. , ,  
Pre-le islative i no - failure to do so source of considerable criticism and debate 
consu8ation or inquiry i 
Election Date i 9 June 1983 
Parliamentary Majority C. 397 SDP 6, PC 2 
: Lab. 209 SNP 2 Others 1 7 
1 : Lib. 17 I 
r --- House of C Q ~ ~ ! ' T I Q ~ S  1 
Lead Minister i Secretary of State for the Environment 
Supporting Ministers ; Prime Minister, Chancellor, Home Secretary, Secretary of State for Education and Science, 
i Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Transport, Minister for Local Government 
1 Hours spent j Vote ( i f  taken) i Comments I 
/ First Reading no debate 
Second Readlng 15 354-219 
money vote on splitting 
resolut~on 1 bill between 
further hour Standing 
Committee dnd 
CWH 351-196 
Committee Stage 6 unamended CWH clause 1 only 
277-156 
176 Standlng Conlmittee 
3 hours debate 276-1 95 Gulllotine moved after 100 hours ~n 
on gulllotine siandlng comtnlttee 
Report Stage I - 13 , Third Readlng 1 325-170 
Consideration o f  6 
Lords Amendments 
-- 
House o f  Lords / -pl____ 
Introduced by Mlnlster of State, Department of the Env~ronment 
I --- -------- --- 
Hours spent Vote ( i f  taken) Comments 
----,-p-P------- - ---- -- --> ---_ _- - 
F~rst  Reading no debate 
Second Readlng 6 
Committee Stage 
-- 
66 
-- - - 
Report Stage 
--- 
35 
- - - - -- - - - - -- -- 
- 
Third Reading 6 
- - -  -- - - 
Considerat~on of 4 
Commons Amendments 
- -- - -  -- - - -  - -- 
- - - - - - - - - - -  - 
Total Parliamentary I House of Commons. 42 on floor of House (plus 176 hours In stand~ng committee) 1 Time (hours) House of Lords 1 17 I 
Total 335 
Referendum n o 
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Purpose I An Act to amend the European Communities Act 1972 so as to include in the definition of 
: 'the Treaties' and 'the Community Treaties' certain provisions of the Single European Act 
i signed at Luxembourg and the Hague on 17 and 28 February 1986 and extend certain 
i provisions relating to the European Court and any Court attached thereto; and to amend 
I references to the Assembly of the European Communities and approve the Single European Act. 
: 4 clauses, 1 schedule 
Manifesto Commitment : 1983 General Election - Conservative Manifesto 
i "We shall continue both to oppose petty acts of Brussels bureaucracy and to seek the 
removal of unnecessary restrictions on the free movement of goods and services between 
; member states, with proper safeguards to guarantee fair competition. The Labour Party 
wants Britain to withdraw from the Community, because it fears that Britain cannot 
i compete inside and that it would be easier to build a Socialist sie e economy i f  we z i withdrew. The Liberals and SDP appear to want Britain to stay In u t  never to upset our 
i partners by speaking up forcefully. The Conservatives reject both extreme views." 
Pre-legislative i Agreed by Prime Minister and Council of Ministers. 
consultation or inquiry ' Select Committee 
Election Date i 9 June 1983 1 Parliamentary Majority ; C. 397 SNP 2 
; Lab. 209 PC 2 
I 1 SDP 6 Others 17 I 
House o f  Commons 
Lead Minister 
Supporting Ministers i PM, Foreign Secretan/ 
Hours spent i Vote ( i f  taken) i Comments 
First Reading I no debate 
Second Reading i 6 i 319-160 
Committee Stage i 24 i 149-43 i CWH 
i guillotine ; guillotine i guillotine introduced after 3 days in 
i debated i accepted ! committee (amended during debate) 
i 270-153 3 hours 
Report Stage j unamended - 
Third Reading i 149-43 
Consideration o f  : no 1 - -  - - -  ~ 
Lords Amendments amendments 
House of  Lords 
Introduced by i Minister of State FCO 
Hours spent ! Vote ( i f  taken) Comments 
First Reading i no debate f 
Second Reading i 4 
Committee Stage ; 13 
Report Stage i reported without amendment 
Third Reading 1 2  
Consideration of 
Commons Amendments ! 
r e n t a r y  House o f  Commons: 33 
Time (hours) House of Lords: 19 
Total: 52 
Referendum no 
-- I 
- - 
CEL!VEKING CONSllTUTlOEJAL REFORM 
I Purpose : An Act to make provision consequential on the Treaty on European Union signed at i Maastricht on 7 February 1992. I 
i 3 clauses, no schedules (8 clauses, no schedules) 
Manifesto Commitment j April 1992 General Election - Conservative Manisfesto 
i None - Treaty signed in November 1991. 
Pre-legislative i Negotiating position debated in Parliament 
consultation or inquiry 
Election Date i 9 April 1992 
Parliamentarv Maioritv i C. 336 SNP 3 
i Lab. 271 PC 4 
i Lib. Dem. 20 Others 17 
House o f  Commons 
Lead Minister I Foreign Secretary 
-- . 
Supporting Ministers i PM (and other Cabinet ministers) 
Hours spent i Vote ( i f  taken) i Comments 
First Reading i no debate 
Second Reading i 22 336-316 
. .-p--.-pp- i 'paving' motion 31 9-316 
i to proceed with : 
Bill 7 hours 
Committee Stage i 137 i CWH 
- 
R e ~ o r t  Staae i 13 lost v o ~ & ~ o m r n i t t e e  o f  the Reaions 
., ., 
Third Reading i 6 i 292-1 12 
-
Consideration o f  i none 
Lords Amendments i 
I House o f  L O K ~ S  
--- 
Introduced by i Lord Privy Seal 
Hours spent i Vote ( i f  taken) i Comments 1 
First Reading 
Second Reading 
Committee Stage 
Report Stage 
Third Reading 
Time (hours) i House o f  Lords: 90 
Total: 275 
Referendum i no (proposed) 

-- - - 
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Introduction 
1 Since 1945, there have been several attempts at significant reform of parliamentary procedure. 
Throughout this period there has also been a steady trickle of incremental improvements to the 
workings of both Houses of Parliament. In this section, three periods of significant reform - two 
largely successhl, and one not - are examined with a view to identifying their origins and key 
determinants of success or failure.95 
1 945-46 Procedure Committee 
2 The Select Committee on Procedure established in 1945 was effectively presented with a 
blueprint for reform of the parliamentary procedures that required little more than some fleshing 
out of the  details. Writing nearly twenty years later, Herbert Morrison (by that time Lord 
Morrison of Lambeth) explained that: "During the Second World War it had been clear to the 
Coalition Government that there would be an exceptionally heavy programme of legislation in 
the reconstruction period. It was important that the parliamentary machine should not break ' 
down under that burden ... Towards the end of the war a Committee of Ministers of the Coalition 
Government had discussed methods of adapting the machinery of Government to bear the 
particular stresses and strains of  the reconstruction period. In particular a scheme for the 
acceleration of proceedings of Public Bills had been drafted by the Committee, but it had not 
been approved by the War Cabinet"96. 
3 Although there was no duty on the Procedure Committee to follow the proposals drafted by the 
wartime Committee (and the Government stressed that they advocated such measures as "a trial, 
on an  experimental basis, during the first one or two sessions"] the Procedure Committee's first 
report was produced just over one month after being commissioned and was based largely on 
the  proposals in the  Government memorandum. This was undoubtedly facilitated by the 
presence on the Committee of Government MPs who had been involved in the preparation of the 
draft plan and were only too aware of the scale of the new administration's legislative ambitions 
and the incapacity of the existing procedures of the House of Commons to  cope with them. More 
idealistic proposals for "the general improvement of the machinery and forms of proceeding of 
the House so as to provide suitable instruments for the discharge of its functions"97 proposed by 
the then Clerk to  the House, later Lord Campion, were not considered. 
4 The principal change introduced was that  all bills, save those "of first class constitutional 
importance" would be sent  to a standing committee instead of being dealt with by the  
committee of the whole House. In addition, the Government's proposal for formal timetabling of 
legislation was accepted by the Procedure Committee who recommended, after canvassing a 
number of alternatives, that Allocation of Time Orders be administered by a business sub- 
committee of each standing committee, consisting of a Chairman and 7 other members chosen 
by the Speaker, with their provisions to be approved by the parent committee. 
Reasons for success 
-a the pragmatic intent: the impetus to reform was the need to streamline the legislative process, 
through whatever ad hoc measures might be found, in order to get a substantial package of 
main programme legislation through Parliament. The Government had won a resounding 
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majority in the general election, promising a radical package of complex social and economic 
measures which gave them the authority to insist that the tenns of reference for the Procedure 
Committee were "to consider schernes for the acceleration of proceedings on puhlic bills". In 
the short term, this clear objective helped to focus the minds of the reformers (although in the 
longer term, the benefits to the quality of legislation may be questioned). 
e the enormous number of new MPs in the 1945 Parliament - 345 new MPs in total, 200 of 
them on the Labour benches - which both facilitated acceptance of the Government's 
proposals as the new MPs were not able to counter the proposals with the judgment derived 
from experience of the system, and somewhat awed by finding themselves part of the 
institution at all, and for the same reasons ensured that there was no irresistible pressure for 
further more radical (or more backbench-friendly) reform. 
e The proposals therefore had Government support. The speed with which the proposals were 
considered and introduced was partly because of a collective sense of the importance of 
beginning on reconstruction, and therefore setting the ground rules, and an awareness by the 
Government that unless this happened in the early days of a new government, the changes 
might never happen at all. 
1965-70 Reform o f  Procedure 
5 After 1965 there was a significant growth in the number of Procedure Committee reports and 
recommendations, many of which demonstrated an increasing reluctance on the part of 
Procedure Committees to act in support of Government interests, identifying instead a 
responsibility to defend the interests of back-benchers. 
6 Significantly, these years also saw the development of a more broadly based parliamentary reform 
movement, arising from a unique combination of factors: increasing anxiety about economic 
performance, with governmental and administrative reform perceived as key to a reversal of fortune, 
was combined with a pervasive belief in the benefits of institutional reform; there was also a generally 
shared belief that Parliament had declined seriously in relation to the Executive. In addition, 
generational change meant MPs on both sides were keener than before on procedural reform, not least 
because many were teachers and journalists ("ideas people" not "producers"); and the establishment of 
Study of Parliament Group in 1964 and the publication of Bernard Crick's influential "The Reform of 
Parliament" in the same year represented a discreet academic pressure group for change. 
7 However, the Wilson Government did not, on coming into power, have any carefi~lly prepared 
plans for procedural reform in the Commons: "indeed the available evidence suggests that right 
down to 1970 procedural reform proposals depended substantially on improvisation. The 
Government was generally guided by its view at any particular point in time of what kind of 
changes might facilitate the passage of its own business on the floor, in the committee of the 
whole House, and in standing committee. But it recognised too that in the climate of opinion of 
the 1960s it was expedient to give some satisfaction to those who were demanding changes."gE 
8 Richard Crossman was made Leader of the House of Commons in August 1966 and had both a 
personal commitment to, and academic interest in, parliamentary reform. The changes made in 
the following two years included: expediting the passage of the Finance Bill by the relegation of 
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large sections to a standing committee; simplifying the procedures for Supply, and Ways and 
Means; extending the range of standing committees for legislation; making experiments with 
morning sittings and second reading committees; and, as a counterpoint to these Govemment- 
supporting measures, extending select committee activity. 
9 There was no one source of the changes, nor was the Procedure Committee regarded with any 
great deference: some Government reforms had never seen the light of a Procedure Committee 
meeting, whilst some recommendations of the Procedure Committee were simply ignored by the 
government. Consultation with MPs was not much valued. The outcome was a patchwork rather 
than a coherent package, much of which faiIed during the parliament or was replaced soon after. 
Reasons for failure 
e external pressure was valuable in providing a climate conducive to positive reform, but was 
overshadowed by the Government failure to appreciate the often quite distinct pressures and 
interests within the House. For example, a proposal for the creation of specialist committees 
"of scrutiny and advice" was made by the  Procedure Committee in 1964-65 and its 
recommendations were well received. But the Government announced in 1966 that although 
it would experiment with specialist committees, they would have wide terms of reference, 
without the firm orientation towards scrutiny of administration and expenditure which had 
been envisaged by the Procedure Committee. "In determining the areas which they were to 
investigate, the Government used a variety of criteria which resulted in some committees with 
spheres of activity which were peripheral to  the interests of the majority of MPs ... as a result 
some committees appeared to have little connection with the mainstream of national political 
and economic planning."99 
* the failure to produce a package that balances the interests of as many sections of the House 
as possible (Government vs. Opposition; front-benchers vs. back-benchers; as well as party 
political interests). Richard Crossman's reforms sought to reconcile two almost opposite goals 
by seeking "ways in which while leaving the Executive the necessary freedom of action, we 
can develop institutions detailed, continuous and effective in their contro1."100 The tensions 
inherent in trying to reach such a reconciliation erupted on the floor of the House shortly after 
the reforms were in place. MPs questioned the  Government's motives and charged the 
Govemment with trampling on the rights and privileges of the House. In respect of the select 
committees, the situation was worsened by the fact that Crossman claimed to be implementing 
the Procedure Committee recommendations. 
9' the wrong person in the right place at the right time. The circumstances were certainly 
favourable to reform, and some have held that this opportunity was wasted by a Leader of the 
House who was distn~sted and disIiked by some Cabinet colleagues as well as by the Opposition. 
e inaccurate or inadequate financial forward planning. A 1973 Royal Commission research paper 
records that "the operation of the new committees strained the technical resources of the House 
of Commons, making demands on accommodation and Commons' staff which the Leader of 
the House used as a reason for limiting the numbers of 'departmental' committees"~0~. 
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1979 Select Conlmittee Reforms 
10 The system of Departmental Select Committees introduced in 1979 was adopted by the  
Conservative Opposition as a manifesto commitnlent after the Labour Government rejected the 
1978 recommendations of the Procedure Committee they had themselves established. This was 
in part classic political game-playing. But the Conservative Party's support for the Procedure 
Committee reform package was not only a function of knee jerk adversarial politics. 
11 The timing of the report towards the end of the parliament meant supportive noises made from the 
Opposition benches prior to the general election were not easy to ignore on return to office; this 
was allied with the personal commitment of Norman St. John Stevas, who as Shadow Leader of the 
House and then Leader of the House championed the reforms and ensured that a manifesto 
commitment to implementing them was given in 1979. Moreover, the Cabinet were convinced by 
the argument that the committees, work in scrutinising departmental activity would help to stem 
the bureaucracy and inefficiency of Whitehall and would be in line with Margaret Thatcher's 
ideological commitment to "rolling back the state"; and by growing backbench pressure to accept , 
the recommendations, partly the result of the more professional approach of the large number of 
new members (many of whom reflected the Procedure Committee's ideal of the Ml-time career 
politician). The experience of minority Government had also highlighted the scope for effective 
back-bench intervention and many parliamentarians were loath to lose such influence. 
12 More widely, the Labour Party had been riven by serious internal dissent and the last thing they 
wanted was to supply new channels for argument and Opposition. The Conservative Party was by 
contrast relatively deferential and homogeneous; it also projected itself as the party of reform; 
the two parties had different experience of select committees - the Labour Party remembered the 
difficult years in the 1960s and mid to late 1970s of specialist committees; the Conservatives, 
period of Government in 1970-74 had coincided with the relatively ineffectual Expenditure 
Committee. 
Reasons for success 
e an effective and zealous champion of the cause within the Cabinet - and the same person in 
the Shadow Cabinet during preparations for the general election. 
@ a united and confident party of Government and the boost provided by the fact that the 
reforms at least appeared to fit with the ideology of the party of government. 
the prior examination of the issues by the Procedure Committee both gave authority to the 
reforms (although slightly different in number and focus to the Committee's recommendations) 
and flushed out likely areas of Opposition or tension in advance. Agreement on the changes was 
also assisted by the reforming mood in the House of Commons. 
9 the speed of introduction. Norman St. John Stevas knew that if the reforms were not 
introduced in the early days of the new Government, the Cabinet would have time to 
appreciate how difficult their lives would be made by Select Committees. 
- - --- -- 
q DELIVERING CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
References 
Rodney Brazier, Constitutional Reform, 199 1.  
Only Israel is like Britain in having an unwritten constitution. 
Donald P. Kommers and W. J. Thompson, 'Fundamentals in the Liberal Constitutional Tradition', 
in Joachim Jens Hesse and Neil Johnson eds., Constitutional Policy and Change in Europe, 1995. 
Nevi1 Johnson, In Search of the Constitution, 1977. 
Rt Hon Dr Brian Mawhinney MP,  Speech to the Consewative Political Centre, 7 February 1996. 
Liberal Democrats, Here W e  Stand: Proposals for Modemising Britain's Democracy, 1993. 
Tony Wright €t David Marquand, 'Commentary', Political Quarterly, September-December 1995. 
Centre for Economic Policy Research, Monitoring European Integration 6: Flexible Integration, 1995. 
Keith G. Banting and Richard Simeon eds., 'Introduction', Redesigning the State, 1985. 
Rt Hon Paddy Ashdown MP, Building Britain A Bridge to the Next Millenium. Speech to the 
Institute of Civil Engineers, 22 January 1995. 
Rt Hon Tony Blair NIP, The John Smith Memorial Lecture, 7 February 1996. 
Geoffrey Marshall, 'What Are Constitutional Conventions?', Parlia~nenta y Affairs, Winter 198'5. 
See Keith G. Banting and Richard Si~neon eds., Redesigning the State, 1985. 
Rt Hon Dr Brian Mawhinney MP, Speech to the Conservative Political Centre, 7 Febixiary 1996. 
Roy Foster, 'Anglo-Irish relations and Northern Ireland', in Dermot Keogh and Michael H. 
Haltzel eds., Northern lreland and the Politics of Reconciliation, 1993. 
Ferdinand Mount, The British Constitution Now, 1993. 
Rt Hon Tony Blair MP, John Smith Memorial Lecture, 7 February 1996. 
Charter 88, The Citizens' Enquiry into n Great Reform Programme, 1995. 
The Preparation of Legislation. Report of a Committee nppointed by the Lord President, Cmnd 
6053, May 1975. 
The Hansard Society Commission on the Legislative Process, Making the Law, November 1992. 
Lord Irvine of Lairg QC, 'The Legal System and Law Reform under Labour', in David Bean ed., 
Law Reform for All, 1996. 
Rt Hon Paddy Ashdown MP, Building Britain A Bridge to the Next Millenium. Speech to the 
Institute of Civil Engineers, 22  January 1995. 
Peter Hennessy, The Hidden Wiring, 1995. 
See Appendix A. 
The Preparation of Legislation. Report qf a Cotnmittee appointed by the Lord President, Cmnd 
6053, May 1975. 
The Life Peerages Act 1958 was introduced in the House of Lords, but was not particularly 
controversial. 
Standing Order No. 6 1 .  
Standing Order No. 61 (2). A motion for any one of these alternatives may be moved by any 
Member immediately after the second reading and is decided upon immediately without debate 
or amendment. 
Standing Order No. 61 (3). If such a motion is opposed, the Speaker may allow a brief 
explanatory statement from the Member making the motion and a Member opposing the motion, 
before putting the question. The Finance Bill is regularly treated in this way, but it is unusual for 
other bills to split. 
R E F E R E N C E S  1 - 
See First Report from the Select Committee on Procedure, Session 1945-46, HC 9. The 
Procedure Committee examined ways in which the House of Commons could deal with its 
expanding work load. The Committee recommended that bills should, as a rule, be referred to a 
standing committee. One of the exceptions to this rule was 'first class constitutional issues'. 
Standing Order No 69. 
For more detailed discussion of the passage of the Maastricht Bill see: D.Baker, A. Gamble ft S. 
Ludlam 'The Parliamentary Seige of Maastricht 1993: Conservative Divisions and British 
Ratification', Parliamenta y Affairs Vol. 47 No 1, 1994 and Richard Rawlings 'Legal Politics: 
The United Kingdom and Ratification of the Treaty on European Union Part One and Two', 
Public Law, 1994. This section draws heavily on both these accounts. 
Technically the Social Agreement, but generally known as the Social Chapter. 
This was unlikely to be the case - the problem would have been with the Protocol, rather than 
the Treaty itself. 
See Appendix A. 
Labour Party, Meet the challenge, Make the change: A new agenda for Britain. Final Report of 
Labour's Policy Review for the 1990s, 1989. 
Guillotines were also successfully used during the passage of the House of Commons 
(Redistribution of Seats) (No 2) Bill 1968; the European Parliament Elections Act 1978; the 
Northern Ireland Act 1982; and the European Communities (Amendment) Act 1986. 
Janet Morgan, The House of Lords and the Labour Government 1964-70, 1975. 
J.A.G. Griffith and Michael Ryle, Parliament: Functions, Practice and Procedure, 1989. 
J.A.G. Griffith and Michael Ryle, Parliament: Functions, Practice and Procedure, 1989. 
First Report from the Select Committee on Procedure, Session 1945-46, HC 9. 
Standing Order 98. 
Bruce George and Barbra Bush, 'Parliamentary Reform: The Internal View', in David Judge ed., 
The Politics of Parliamentary Reform, 1983. 
Standing Order 45A. 
The Hansard Society Commission on the Legislative Process, Making the Law, November 1992. 
Public Bill Procedure. Second Report of the Select Committee on Procedure, Session 1984-85, 
HC 49;  Allocation of Time to Government Bills in Standing Committee. Second Report of the 
Select Committee on Procedure, Session 1985-86, HC 324; and the Hansard Society Commission 
on the Legislative Process, Making the Law, November 1992. 
Rt Hon Tony Blair MP, John Smith Memorial Lecture, 7 February 1996. 
S A Walkland ed. 'Introduction', The House of Commons in the Twentieth Century: Essays by 
Members of the Study of Parliament Group, 1979. 
Fourth Report from the Select Committee on Procedure, Session 1986-87, HC 373. 
Lord Carrington, ReJect on Things Past: the Memoirs of Lord Carrington, 1988. 
Brigid Hadfield, 'Whither or Whether the House of Lords?', Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly, 
Winter 1984. 
Donald Shell, 'The House of Lords in Context', in Donald Shell and David Beamish eds., The 
House of Lords at Work, 1993. 
Providing one year has elapsed between the date of its first second reading in the Commons and 
the date on which it is given its second third reading. 
See for example the Hansard Society Commission on the Legislative Process, Making the Law, 
November 1992. 
Keith G. Banting and Richard Simeon eds., 'Introduction', Redesigning the State, 1985. 
